Difficult Days for Begin

After the hours of arguing in the Cabinet Room at the White House last week, Israeli Premier Menachem Begin slowly started massaging the pectoral muscles on the left side of his chest. It was a nervous habit that betrayed the anxiety of a former heart-attack victim enduring new stress. In the wake of Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon, Begin had gone to Washington to defend his belligerent policies, and he had found little support in the White House. At one point, in what Begin later called "difficult days," President Carter tried to summarize the state of disagreement in concrete terms. Begin protested gently that the President was "putting everything negatively." Carter pursed his lips in obvious annoyance.

Nobody raised his voice or displayed any sign of anger. But after six hours of intense talks between the two leaders, Begin had not budged an inch. After a final, hurried handshake, Carter failed even to walk his guest to a waiting limousine. He turned back toward the White House, his shoulders drooping in despair, and shortly afterward declared to a group of Congressmen: "The negotiations are at an end as far as the present time is concerned. I need your help and advice."

Not even the most optimistic U.S. officials had expected any dramatic breakthrough in last week's Begin-Carter meeting, their third in eight months. Begin's hard-line pronouncements were only too familiar in Washington. He had refused to concede, as his predecessors had done, that Israel's acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242 meant that it was committed to an eventual withdrawal from the West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as from the Sinai and Golan Heights. He had declined to accept Carter's formulation, proposed in January on a trip to Aswan, that the Palestinians have the right "to participate in determination of their own future." He had adamantly opposed Carter's plan to sell advanced F-15 fighter-aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Washington officials were quite aware too that the Palestinian terrorist raid into Israel and the powerful Israeli retaliation in southern Lebanon had made Begin even less tractable. Nevertheless, the U.S. had hoped to keep Begin's mind focused on the need for overall peace negotiations and to persuade him that Israel had not yet responded adequately to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative. The result: nil.

The deep differences were evident from the moment Begin arrived. Fearful that the visitor might make some inflammatory remark on deplaning without Carter present for a rebuttal, the State Department had asked him to forgo any statement upon landing. He did so, striding silently past waiting microphones and reporters.

In a quiet welcoming ceremony on the south lawn of the White House, Carter praised Begin as "a man of destiny." He gave no hint of whether he judged that destiny favorably. Begin's aides were quick to note that this vague accolade contrasted with the President's greeting of Sadat only a month before at a similar White House ceremony as "the world's foremost peacemaker."

As the wary welcome continued, Vice President Walter Mondale and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance listened impassively. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski clutched a notebook tightly. Carter sympathetically cited "the recent cowardly and unjustified attack by terrorists on innocent civilians in Israel," but he quickly added a corrective hint that Israel might have overreacted, since the raid, he said, "has resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and tens of thousands of people who are now homeless."

Begin rejected any such notion. He spoke of the Palestinian raid as "that unspeakable atrocity." It was, he said, "another reminder of what character is the implacable enemy" facing Israel.

Carter wasted no time in reminding Begin that the U.S. had cooperated with past Israeli governments in pursuing peace "under the broad scope of United Nations Resolution 242." He noted that "peace can come from a guarantee of security, and our staunch friendship for Israel will continue to be a major element in this foundation for progress." Translation: Israel should give up occupied territory in exchange for a U.S. pledge to support any security arrangements. Begin only looked bleakly ahead.

The two leaders and their top aides met first for two hours in the Cabinet Room in the West Wing of the White House. The Israelis reluctantly agreed to talk about peace principles first and Lebanon, only fleetingly, later. Carter pleaded with the Premier to agree to withdraw troops from most of the West Bank in exchange for two conditions: that neighboring Arab states would establish full diplomatic, economic and other relations with Israel, and that the U.S. would consider guaranteeing Israel's security.

But in the face of all this, Begin remained unmoved. Carter at times seemed incredulous at Begin's arguments. He implored Begin to be reasonable. Begin repeatedly talked as though the U.S. were proposing an independent Palestinian state. "Why do you keep saying that?" Carter asked. "Nobody is asking you to agree to a Palestinian state. Nobody wants that." Begin kept reciting his own technical explanation of why Resolution 242 did not apply to the West Bank. "I'm not worried about the words and how you interpret them," said Carter. "What disturbs me is my impression that what you're really saying--I shouldn't put it so bluntly, but I will--my impression is that what you're really saying is that you have no intention of withdrawing from the West Bank at all." No one on the Israeli side responded. The silence seemed to confirm Carter's apprehension.

As the talks continued, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who accompanied Begin on the trip, engaged in more direct debate. "Unlike Begin, he seemed to be really listening when others had the floor," reported one participant. "And when he had the floor, he did a lot more improvising than Begin." That did not mean, however, that the Premier and his Foreign Minister displayed any direct disagreements on Israeli policy.

Running behind schedule, Begin rushed off to the first of two meetings with influential members of Congress. He talked to both the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pleading his case in much the same words he had used at the White House. The legislators were generally unsympathetic. Even New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits, a staunch ally of Israel, came away admitting that "the friends of Israel here in the Senate are worried about Begin holding up negotiations with Egypt."

In a Carter innovation in summitry, the talks resumed for three hours through a candlelight dinner in the family dining room of the White House, with only Begin, Carter and their wives, Aliza and Rosalynn, present. Precisely what was said by any of the four has not been revealed, but it apparently was by no means limited to social chitchat.

Carter later told Senate leaders that he had talked alone with Begin in the presidential hideaway study after their dinner. He had assured Begin that the U.S. would not accept the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and that the U.S. did not expect --and would not demand--total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory.

But instead of showing any softening in his attitude, Carter reported, Begin insisted that 1) he would not stop the creation or expansion of more settlements; 2) he would not turn all Sinai settlements over to Egypt; 3) he would not accept Egyptian or even U.N. "protection" for Sinai settlements; 4) he would not agree that Resolution 242 applies to all fronts; 5) he would not approve the Carter plan, under which the West Bank would be internationalized for five years and Palestinians could then decide whether to join Israel or Jordan or remain in internationalized status. Begin insisted that Israel must be responsible for "security and order" along the West Bank, although he would allow Palestinians to decide whether they wished to become citizens of either Jordan or Israel.

Next day, in a final 75-minute meeting back in the Cabinet Room, Carter tried summarizing the talks, and it was then that Begin called the President's attitude too negative. Begin said that he preferred to look at "the positive side." But if there was a bright side to the meetings, the two parties apparently could not agree on what it might be. Representatives of both governments spent a full day trying to write a summary of what had transpired for the usual final communique, but finally gave up. Explained Presidential Press Secretary Jody Powell: "That would further complicate the situation."

At the farewell ceremonies on the south lawn, both Begin and Carter looked grim, fatigued and discouraged. The polite code words conveyed the lack of progress. Carter described the talks as "detailed and frank"--which is the diplomat's way of saying they were contentious. He avoided even the pro forma declaration that they had been "productive." He offered an ostensibly friendly observation: "The Israel of 1978 is strong and more secure militarily than at any time in its history. We in America take satisfaction in the knowledge that we have contributed in some small measure to the realization of that dream of strength." That message was meant to convey three barbed points: 1) Israel is strong enough not to fear withdrawal from occupied territory; 2) since the U.S. has helped arm Israel, it ought to have some influence over how Israel uses those weapons; and 3) Israel is strong enough not to worry about U.S. sales of warplanes to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Begin was not subtle in objecting publicly to those sales of aircraft. Said he: "Behind those people who carry out abominable acts [the Palestine Liberation Organization], there is an alignment of many Arab states, armed to the teeth by the Soviet Union and sometimes getting modern weapons also from the West."

As Begin left the White House, Carter almost immediately held a meeting with a delegation of key Congressmen, at which he pushed his case for the package sale of airplanes to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. Congress can block the plane sales if both chambers agree to do so, but the White House claims confidence that this will not happen. No vote is expected until the Panama Canal issue is resolved next month.

Begin took time out to celebrate Purim, the Jewish holiday that recalls Queen Esther's success in preventing a massacre of Jews' in Persia. Yarmulke on his head, he sat next to a rabbi at the Israeli ambassador's residence and chanted the Hebrew text from an antique scroll.

Then, after an address at the heavily guarded National Press Club, Begin flew on to New York City to plead for support from American Jewish leaders, terming them Israel's "second line of defense." Looking weary and depressed, he appeared before some 1,000 representatives of Jewish organizations from 30 states at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Many were near tears as Begin argued that Israel, not Egypt, had presented a detailed peace plan and that Egypt, not Israel, had broken off the negotiations. "The words adamance and intransigence do not have anything in common with us," he contended.

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, abandoned a tradition of nonpartisanship in Israel's internal affairs by throwing the support of his group's 32 diverse Jewish organizations behind Begin. "Israel has a leader who deserves this support," said Schindler. "He is a worthy leader not only of Israel, but of the entire Jewish people." Meaning: any attempt by Washington to try to pry Begin from power in Israel would be resisted by much of the Jewish community in the U.S. After winning that resounding backing, Begin flew home to Jerusalem.

The disagreements between Jerusalem and Washington are now so apparent that the future of Middle East negotiations is highly uncertain. All talks between Israel and Egypt have been stalled for two months--largely over the same issues that separate Carter and Begin. The main U.S. effort will now be, as one Carter aide described it, "to keep Sadat predisposed to continuing the negotiations." A State Department aide expressed the aim less hopefully: "We're trying to keep a piece of machinery oiled and in running order even when it's out of gas and the operators aren't willing to drive it anywhere."

More practically, U.S. officials are now eying Begin's political situation back home in Israel (see WORLD). Perhaps a bit wishfully, they wonder whether the Begin-Carter impasse may not build new pressures against Begin from Israeli public opinion, the Knesset, the Cabinet and his Likud coalition colleagues. Certainly the pressures that were exerted on Begin in Washington seem to have had no effect at all.

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