The Problems Sadat Left Behind

When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Washington last week, he left behind him a peace process that had ground very nearly to a halt. As one Egyptian official put it, "The two sides have gone as far as they can in bilateral negotiations. The time has come for the U.S. to step in and break the logjam."

Sadat left for the U.S. at a time of rising tension between the U.S. and Israel over the establishment of new Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River. There are only about 4,500 Israelis in the West Bank (compared with 700,000 Arabs). Nonetheless, the U.S. has always opposed the settlements, partly because they violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits a country from moving its own people into occupied territories, and partly because the pioneer communities are a provocation to the Arabs. On the other hand, Israeli Premier Menachem Begin has always insisted upon the right of Jews to live in Judea and Samaria (the biblical lands that encompassed the West Bank) and their historical obligation to settle it. On separate visits to Washington last year, Begin and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan assured U.S. officials that there would be no new civilian settlements in the West Bank and that any new pioneers in the area would live within the confines of existing army camps.

Since last October, nine new settlements have been established that are ostensibly within army camps. Last month a tenth settlement was started at Shiloh (see box). Begin told President Carter that the Shiloh settlement was authorized strictly as an archaeological exploration site, though the settlers themselves admitted frankly that they were in Shiloh to stay. The U.S. had hoped to avoid an open quarrel with Jerusalem on the eve of Sadat's visit, but Carter did send a stiff letter about Shiloh to Begin, who was said to be shocked and angered by its language. Privately, Administration officials are furious, feeling they have not been fairly treated by the Premier and his colleagues. They understood Dayan to have told them last September that there would be no new civilian settlements in the West Bank "for a year." Or did he mean for the remainder of 1977? It is unclear whether the other nine settlements started since October will eventually be turned over to civil authority, but there is little doubt that Shiloh is intended to become a permanent settlement.

Dayan insisted last week that he had made no such promise about the settlements, but a U.S. official snapped: "Our notes [from the September meeting] differ." Another Administration official was more blunt. "They're lying," he said. "There's no other way to call it." Sadat was expected to ask Carter to put pressure on Israel to dismantle the settlements. As one U.S. official in Jerusalem put it, "We don't like it, but what can we do? We can't stop a sovereign government from doing what it wants." Nonetheless, American diplomats are troubled by a feeling that Jerusalem still does not fully understand the implications of the settlement ventures or the extent to which they may impede negotiations.

Helped along by the amiable rapport that Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman has developed with his Egyptian counterpart, Mohammed Abdel Ghany Gamassy, the two sides made some limited progress last week at the second round of the military talks in Cairo. At the outset, nobody was particularly optimistic, but in three days of talks the delegates narrowed the gap toward a Sinai settlement. The Egyptians reportedly suggested that the Israelis could keep their settlements in the Rafah salient of the northern Sinai for a limited time (the exact period to be decided later), as part of a U.N. buffer zone, and retain their settlements along the Gulf of Aqaba--but only under Egyptian rule, as Cairo's "welcome guests." More important, the Egyptians seemed ready to allow Israel to keep its big military airbase at Etzion and continue using the military airbase at Eitam as a civilian airfield. Weizman took the proposals home with him for Begin's Cabinet to study, and hopes to renew the talks within two or three weeks.

Of the four major airfields the Israelis currently have in the Sinai (see map), Eitam and Etzion are regarded as vital to their national defense. From Etzion, which is located in an area with few flat spaces, Israeli jets can patrol not only the Strait of Tiran but also (with mid-air refueling) Bab el Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea. Squadrons at Eitam can guard the southern coast of the Mediterranean and the Sinai as far as the Suez Canal.

To reduce their nation's vulnerability in the event of a surprise attack, Israel's military leaders are convinced that they need more airfields than the four they have today within the country's pre-1967 borders. They also need additional bases simply to accommodate their air force, which is three times as large as it was in 1967. Some U.S. observers have suggested that Israel should be giving more thought to building additional fields within its own borders, but either way, the costs are enormous. To rebuild Etzion 25 to 40 miles to the northeast would cost at least $1 billion--a tab the Israelis would expect the U.S. to pick up as part of the peace package.

While Sadat and Carter conferred in Washington, Algerian President Houari Boumedienne was host at another kind of summit taking place in Algiers. There the Arab leaders of the so-called steadfast states, who oppose Sadat's peace initiative, were trying to develop a new strategy of their own. As at a previous meeting in Tripoli, the results were minimal.

First the Iraqis decided to boycott the meeting, partly because they felt the other participants would be too moderate and partly because they were miffed that the meeting did not take place in Baghdad. Then it appeared that Libyan Strongman Muammar Gaddafi was also staying home; he finally showed up a day late, as did George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

There was some predictable anti-U.S. rhetoric, including a complaint by Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika about an "American-Zionist" plot to keep the Soviet Union out of the peace process. But when it came time to define what measures should be taken against Sadat, none was forthcoming. Concluded TIME Correspondent Dean Brelis: "Sadat so far has outsmarted the Arabs who oppose him because he continues to insist on a comprehensive settlement. They are clearly afraid that, despite the countless obstacles, Sadat will somehow pull off a settlement." Having gambled that he will fail, the anti-Sadat Arabs have not yet decided what they will do if, by chance, he should succeed.

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