Turner: "I Will Be Criticized"

In an exclusive 90-minute interview, Stansfield Turner discussed the changing nature of spying with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott.

Excerpts:

On the mission of U.S. intelligence. American intelligence today is moving away from the two focuses of intelligence for its first 20 or 25 years [after World War II]. The first focus was on covert action, and the second was a preoccupation with the Soviet Union, particularly the military aspects of the Soviet Union. Let me not leave any doubt. The Soviet military is the No. 1 intelligence issue and must remain so. But without neglecting the cardinal line of defense, we've got to be able to tackle a much wider range of subjects. Today we've got to look at most of the 150-odd countries of the world. We have legitimate needs for good intelligence information on many of them. That transcends military matters. It gets into the economic as well as the political area. So the character of the whole organization has got to shift to accommodate these new factors.

On congressional oversight. There are clear risks in the process of oversight. The first is that we will end up with intelligence by timidity--we won't take any risks because somebody might criticize us. The second is exposure. If you have too many people viewing a sensitive operation, it may become publicly known and cost somebody's life or abort the operation ... I'd like to see us notify fewer committees of Congress; now we technically report to eight of them.

On the changing demand for covert action. I don't think the country wants us to interfere as much in other people's affairs by covert means today as in the past. I don't think it's as effective today as in the past--and it wasn't all that effective then. The batting average is not big league.

But I'm dedicated to preserving for this country the capability to turn to political action when it suits the purpose and when it is properly authorized. We have not by any means abandoned covert action. While it has been much scaled down from the height of the '50s and '60s, it does continue.

On how a covert action is undertaken. I'm not the guy who should push covert action. I'm not a policymaker, but if someone who is a policymaker asks, "Turner, what can you do for us in the way of covert action here?" I like to reach in my pocket and have a plan there, ready. A couple of times it [a plan] has been accepted. But on the whole I have not found it a very attractive option.

On clandestine financing of foreign political forces. Let's say Country X is having an election tomorrow, and we like Party A but don't like Party B. If we go into that Country and start feeding money to people in Party A, even assuming we're totally free of leaks in the U.S., there's still a high probability that there'll be a leak in Country X.

You could say that we got away with it in the past, but today you probably wouldn't get the politicians in Party A in Country X to accept the money, for fear it would become public knowledge and they'd lose more than they'd gain.

So I'm saying that some of the tools that have been used in the past have different effectiveness in a different world climate. Evidence of external tampering, particularly from one of the major powers, has tremendous internal ramifications that it didn't have 25 years ago.

On the proposal that a separate agency be set up to conduct covert operations. That would be costly and perhaps dangerous. You would end up constructing' an organization, with people overseas, just for covert action, whereas today we get dual service out of people [those in covert operations engage in intelligence gathering as well]. If there were a separate bureaucracy with good people in it, they would end up promoting covert action --not maliciously, but because they would be energetic. We should be ready to do what we're asked to do, but not be out drumming up business.

On assassination. I am categorically prohibited from doing it. If we were in some extremis situation where it was justified to take human life for a good cause, like a hijacking, why, at least we could get the President to make an exception. Now, if it [the presidential prohibition] becomes law, we are going to have to be very precise on how that law is worded so we don't get into an absolutely absurd situation. But nobody wants to do assassinations.

On paramilitary operations. We are retaining a paramilitary capability on stand-by as part of our covert action kit.

On antiterrorism and antinarcotics operations. We have put more emphasis on both in this past year by allocating some increase of resources and by re-emphasizing to our chiefs of station that those objectives are high on our list. We have had some important successes. We have been able to abort intended terrorist operations from time to time by alerting people to them.

On the CIA's policy of making some of its studies public. I'm just so proud of what we have contributed in the past nine months to the public debate on major issues. Look at this morning's newspaper: there's a long story on Soviet oil-extraction problems. We triggered that last April by releasing a study on Soviet oil. We've put out several studies on the Soviet economy and its prospects, a study on the world energy situation, a study on terrorism. All these have given the taxpayer a greater return on his investment in intelligence. I intend to keep on with this program. I will be criticized sometimes for supporting the Administration's policy and sometimes for not supporting it. I'm doing neither. I'm giving the information we have.

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