Menachem Begin's Big Blitz

Round 2 opens with a campaign for U.S. support

An Israeli official, trying to sum up Middle East events, turned to metaphor: "It was a storm that blew away the old leaves and limbs and left Sadat and Begin at the top of a very high tree, precariously balanced and swaying in the wind. Now they will have to grasp each other's hands to keep from falling. "

Whatever else Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative may have accomplished, it has blown not just a fresh breeze but a whirlwind through the diplomacy of the Middle East. It was scarcely a month ago that Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem. Last Wednesday, exactly 26 days later, Egyptian and Israeli delegates were sitting down together in a Cairo conference room, in the very shadow of the pyramids, to lay the groundwork for full-scale peace talks. At the very moment that the session was being called to order, Israeli Premier Menachem Begin was headed for Washington to meet with President Carter, a sudden summit conference arranged in a matter of hours at Begin's request. After two meetings with Carter--one early Friday, one late Saturday--Begin said that he would confer with Sadat in Egypt within the next several days, probably over the Christmas weekend. The determination to keep the peace initiative moving was invigorating and bold. But it also revealed the degree to which Begin and Sadat recognized that they were precariously balanced indeed.

Begin's dilemma had been how to devise a suitable response to Sadat's stunning peace overture. As days went by, the pressure on Israel to react grew and grew. What was needed from the Israelis was concessions that would be sufficiently important to allow the negotiating process to continue--if possible, with the support of Syria and the other Arab states that chose to boycott the Cairo conference. Begin recognized the challenge and, according to aides, relished the idea of going down in history as a peacemaker. Since their Jerusalem meeting, he and Sadat had continued to communicate in secret. But Begin also knew that the hours were running short. Said his Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan: "We don't have much time to play with. The first phase [of the Cairo talks] will be over by Christmas. Then we must make the next move, either to meetings at the Foreign Minister or Prime Minister level or to Geneva in February to sign a peace treaty."

Begin decided to act early last week, when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance arrived in Jerusalem on an eight-day Middle East trip. He told Vance that he wanted to go to Washington to discuss a new set of Middle East peace proposals with Carter. The surprised Vance swiftly forwarded the request. Within three hours the White House replied: Come ahead.

Why did Begin rush to Washington? He could have passed his ideas to Vance in Jerusalem, but declined to. "I felt President Carter should be informed in detail," Begin said as he arrived in New York City, his mood chipper. A more cynical view, one held by some foreign observers and even some Israeli opposition figures, was that Begin's proposals were so insubstantial that Carter's help was needed to sell them to Sadat. If Carter failed, it was reasoned, the U.S. would "share the blame" in world eyes. In short, Begin had to have U.S. support for his plan. "The President deliberately became a partner to any Middle East situation," said an Israeli official last week. "He asked for the trouble, and now he will have to face it." Carter, of course, was equally determined not to be caught in the middle.

The Premier's proposals had been agreed upon only 24 hours before he left Jerusalem by Israel's Ministerial Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs. At the White House, Carter and an audience of Administration and Israeli officials listened with rapt attention as Begin unfolded his plan, referring frequently to a panoply of maps and charts. In broad outline, this was his proposal:

The Sinai. Most of the peninsula would be returned to Egyptian control, but Israel would retain some of its fortifications. The Rafah salient, in the north, would revert to Egyptian control, but Israeli civilian settlements would remain. The settlements along the Gulf of Aqaba might become part of a joint desert development project. The right of navigation in the waterways would be guaranteed.

The West Bank. In a variation on what has been known in Israel as an "enhanced status quo" plan, the West Bank region would be under the sovereignty of neither Israel nor Jordan, though the 700,000 West Bank citizens would have the right to choose between Israeli and Jordanian citizenship. They would have local civil autonomy under their own elected representatives. Israel would retain its right of military access and some fortifications and perhaps its 51 settlements. No mention was made as to whether any of the 2.3 million people in the Palestinian diaspora would have the right to return.

Jerusalem. Israel would keep control, but would establish a special authority as "Guardian of the Holy Shrines" in the Old City.

To sweeten the offer for Sadat, the Israelis have been urging the U.S. to give a large amount of additional aid to Egypt (which is currently receiving $900 million a year from the U.S.). They also suggest that the U.S., under a reduction-of-forces agreement, should modernize Egypt's military equipment. "Generals must have something to play with," says one Israeli, himself a former general. If Egypt now has 3,000 tanks, the number under such a plan might be reduced to 1,000, but these would be the latest and best the U.S. could offer. Though the Israelis do not suggest a reduction in the size of their own armed forces by the 75% they would urge upon the Egyptians, they realize the need for drastic disarmament. "We don't have enough air space for our planes," says an Israeli military official, "and have barely enough room to park them."

The Israelis insist that their ultimate aim is a comprehensive settlement with all their Arab neighbors. But they argue that this can be achieved only in stages, starting with an Israeli-Egyptian accord and moving on to agreements with Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the moderate Palestinians. For that reason, Begin offered no new proposals about the Golan Heights, since the Syrians refuse to negotiate at this time anyway. If the problems of Sinai and the West Bank can be settled, the Israelis say, Syria will feel obliged to join the talks.

Washington's initial official reaction to the Begin plan was polite and restrained. Carter dutifully telephoned Sadat to keep him advised, but in the White House there was some concern. "The plan goes further than I had expected," said one U.S. official, "but it is not good enough. Sadat won't accept it." Later, at their second meeting, the President told Begin that the plan was a step forward, but that obviously further steps were necessary.

"In truth," reports TIME Jerusalem Bureau Chief Donald Neff, "the thrust of the proposals is that Israel, despite public statements to the contrary, is going full speed ahead for a bilateral agreement with Egypt, which for the moment remains the only Arab country willing to negotiate. Its paramount national goal is to neutralize Egypt, thereby practically eliminating the threat of war. The Israelis obviously hope that a huge amount of new U.S. aid to Egypt will tempt Sadat to forgo his pledge not to sign a bilateral peace agreement with Israel."

In a conversation last week with TIME Chief of Correspondents Murray Gart and Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn, Sadat insisted that he had no intention of signing a separate agreement, citing "Egypt's obligations to the rest of the Arab world." But the other Arab "confrontation" states remained fearful that once Egypt made peace with Israel, Sadat would feel little obligation to bargain with Israel over the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, and the other states would not have the power to do so. let alone to wage war against Israel on their own. This argument is correct as far as it goes, but the Arabs' present unwillingness to negotiate with Israel is badly weakening their position. In fact, it appeared likely last week that the Egyptians and the U.S. were now prepared to bypass the Palestine Liberation Organization in future negotiations. Said President Carter at a press conference: "The P.L.O. has been completely negative. I think they have removed themselves from any immediate prospect of participation in a peace discussion."

For the most part, Arab diplomacy remained paralyzed by outrage and indecision, as Cyrus Vance discovered during his quick stopovers in six Middle East capitals. He had believed that Jordan's King Hussein would be amenable to joining the Cairo talks at a later stage. Instead, Vance found, the King was determined to remain an uncommitted moderating force, but would probably be prepared to join a Geneva Conference later. Lebanese President Elias Sarkis was swamped with his country's own post-civil war problems. In 4 1/2 hrs. of talks in Damascus, Syria's Hafez Assad reiterated his view that Sadat's initiative would fail, that the Arabs were obliged to reject it on almost theological grounds, and that the "great wound" inflicted by Sadat's Jerusalem adventure would take time to heal.

In Riyadh, Vance's reception was hardly more encouraging. When he delivered a personal message from Carter to King Khalid, the Saudi monarch's first question was: "Is it in Arabic?" A government statement said later that the Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, felt "his talks with Secretary Vance reinforced his own natural optimism, which he does not wish to exaggerate." Official members of the Vance party came away convinced that the Saudis will continue to support Sadat, and that they gradually will take a more active behind-the-scenes role in bridging the gap between the Arab camps. Nonetheless, Vance felt he could report back to Carter that he had found "real momentum" for peace.

There was one place where the strength of that momentum was beyond dispute: Cairo. There, Israeli and Egyptian delegates met at the historic Mena House hotel, shook hands, laughed and sat down to talk at a round table in the ornate Rubaiyat room. As is the case with so many events in the Middle East today, the participants hardly seemed able to believe where they were or what they were doing. Premier Begin joined in the euphoric mood. Before leaving for Washington, he had greeted an Israeli negotiator by telephone: "Shalom, shalom, how is the weather in Cairo? Sunny and cold?" The Israeli shouted in delight that he could see the pyramids. "Look at them, you had a part in [building] them," joked Begin, "but don't ask for indemnities."

Describing Egypt and Israel as "two ancient lands, two very old peoples, two civilizations, two historic neighbors." Chief Israeli Delegate Eliahu Ben-Elissar told his Egyptian hosts: "We come to renew an agelong relationship."

The discussions focused mainly on procedural matters that could provide the framework of a Geneva Conference. The Israelis favored an agenda to discuss three points: establishment of diplomatic relations, cultural exchanges, and the freedom of the Suez Canal and other waterways. The Egyptians proposed instead to prepare a "declaration of principles" that would form a basis for detailed negotiations at a full-scale conference later.

After one full working day, the meeting recessed for three days in observance of the Moslem Friday, the Jewish Saturday and the Christian Sunday. It would resume this week, then break for the Christmas holidays.

Altogether, the first meeting served as a good beginning, propitious enough, perhaps, to suggest that Sadat might try to upgrade the negotiations by having foreign ministers attend. One immediate possibility: he may name his own chief delegate, Esmat Abdel Meguid, as his new Foreign Minister. This would automatically open the way for Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan to go to Cairo.

But in most other Arab capitals, the mood ranged between angry and apprehensive. In Beirut, many shops were closed as a sign of mourning; streets were hung with banners bearing bitter messages: ONLY TRAITORS MEET IN CAIRO and SADAT'S FINAL DAY OF SURRENDER. "Sadat's peace initiative," charged P.L.O. Leader Yasser Arafat, "aims at besieging and isolating us." In Damascus, Syria's Assad declared: "Falling into the lap of the enemy is not peace but surrender." Assad had visited Saudi Arabia and four other Gulf states, and although the leaders in those countries still quietly support Sadat, they had received Assad with courtesy. Said a Western diplomat: "This is the kind of Arab waiting game Assad understands. If Sadat fails, the Arabs will stone him to death. If he succeeds, they will call him a hero."

In the U.S., meanwhile, Menachem Begin had wasted no time in seeking public support for his policy. He lunched at Blair House with a group of powerful pro-Israel Senators--New York's Jacob Javits, Washington's Henry Jackson, Florida's Richard Stone and New Jersey's Clifford Case--to whom he confided his new ideas. The Senators were modestly encouraging; Javits, for instance, welcomed the proposals as providing a "credible basis for negotiation." On Sunday, the Premier's audience was far wider; he was the guest on CBS-TV's Face the Nation.

Whatever the merits of the Israeli plan, Begin's U.S. blitz was partly successful. If it lacked the spectacular daring of Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, at least it constituted a response; if the proposals fell short of Egypt's expectations, at least they could provide the basis of further negotiations. After learning the details of Begin's plan, Sadat told a press conference at week's end that he was "more optimistic than ever." Above all, momentum was maintained. The two leaders would meet again shortly. They were the only players in the arena, and they were determined to keep the action alive.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.