Dealing or Double-Dealing

A military operation stalls hopes for settlement talks

Prime Minister Ian Smith seemed to be pulling another fast one. Just as moderate black nationalists were responding favorably to his unexpected endorsement of universal adult suffrage as the basis for majority rule in Rhodesia, his air force and army were striking the mightiest blow yet against antiregime black guerrillas based in neighboring Mozambique. The military attacks, which were disclosed last week, cast serious doubts on the sincerity of Smith's conciliatory statements calling for a negotiated transfer of power to the country's black majority. Suspicions increased when Smith unexpectedly convened the negotiations late last week (about seven days ahead of schedule) even though Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole--the two key moderate black leaders--would not be at the conference table.

The targets of the five-day military operation were two camps in Mozambique that have been used as supply and staging areas for the guerrilla forces of Robert Mugabe, Marxist leader of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union). Waves of aging Canberra, Vampire and Hunter warplanes, followed by transports and helicopters carrying black and white troops, first hit a base near Chimoio, about 54 miles within Mozambique, and then attacked a camp near Tembue, 132 miles inside the border. According to Rhodesian officials, the attacks were extraordinarily successful, killing at least 1,200 guerrillas and destroying some 40 trucks and massive quantities of ammunition and fuel. Mozambique officials charged that nearly 100 women and children died in the bombings.

Bishop Muzorewa, still regarded as the most popular black leader inside Rhodesia, denounced the military operations as "abhorrent massacres" that would "adversely prejudice" any talks with Smith. Proclaiming a week of mourning, the bishop declared that the dead are "mostly men, women and children who fled from the land of their birth to seek asylum." He said there could be no negotiations during the mourning period and boycotted last week's talks. Sithole, who was traveling in the U.S. to drum up support for his African National Council, also condemned the raids.

Rhodesia's Defense Minister Roger Hawkins justified the attacks on the ground that "terrorist incursions from Mozambique were increasing; it was essential to take action in self-defense." The guerrillas have traditionally infiltrated across the border to launch offensives during the December-January wet season, when thicker vegetation provides added cover. Some 3,000 guerrillas were thought to be preparing to move into Rhodesia from the camps.

There may have been political motives for the raids as well. Perhaps Smith flexed his muscles to try to force concessions from Muzorewa and Sithole at the conference table. He may also have been attempting to convince black moderates inside Rhodesia that his armed forces would be able to defend a transition government from attacks by radicals outside the country. Another possibility is that the Mozambique raids were aimed at widening a rift between Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, who as head of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) is co-leader of the so-called Patriotic Front. By devastating Mugabe's guerrillas--but leaving Nkomo's Zambia-based guerrilla forces untouched--Smith may have been trying to tempt Nkomo into joining Muzorewa and Sithole at the talks.

Smith offered no explanation of the timing of the raids. If their purpose was to bolster the bargaining position of Rhodesia's whites, the Prime Minister possibly miscalculated. Muzorewa, the popular moderate, was forced to rally to the defense of Mugabe, the hardliner. Said the bishop: "Rhodesian whites, and I include the Prime Minister, simply don't realize the depth of feeling aroused among the Africans by the two attacks." Fearing that any association with Smith would discredit them among Rhodesia's blacks, Muzorewa and Sithole might want to reconsider any transfer of power to which the Prime Minister was a signatory.

In that case, renewed momentum toward a peaceful settlement would again depend upon Britain and the U.S., whose blueprint for Rhodesia was eclipsed when Smith accepted universal suffrage. A main feature of their plan calls for a London-appointed administrator to govern for a six-month transition period during which a constitutional conference--based on one man, one vote--would create the political structure of an independent Rhodesia. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and British Foreign Secretary David Owen are to meet this week at a NATO conference in Brussels, where they will certainly review their strategy for Rhodesia. qed

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.