Helms Makes a Deal

Ex-CIA chiefs conviction shows shift in attitudes about spying

One of the touchiest problems inherited by the Carter Administration was the case of former CIA Director Richard M. Helms. It brought into play questions of national security, loyalty, perjury and, in some ways, the future of the intelligence agency and its directors. Last week the case was settled in a manner that did not completely satisfy anybody but seemed a thoroughly reasonable compromise.

Helms' difficulties date back to 1973, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was weighing his nomination as U.S. Ambassador to Iran. Twice the committee quizzed him in closed sessions about covert U.S. efforts to prevent Salvador Allende Gossens from becoming President of Chile in 1970. Twice Helms in effect lied.

Jimmy Carter's Justice Department could have chosen not to prosecute the now retired ambassador at all or, at the opposite extreme, to charge him with two felony counts of perjury, each carrying a maximum five-year prison sentence and a $2,000 fine. The department took a middle course, charging the 64-year-old Helms with two misdemeanor counts of failing to answer senatorial questions "fully, completely and accurately." The penalty on each count is 30 days to a year in jail and a fine of $100 to $1,000.

Carter and Attorney General Griffin Bell hit on that solution after months of bargaining with Helms and his attorney, the celebrated Edward Bennett Williams.

Helms' lawyer maintained that if his client went to trial on more serious charges, an adequate defense would require that national secrets be divulged. This was an ironic shift: throughout his long career Helms had taken many risks--even putting his life on the line when he had been a covert agent--to protect the nation's secrets.

Bell took the threat seriously. He told Williams that if Helms would plead nolo contendere (no contest)--in reality an admission of guilt--to the misdemeanors, the Justice Department would support Helms' insistence that his accumulated federal pension rights be protected, and would recommend that he not be imprisoned. This bargain was intended to ensure that no national secrets would be endangered at a trial. At the same time, it would demonstrate that the Carter Administration is in accord with Congress that even CIA chiefs are accountable to both the public and the law.

After Helms agreed to cop the plea and all details were worked out, the Justice Department whisked him into the federal courtroom of Judge Barrington D. Parker in Washington without notice. Assistant Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti presented a three-page "statement of facts" to which Helms had agreed.

In essence it said that when Helms testified on Feb. 7, 1973, and March 6, 1973, he was fully aware that the CIA in 1970 had secretly funded anti-Allende propaganda, financed groups opposed to Allende, applied economic pressure on Chilean military forces to thwart Allende's selection, and discussed with the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. the support of candidates opposing Allende. The actions had been approved by the 40 Committee of the National Security Council under President Richard Nixon. But Helms had testified that the CIA had not tried to influence the election. All the efforts failed in any event, as Allende won narrowly in September 1970.

Civiletti told the judge the misdemeanor no-contest plea was "fair and just."

Bringing Helms to trial, he said, "would involve tremendous costs to the United States and might jeopardize national secrets." Helms, moreover, had "performed outstanding services to the United States Government" during "a most distinguished career."

On his lawyer's advice, Helms made a personal plea to Judge Parker. During his Senate testimony, he said, "I found myself in a position of conflict. I had sworn my oath to preserve certain secrets . I didn't want to lie. I didn't want to mislead the committee. I was simply trying to find my way through a very difficult situation in which I found myself." Helms said he nonetheless agreed with the charges against him, although he understood "there is to be no jail sentence and I will be able to continue to get my pension from the U.S. Government."

Parker thereupon jolted Helms, Wil-iams and Civiletti by declining to wrap up the deal right then and there. When Williams demurred, Parker asked: "You had hoped that I would sentence him today?" Replied Williams: "Both the Government and I had hoped that you would do that." The judge was not to be hurried. "Well, Mr. Williams, I am like a ship without a rudder. I am a fish out of the sea. I do not have any report or anything to aid me in sentencing."

Four days later, Parker's courtroom was jammed with reporters and spectators as he made his decision. The judge came on like a tiger, scolding Helms. "You now stand before this court v in disgrace and shame ... There are those employed in the intelligence-security community who feel that they have a license to operate freely outside the dictates of the law No one, whatever his position, is above the law." Then Parker turned pussycat. He meekly accepted the prearranged deal, fining Helms $2,000 and suspending a two-year sentence. Outside the court, Helms declared: "I don't feel disgraced at all." Added Williams: "He is going to wear this conviction like a badge of honor. He'll wear it like a banner."

The plea bargain came under immediate attack. Said Democratic Senator

Frank Church, chairman of a Senate committee that had probed CIA activities in Chile: "I thought there was to be an end to the double standard of justice for the big shots. Apparently, Helms was just too hot to handle." Republican Senator Howard Baker, a member of the Church committee, was more sympathetic. The case, said Baker, was "handled about as well as it could have been under the circumstances."

Helms' sympathizers argued that the ex-director was the victim of a change in the rules in the middle of the game.

Walter Pforzheimer, who retired in 1974 as the CIA'S assistant general counsel, notes that from the time the agency was created in 1947, members were not required to answer any questions about operations--unless the questions were posed by the appropriate congressional oversight committee. When "outsiders" on other congressional committees asked troublesome questions, says Pforzheimer, CIA personnel referred them to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittees, which had oversight duties. "I have never heard of a case where the director failed to answer the questions of our oversight committees," insists Pforzheimer. "I know Dick lived up to that." John A. McCone, who directed the agency from 1961 to 1965, agrees that Helms' mistake was in consenting to testify on sensitive CIA matters before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was not one of the oversight committees. Some sources suggest that Helms so badly wanted to become Ambassador to Iran that he let ambition cloud his judgment.

Not surprisingly, other former CIA directors were sympathetic to Helms.

George Bush said the case "should have been dismissed." William Colby said that "Mr. Helms was trying to keep a secret as he was supposed to" under presidential direction and was caught in a change in which "American intelligence is going to operate under American law." Energy Secretary James Schlesinger insisted, "It is a shame that Dick Helms should have been in court at all. It would have been a national disgrace had the outcome been more severe. He should treat the episode like a dueling scar--it underscores his service to his country."

The debate is far from over. The law requires that witnesses testify truthfully before congressional committees--but it does not require that Congressmen keep their mouths shut. Even when testifying before the congressional oversight committee, a CIA chief might be uneasy about blowing the cover of a current operation or exposing the methods and personnel of past projects. Despite the Helms case, drawing the line between an ultimate public accounting and a current operational imperative will always remain a difficult task for those who direct clandestine operations abroad.

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