Loneliness Is an Enemy

Embargoes may sting, but they may not really hurt

"To be isolated and ostracized will mean loneliness. Loneliness is an enemy of a person and of a nation. It makes you do funny things, stupid things--this we will have to guard against. But we can hibernate--and fairly long too. All of us, black and white, will suffer. But we will not be the only ones."

So said Willem de Klerk, editor of Die Transvaler, the country's influential Afrikaans-language newspaper. And that was the reaction of many white South Africans, as they faced the all but inevitable prospect that the United Nations this week would adopt a mandatory arms embargo against their country for the first time. The expected U.N. resolution--perhaps the first in a series that could lead to economic sanctions as well--was a direct response to the Pretoria government's latest wave of repression. A week earlier more than 50 black leaders had been placed under detention and 18 black and interracial organizations, the country's leading black newspaper, and seven white activists and journalists had been "banned" (see box).

South Africa has for years vied with Israel for the title of the U.N.'s leading pa riah. A voluntary arms embargo against South Africa has been on the U.N.'s books since 1963, but as recently as two years ago, the U.S., Britain and France voted against a Third World effort to make the embargo mandatory. Resentment against South Africa has been building, however, since the Soweto riots began 17 months ago. It has been further fanned by the death in September of the imprisoned black political leader Stephen Biko. An autopsy, still to be released, reportedly finds that Biko's death was caused by "extensive head injury of unknown origin," and an inquest begun two weeks ago and postponed will continue Nov. 14. The South African crackdown on political dissenters was the final straw.

The Carter Administration's self-described "point man," Ambassador Andrew Young, took the lead at the U.N. last week by stating that he favored "some form of sanctions" against Pretoria. Young was accurately telegraphing the Administration's view. Referring to the South African crackdown at his Thursday press conference, President Carter declared: "I think it's important that we express in no uncertain terms our deep and legitimate concern about those actions ... my decision has been to support strong sanctions against the sale of weapons to South Africa."

However, Washington is opposed to economic sanctions--a far more drastic step that it believes would be counterproductive. The Administration's goal is an arms embargo subject to renewal by the Security Council every six months. The hope is that such a resolution would persuade Pretoria to ease the strictures of apartheid and repression. Young gained the support of the other Western members of the Security Council (Britain, France, Canada and West Germany) for a carefully worded resolution that would impose the arms sanctions and also brand South Africa "a threat to international peace and security." With the help of Tanzania's Ambassador Salim Salim and Nigeria's Leslie Harriman, Young then began negotiations with the 49-member African group, the U.N.'s largest bloc. Most of the Africans favored the far stronger action of all-out economic sanctions, but Young argued that such a resolution would almost certainly lead to U.S., British and French vetoes. At week's end, the exact language of a resolution that both the West and the Africans could support was still being debated.

Meanwhile South African government officials reacted to the statements by Young and Carter with rage. Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha, formerly his country's Ambassador to Washington, denounced the U.S. as a "faithless friend" and as Pretoria's "No. 1 enemy," and accused Carter of demanding from South Africa a standard that it would not expect from black Africa. As for an arms embargo, Botha contended that South Africa's arms industry was strong enough to overcome any sanctions. Said he: "I think the superpowers, if they want to overcome us, will have to do it with a force of a very vast nature. It will be a very expensive effort. And I'm not bragging."

Botha was probably right. For the moment, an embargo would be B the largely long term, symbolic. an arms However, boycott over could deny South Africa access to new technology, thereby limiting its military effectiveness. South Africa is roughly 75% self-sufficient in arms and 100% in am munition. It builds its own patrol boats to carry its own guided missiles. French and Italian jet fighters have been built in South Africa under license, and if nec essary, the country could probably make the planes on its own. It manufactures ev erything from armored and scout cars to field kitchens -- all custom-built for Afri can bush conditions. South Africa's mil itary budget is $2 billion a year -- almost five times what it was five years ago. Since the U.S. and Britain have ob served a voluntary arms embargo for more than 14 years, any U.N. resolution now would affect their trade with South Af rica only slightly. Actually, the U.S. has continued to sell the South Africans such items as communications equipment, small four-passenger executive aircraft and spare parts for the seven Lockheed C-130 transports sold to South Africa pri or to 1963. This trade, amounting to about $25 million a year, would end under the new embargo. France, which ignored the 1963 boycott, was South Africa's largest arms supplier for over a decade. In 1975, however, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing promised to halt future ground and air arms sales. Still to be delivered, under the terms of a longstanding $800 million contract, are two submarines and two patrol boats. Israel has also supplied patrol boats, as well as Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles, and is believed to have an agreement for providing other missiles and technology for naval vessels being built by the South Africans.

The next step in putting international pressure on South Africa would be the imposition of economic sanctions. Unquestionably these would hurt the country --but it would survive. The mechanical, electrical and building industries would be hard hit. If foreign investment began to dry up, the government would cut its financing of schools, hospitals and social services--a move that would affect blacks as much as whites. At the same time, the government would probably postpone such long-term projects as power plants and pipelines and encourage development of local manufacturing industries.

In addition, economic sanctions would pose some discomfiting problems for Western nations. Britain has $5 billion invested in South Africa; the U.S. has $1.5 billion. Last year the U.S. exported $1.5 billion in goods to South Africa, mostly high-technology equipment, machinery, aircraft, vehicles and chemicals, and imported $925 million in goods from South Africa, including diamonds, platinum, chrome and other natural resources. Some 350 U.S. firms have offices or plants in South Africa. For most of the past 70 years Britain has been South Africa's leading trading partner; last year it bought 22% of South Africa's exports. Reviewing Britain's trade and investment ties with South Africa, one economist remarked last week that those links are "virtually irrevocable."

West Germany and France would also suffer a serious, if lesser, loss of trade. But dozens of smaller countries closer to South Africa would also be affected. Gabon, for instance, buys meat from South Africa; Zambia buys everything from mining equipment to canned goods. Alternative markets are distant--and thus more expensive. At least four U.N. members --Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique--are heavily dependent on neighboring South Africa not only for trade but for communication.

If South Africa's economy has an Achilles' heel, it might be oil. But no international oil embargo against Pretoria could succeed without the cooperation of Iran, which supplies almost all of the country's crude. The Iranians have supported South Africa consistently --both for commercial reasons and, it is said, because the Shah is still grateful to the South Africans for having given sanctuary to his late father after he was deposed in 1941. In the meantime, work is proceeding on a huge, $2 billion oil-from-coal plant near Johannesburg that is expected to supply up to 40% of the country's energy needs by 1981.

In effect, a great gamble is involved in the pressure ploys against South Africa. Among other things, the U.S. and Britain are banking on Vorster's support in gaining independence for Namibia (South West Africa) and Rhodesia. If they overplay their hand at the U.N., they risk the loss of Vorster's aid--a reality that the gruff Afrikaner may be counting on. "A large part of the world game against South Africa is bluff," Vorster proclaimed last week. "Now it has to be determined where the bluff ends and the serious part of the game begins." -

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