I HAVE LEARNED A LOT

President Jimmy Carter discussed his foreign policy with TIME Managing Editor Henry Grunwald, Washington Bureau Chief Hugh Sidey, White House Correspondent Stanley Cloud, Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott and State Department Correspondent Chris Ogden. Excerpts from the interview:

Q.. The principles you have enunciated for a Middle East settlement are clearly not accepted by Israel. Why, then, do we press so hard for a Geneva conference? Isn't it very likely that, if it convenes, it will break down?

A. That is certainly always a likelihood. It would be a mistake to assume that the Geneva conference is going to be easy or brief. But it will be the first opportunity, if it materializes, for the Arab leaders and the Israeli leaders to meet together hi extensive negotiations to understand one another's approach, positions, attitudes, and to marshal the opinion of the world on the points in dispute.

I think if a particular leader of one of the countries should find that his position is in direct contravention to the position of all the other parties involved, including ourselves and the Soviet Union, and was a narrowly defined question in his own country, there would be a great impetus on that leader to conform with the overwhelming opinion.

No one can guarantee success. It is a problem that has been extant for 29 years or more--some say thousands of years. But I think it is a good first step and I think that anyone who would only go with a guarantee of success would probably not likely take the first step toward peace.

Q. If the conference breaks up in animosity and anger, wouldn't that increase the danger of war?

A. That is a possibility. My genuine belief is that all the leaders want peace. They all have a publicly expressed position of flexibility that all items are negotiable. This is our best hope in many years.

Q. If the Israeli position at Geneva should be quite different from yours, would you find some means of persuasion or pressure?

A. I don't know. I have to say that our own positions that have been spelled out in general terms deliberately are the ones we still espouse. They haven't been completely accepted by the Israelis nor the Arab leaders, of course, and we can't say yet that they are completely endorsed by the Soviets either. I think there has been a general acceptance of the proposition that the step-by-step incremental approach is too long, too tedious and leaves unhealed wounds. I think there is a general acceptance of the proposition that we ought to have a comprehensive settlement, based on peace treaties with all the Arab nations and the Israelis being involved together. I can't anticipate now what our position would be. I would try to marshal the support of the leader, first of all. Secondly, the opinion of his people back home, the constituencies that might exist in our own country that would have influence around the world, opinion that exists in the European Community, and in the Arab nations as well.

Q. Did Mr. Begin tell you that he would drop his opposition to any P.L.O. participation in the Geneva conference if the P.L.O. were to accept the principle of the existence of Israel?

A. No, Mr. Begin talked to me about refugees, Palestinians. And in his other statements he has said that he did not object to Palestinians being represented in the Arab delegations or in the Jordanian delegation. When pressed, he said in his press conference that if they were identifiable members of the P.L.O. leadership, that he would object. He went on to add immediately, because the P.L.O. are publicly committed to the destruction of Israel. I cannot speak for Mr. Begin [but] if the Palestinian leaders adopted that position [acceptance of Israel's existence] or espoused the U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338*as a basis for negotiations at Geneva, we would immediately commence plans to begin talks with the Palestinian leaders. I hope that Mr. Begin would accept that [the participation of some Palestinian leaders at Geneva]. But I don't have any way to predict what he would do.

Q. Mr. Begin announced legalization of the Israeli settlements in occupied territories only a few days after your cordial meeting. It has been suggested that, in effect, he set you up.

A. I think I have read some newspaper reports that said Mr. Rabin accused Mr. Begin of being set up by me. Mr. Begin and I instantly liked each other and trusted each other, and we had the frankest possible discussions. We did not mention the subject of legalizing existing settlements,, I didn't think about it. I re-emphasized-to Mr. Begin our national position is and has been that the settlements in the occupied territories were illegal. I also let him know that I thought the establishment of new settlements would be an obstacle to peace. And that is a position that we still maintain.

Q. Are you getting any indications of flexibility from any of these leaders in private that we are not seeing or hearing in public?

A. Yes. I have had indications from all of them that, predicated on future demonstrations of good faith by the other nations involved, they would be as forthcoming as possible.

Q. If we knew what was said between you and Begin during your private meeting, would we be more optimistic?

A. I can't answer that. I think that Mr. Begin has fairly well expressed his opinion in public. There were some private conversations that made me optimistic. I think he also feels optimism.

Q. It looks very unlikely that there will be a SALT agreement before October 3, when the old one expires. What do you plan to do?

A. We would like to have an agreement. Our,negotiating teams are working on this regularly. [But] if we should not be successful, then my hope would be that we could extend the present agreement for a period of time.

Q. Would you still like to get together with President Brezhnev?

A. Yes. His position has been that at the time we meet we should have demonstrable success in negotiating a significant agreement between our two countries. And my position has been that perhaps the meeting would let us become acquainted and that we ourselves might alleviate some of the disagreements that remain among the negotiators. It is an honest difference of approach, but we are not desperate for an early meeting. I would hope that before too many months go by we will have an ability to meet both my standards for the meeting and his.

Q. What makes you think such a meeting would allay the almost personal animosity that seems to have developed between the Soviets and us?

A. I don't agree with your basic premise. I think in the last few weeks there has been some alleviation of indications of animosity in their published editorials and news reports. They have now ceased any personal allegations against me. And I think the Charleston speech has been fairly accurately reported as a move toward better understanding.

Q. One of your aides was quoted as comparing a youthful, vigorous American Administration with a rather tired, old Soviet regime. Is that a description you would endorse?

A. No, I wouldn't characterize it in that distinction at all. We have got bureaucratic lethargy, and I think in many ways the Soviets are very dynamic and aggressive, and vice versa. We have no fear of the Soviet Union, that they might dominate the world or that democracy is on the decline.

But I respect the Soviet Union. Their technological achievements have been notable. Their influence around the world has been a matter of concern for us in the past because it has been so successful. But I think the degree to which we can properly interrelate with the nonaligned countries of the world, the developing nations of the world, and let them test the proposition that our system of government is preferable, that we want no control or domination over them--these are the kinds of things I think will ultimately prevail, and not which country is the most vigorous or which military force is most powerful.

Q. You have said that you were surprised by the Soviet reaction to your human rights approach. Would you do anything differently if you could do it over again?

A. No; no, I wouldn't. I think it was time for our country to re-establish itself as a people who are genuinely confident that our principles and aspirations are correct. I think it was time for the world to know we stand for the same dreams and principles that were part of our nation's founding, that the right of human beings not to be imprisoned without trial and be subjugated by the state and be deprived of a right to speak are part of our national consciousness, not only in our nation, but our influence to the extent it can be exerted, should mirror that around the world. The thing that surprised me was the Soviets thought we were singling them out and it was a political ploy and not a genuine representation of what our people believe.

Q. Didn't you get any advice from your staff that that would happen?

A. Of course. It was obvious to us that a pursuit of the human rights question would be a controversial matter. But I have never interpreted it then or now as concentrating on the Soviet Union to the exclusion of other nations. And I have never had any intention to aggravate relationships between us. But I can tell you that among the National Security Council staff, in which there are several Soviet experts, and within the State Department, there was no concern expressed to me, either through Dr. Brzezinski or Secretary Vance, nor their subordinates with whom I came in contact, and I think there was at least some degree of surprise.

Q. Is that a failing?

A. Oh, I don't think so. In retrospect, I know the three of us, plus the Vice President, who meets with us on all occasions --none of us would undo what we had done, nor would we have approached the issue in a more timid fashion.

Q. Is there a chance that, say, by next year we might have recognized the People's Republic of China and severed our relations with Taiwan?

A. There is a chance we might have recognized the People's Republic.

Q. But certainly we could not continue our present relations with Taiwan?

A. If I could write the script, I could devise a way out of the dilemma. We don't feel any urgency about the normalization of relations with the People's Republic, although it is one of my goals. But in the process we certainly are interested in the peaceful lives of those who live on Taiwan, and we hope that those two goals are not incompatible.

Q. You don't feel the Chinese are getting a little impatient?

A. No. We have reconfirmed that the basis of our relationship and future negotiations will be the Shanghai Communique, which I have just today reread. And they have been so far satisfied with our approach without any time limit.

Q. Has running our foreign policy been tougher than you expected?

A. The extreme complexity of it has exceeded anything that I could have envisioned. [But] I don't feel ill at ease in the job of representing our people in international matters at all. I have learned a lot in this first six months and I have got excellent advisers.

*The carefully phrased U.N. resolutions in effect call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory in return for Arab recognition of Israel.

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