Jimmy, the Bible

It somehow seemed an unlikely time and place for Jimmy Carter's first full-length speech on Soviet-American relations. Here was the President on what looked for all the world like an old-fashioned barnstorming tour through his native South last week, and here were 500 Southern state legislators in the gardenia-adorned Gaillard Auditorium in Charleston, S.C., all ready for a few lighthearted moments of down-home pleasantries and political good tidings. That same evening the President was off to Yazoo City, Miss., for a "Citizens' Public Meeting" (see following story) and then, the next day, he was lifted by helicopter to an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico, where he donned red coveralls and a white hard hat with "President Jimmy Carter" painted on in green--and pronounced himself in favor of further offshore exploration all along the Atlantic Coast. In fact, he said on returning to New Orleans, the U.S. should seriously consider building a new sea-level canal through Panama just to handle the Atlantic-Pacific oil trade. By the year 2000, the President reckoned, such a canal just "might be in the interests of national security militarily as well as economically."

The high point of two frenetic days of travel, though, was Carter's stopover in Charleston. The spectacle of thousands of people turning out in 100DEG temperatures to cheer the presidential motorcade as it wound through Charleston's narrow myrtle-scented streets evoked familiar campaign memories, but Carter quickly made clear to the legislators that he had a much broader--and more distant--audience in mind.

The message was for Moscow, and the tone was intended to ease tensions, but the substance was basically nonconciliatory. Though he spoke of "the invisible human reality that must bring us together," Carter made it clear that he had meant everything he previously said that had roused Soviet ire. Carter tried to drive home points with Southern politicians, as well as Soviet leaders, by citing the Bible and Leonid Brezhnev in almost the same breath. After all, Carter noted, the Soviet President had remarked three weeks ago that "realism in politics and the will for detente and progress will ultimately triumph, and mankind will be able to step into the 21st century in conditions of peace, stable as never before." To make this big step, added Carter, echoing St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, "our planet must finally obey the biblical injunction to 'follow after the things which make for peace.'

One of those peacemaking things, he stressed, would be for the Soviets to agree to progress on the long-stalled Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Carter did not want the Kremlin to think the U.S. would settle for less than a substantial, comprehensive arms limitation deal. "Our view," he cautioned, "is that a SALT agreement which just reflects the lowest common denominator that can be agreed upon will only create an illusion of progress and, eventually, a backlash against the entire arms control process." Answering Moscow's complaints about his determination to develop the cruise missile, he reiterated that the U.S. would certainly limit its strategic weapons buildup if the Soviets did the same. But if Moscow persists in holding out against a SALT pact, he warned, "the U.S. can and will do what it must to protect its security and ensure the adequacy of its strategic posture." That line drew thumping applause in Charleston, but to Russian ears it must have sounded like a threat to resume the arms race.

Concern for Rights. Carter got still more applause for his sharp refutation of Soviet criticisms of his policies. Said he: "If these comments are based on a misconception of our motives, we will redouble our efforts to make them clear, but if they are merely designed as propaganda to put pressure on us, let no one doubt that we will persevere." Soviet leaders erred if they thought his Administration's "concern for human rights" was "aimed specifically at them." Rather, he repeated, his policy applied "not to any particular people or area of the world, but to all countries equally, including our own." And, he added, "it is specifically not designed to heat up the arms race or bring back the cold war."

The speech was part of a calculated White House campaign to persuade Moscow that Carter is serious about human rights and arms control. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in particular believes that much of the

Kremlin's strident opposition to American policy is bluff, and that Soviet leaders will calm down if and when Carter convinces them that he is not going to change his line.

As Brzezinski told TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott: "Part of the problem with detente is that there have been too many atmospherics, too many ups and downs. We've got to stop going on this roller coaster and develop a mature, continuing relationship. Also, there is a lot going on in Soviet-American relations, and a lot is going well, so it is a mistake to judge it just on SALT."

Tit-for-Tat Games. Brzezinski bases his carefully qualified optimism on agreements for technical and scientific cooperation in space projects, environmental problems and other areas. It is, in fact, precisely because there are so many Government agencies involved in Soviet-American relations that a special interagency committee was formed last week in order to coordinate their diverse activities. The committee will have no policymaking power but will pull together material on the Soviet Union gathered by all Government offices in order to help the White House and State Department develop a coherent policy.

The chief idea man will be Marshall Shulman, the Columbia University Soviet expert and special adviser to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who will serve as co-chairman with George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs. Indicating his own desire to accentuate the positive, Shulman, 61, has written that U.S.-Soviet relations are "at their best when they bring together specialists with common professional interests," instead of playing "tit-for-tat games" in attempts to gain the edge in power and influence. He has advocated more private diplomacy, less outspoken criticism of human rights abuses.

While Shulman's outlook appears distinctly less hard-line than that of Brzezinski, there is no conflict between them. Brzezinski, a former colleague of Shulman's at Columbia, coaxed him into serving on the committee. Was the. committee formed because Carter figures he needed an alternative to Brzezinski and the National Security Council for advice on Soviet policy? No, indeed. The President had not even heard of the new group until he read about it in the newspapers. It was originally proposed by William Hyland, top NSC Soviet analyst, and the directive which actually created it was signed by Brzezinski.

The real evidence of Brzezinski's power lay in Carter's speech in Charleston last week. Brzezinski worked closely with the President on drafting it--and thus pre-empted State Department plans for a major speech on the same subject by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

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