Danger: Eurocommunism

Henry Kissinger last week came back into public view with guns blazing. His target: Eurocommunism.

The Communist Party of Italy, which gained 34% of the vote in national elections a year ago, now holds a virtual veto over government programs in parliament. In France, another Communist party and its strong Socialist ally could well win a majority in next March's parliamentary elections. In Portugal and Spain, the Communists are fighting to increase their influence. There is a growing view among intellectuals, journalists and some politicians on both sides of the Atlantic that: 1) the U.S. cannot do anything to stop these trends and should not try; 2) the trends are not necessarily bad because Eurocommunists are different, representing a needed and probably democratic opposition to worn-out governments; and 3) nothing much would change if a few Communists join Western European Cabinets.

Kissinger blasted all these assumptions as delusions, in one of the most eloquent and closely reasoned speeches of his career. Speaking at a conference on Italy and Eurocommunism at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, he issued a powerful warning--intended as much for the Carter Administration and European leaders as for his audience of businessmen and scholars. "The accession of executive power [by these Communist parties]" would 1) be a massive change in European politics; 2) have basic consequences for the structure of the postwar world and for the Western alliance; and 3) alter "the prospects for security and progress for all free nations."

The former Secretary of State questioned the conventional wisdom that the Eurocommunist parties are independent of Moscow. Not so, he implied, except on nonessential matters. Moreover, he suggested that the degree of independence from Moscow is less important than the basic nature of Communism. Said Kissinger: "We are entitled to certain skepticism about the sincerity of declarations of independence which coincide so precisely with electoral self-interest. One need not be a cynic to wonder at the decision of the French Communists, traditionally perhaps the most Stalinist party in Europe, to renounce the Soviet concept of dictatorship of the proletariat without a single dissenting vote among 1,700 delegates, as they did at their party congress in February 1976, when all previous party congresses had endorsed the same dictatorship of the proletariat by a similar unanimous vote of 1,700 to nothing."

Communist parties have always had as their guiding principle the right of a minority to seize power as "the vanguard of the working class" and impose its will on the rest of the population. How then, Kissinger asked, can one take at face value the recent declarations of the French, Spanish and Italian Communist parties that they intend to work within a framework of political pluralism? After all, he pointed out, French Party Boss George Marchais has listed Bulgaria, Poland and East Germany as countries having a "pluralistic" party system. In a devastating passage, Kissinger cited a series of quotes to the same effect from East European Communist leaders, uttered during the late '40s. Hungarian Communist Leader Erno Gero, for example, observed in 1944 that "the Communist Party does not approve of the idea of a one-party system. Let the other parties operate and organize as well." In 1945 the East German Communist Party promised "a parliamentary democratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties." Marchais speaks of "socialism in the colors of France," but in 1938, Kissinger noted, George Orwell described French Communist strategy as "marching behind the Tricolor."

Once in power, Kissinger asked in effect, could the Communists ever allow "the democratic process to reverse" the situation? True, Communists got out of the French and Italian governments after World War II. But that was when their parties were very much weaker and the democratic forces very much stronger. And the stern Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" guides the internal structure of all Communist parties. "Only in Western Europe and the United States are there still illusions about the nature of Communist parties. In Eastern Europe, boredom, intellectual emptiness, inefficiency and stultifying bureaucracy have been obvious for decades."

The U.S. Government deals with Communist regimes in the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe. Why then can it not learn to deal with Communist parties in Western Europe? Kissinger's answer: "There is a crucial difference between managing conflict with adversaries and maintaining an alliance among friends." The character of that alliance--which has a moral base in a heritage of shared convictions about principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law--would become "confused to the American people" if some NATO members had Communist governments. "The moral and political basis for our present troop deployment in Europe" would be undermined. Inevitably there would be "significant divergences on foreign policy between Europe and the U.S." Although the Communists pay lip service to NATO, their participation in Western European governments would weaken NATO'S military strength, force a change in its security practices, turn it by default into a largely German-American alliance, threaten the balance of power between East and West and undermine European unity.

Powerfully, Kissinger explored some of the deeper reasons for Communism's present gains. "In the end," he said, "the Communist parties find their opportunities less in their inherent strength than in the demoralization, division or disorganization of their opponents; they succeed only when the democratic system seems unable to solve the social problems of the day, when the center does not hold and societies become polarized." Violence, such as that currently tormenting Italy, drives many to support Communism in desperation. Ticking off some of the basic causes of Communist gains, Kissinger noted: "A relativist age debunks authority and puts nothing in its place as an organizing principle of society. Massive impersonal bureaucracy disillusions the citizen with the responsiveness of his government. Intellectuals condemn society for materialism when it is prosperous and for injustice when it fails to ensure prosperity."

What should the U.S. do? Kissinger conceded that whether or not the Communist parties enter government is a matter for the voters of Europe to decide. But he also argued that America can encourage democratic forces in the West by recognizing the problems if Communists come to power and by not giving the impression, "through ostentatious association or consultation with Communist leaders," that "we consider Communist success a foregone conclusion." This is not the case, he said, although "United States hesitation and ambiguity can contribute to the impression" that it is and feed "the myth of [the Communists'] inevitability." He argued strongly against the position that an active U.S. policy of discouraging Europeans from voting Communist would be counterproductive. "I believe the opposite to be true," he said. "I consider it important that Europe know of America's interest and concern. If the United States has a responsibility to encourage political freedom throughout the world, we surely have a duty to leave no doubt about our convictions on an issue that is so central to the future of the Western alliance and therefore to the future of democracy."

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