G.I.s at the DMZ: Time to Come Home?

They are the last American ground forces on the Asian mainland. Manning guard posts along the Uijongbu Corridor, 14,000 G.I.s of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division stand astride the traditional invasion route from northern Korea to Seoul. For nearly 25 years, the presence of the 2nd Division along the Demilitarized Zone has been visible proof of America's commitment to defend the Seoul government against renewed aggression from the north. But the division's days in South Korea are numbered; President Carter has decided to withdraw the 2nd, along with its 17,700 support troops, by 1982. That decision has already cost one U.S. Army general his job, triggered a congressional hearing and set off a debate that raged last week in military circles, in Seoul and in other Asian capitals, where there are tremors of concern about Carter's foreign policy (see following story).

South Korean President Park Chung Hee was formally notified of U.S. plans for the troop withdrawal last week by Philip Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During a three-hour session in the Blue House, the presidential mansion in central Seoul, Park took the news--by then hardly a surprise--calmly and thanked his visitors for all the U.S. has done for his country. He was aware, Park said, that the G.I.s could not remain in Korea forever.

Solemn Commitment. During last year's campaign, Carter had pledged that he would gradually pull all U.S. ground forces out of Korea. After his inauguration, the President ordered studies of how best to accomplish this goal. When questioned about that decision at his Washington press conference last week, Carter explained: "The time has come for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a period of four or five years." He stressed that the U.S. would leave behind "adequate intelligence forces, observation forces, air forces, naval forces and a firm open commitment to our defense treaty." For these reasons, Carter insisted, "there need not be any doubt about potential adversaries concerning our support of South Korea." Emphasized U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Richard Sneider in an interview with TIME: "We will not do anything to disturb the [military] balance or weaken the security of [South Korea]. This is a very solemn commitment."

The troop withdrawal is a reaffirmation of the so-called Nixon Doctrine, by which the U.S. promises continued support of its allies but expects them to do their own fighting on the ground. In keeping with this principle, the U.S. 7th Division was withdrawn from South Korea in 1970-71. By ordering the 2nd Division home, Carter probably feels he has reduced the risk that the U.S. will suddenly find itself embroiled in another Asian land war--a political disaster for any President.

Not the Cost. A nonmilitary reason for the decision may well be the Administration's desire to place a bit more distance between itself and the repressive Park regime. Ambassador Sneider, however, insists "that there is no linkage between troop withdrawals and the human rights issue. The two are separate and will remain so." One argument that Carter cannot--and did not --raise to justify his decision is that it will save money; one congressional study projects that the cost of posting the 2nd Division in the U.S. will run $150 million more over five years than the cost of keeping the unit in Korea.

The Administration's confidence in South Korea's ability to defend itself is probably well placed. The military forces on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone are, in general, equally matched (see map). North Korea's superiority in tanks and armor is offset by, among other things, Seoul's larger ground forces, its advantage of being able to fight from strong defensive positions and its staying power provided by a booming economy that surged 15% (after inflation) last year. Moreover, North Korea's lead in the air--and perhaps on the sea as well--is more than balanced by the presence of about 65 U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers based at Osan and Kunsan and by units of the Seventh Fleet patrolling off the coast. The Phantoms will stay even after the G.I.s go home.

South Korea is now in the midst of an ambitious $5 billion military modernization program that will be completed by 1981. The Administration has requested $250 million in military credits for Seoul and the authority to sell South Korea $100 million in arms in fiscal 1978. In a strictly military sense, therefore, the 2nd Division's highly trained units--possibly the most combat-ready troops in the entire U.S. Army--will not be essential to South Korea's defense by 1982.

The division nonetheless performs an important strategic task: it is a deterrent to invasion. North Korea's militant dictator, Kim II Sung, 65, who ceaselessly demands the unification of the peninsula under Communist rule, might well attack the south if he thought the U.S. would not spring to Seoul's aid. The departure of U.S. ground units, critics claim, could prompt Kim to miscalculate and unleash another Korean War.

This is what worries Major General John Singlaub, whom Carter ousted as the third-ranking U.S. officer in Korea for telling a Washington Post reporter that withdrawal of the 2nd Division "will lead to war" (TIME, May 30). In an appearance last week before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations, Singlaub repeated this charge. He also warned of new intelligence indicating that Pyongyang's military buildup--especially of tanks, speedy patrol boats and trucks--is moving fast and is "far out of proportion to what we thought they had."

Singlaub told the Congressmen that the overwhelming majority of military officers agree with him and that it was his "impression" that many top officials in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul feel the same way. Added Subcommittee Chairman Samuel Stratton, a New York Democrat: "Most of the generals and members of the House are opposed to pulling ground forces out of Korea." (At week's end, Singlaub was reassigned to an important new post: Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson in Georgia.)

Deterrent Value. Another critic of the withdrawal decision is Edward Luttwak, associate director of Johns Hopkins' Center of Foreign Policy Research. "South Korean forces are not a substitute for U.S. ground troops in deterring a North Korean attack," Luttwak argues. "As long as American troops remain there, deterrence is higher because the U.S. will be more active in defending the country." Says retired Korean Major General Kim Chum Kon, a respected strategist who was a division commander during the Korean War and is now dean of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration at South Korea's Kyung Hee University: "When U.S. troops are deployed along the main invasion route, they cannot be avoided in the event of an attack. That's the deterrent value."

Opposition to the Administration's decision has created a rare consensus in South Korea. In rallies and demonstrations throughout Seoul last week, Koreans called on the G.I.s to stay. Even bitter enemies of the Park regime joined the protests. The Rev. Kim Kwan Suk, Secretary General of South Korea's National Council of Churches and an outspoken critic of Park, urged the Carter Administration to reverse its decision. South Korea's 79-year-old former President Yun Po Sun, who received a suspended prison sentence for speaking out against the regime, told a press conference in Seoul that U.S. troops were in his country to protect "freedom and democracy"; without them, he warned, the north would attack. The dissidents also worry that Park's repression might intensify without the moderating presence of U.S. ground troops.

Some strategy experts argue that the withdrawal decision disregards relevant geopolitical realities. Luttwak, for example, is bothered by what sort of signal a reduction in U.S. forces in the northwest Pacific might transmit to Japan--a country understandably sensitive to the power balance on the nearby peninsula. Washington's Korea policy, coupled with the growing power and presence of the Soviet navy around the Japanese islands, might eventually coax Tokyo toward a stance of neutralism or even accommodation with the Soviets, out of fear for its own security. There is also concern about Peking's reaction. The Chinese probably want U.S. forces out of Korea; on the other hand, Peking may fear that Moscow--to increase its leverage in Pyongyang--would encourage North Korea's Kim to attack the south.

There are risks in the withdrawal, as Administration policymakers privately admit. Conceded one U.S. official last week: "There is no doubt that we lose some part of our deterrence. But how much? How strong will the South Koreans become? What will the North Koreans perceive? Actually we don't know." They do know, however, that Jimmy Carter has made up his mind, and as the abrupt reassignment of General Singlaub proved, he is most unlikely to change it. All that needs to be decided now, in the consultations that began last week with Seoul and Tokyo, is the timetable for the 2nd Division's departure.

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