ARMING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

In the heart of the Pentagon, a heavy oaken door leads to the supersecret National Military Command Center. No one gets through the door without presenting a color-coded Joint Chiefs of Staff identification badge, which armed guards scrutinize under ultraviolet light. In one section of the two-story center, shifts of officers and men from all four of the armed services maintain a round-the-clock vigil. A red telephone links them directly to the White House; a beige phone can instantly reach any U.S. military commander anywhere in the world. Mounted on one wall are half a dozen computer-fed display screens (each 6 ft. by 8 ft.), which flash the status of U.S. forces. Last week, at the press of a button, the screens gave this picture of some of the U.S. strategic strength on station: 1,054 nuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles, most of them sited in concrete-reinforced underground silos scattered across the Great Plains; 21 nuclear-powered submarines gliding stealthily through the world's oceans, their 336 slender missiles within range of Soviet targets; 90 B-52 bombers ready to take to the air on 15 minutes' alert; six aircraft-carrier task groups deployed in the world's oceans; five combat-ready divisions positioned in Germany from the Rhine to the East-West frontier.

These are just a part of the forces in the American military arsenal--unquestionably the most powerful in the nation's history. But how long they will suffice to protect the U.S. and its interests is a question that preoccupies an increasingly broad spectrum of defense experts and politicians in Washington and other Western capitals.

It is this concern with the future military adequacy of the U.S. that caused two senior Cabinet officers to fly to Europe this week for very different kinds of talks. The assignment of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown: to meet in Brussels with America's closest European allies to discuss ways of strengthening NATO. The assignment of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: to confer in Geneva with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko about a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. The SALT talks could affect the status of U.S.-Soviet relations for years to come.

Dramatic results are not expected immediately from either of the talks. Still, the gravely important subjects to be discussed at both will help Washington answer a multibillion-dollar question: What does it take to defend America? Facing the Administration in the next year are a series of complicated and costly decisions concerning new weapons systems and force modernization that are likely to determine the military profile of the U.S. through the end of the century. President Carter has said that if it appears "the Soviets are not acting in good faith with us [in the arms talks] and that an agreement is unlikely, then I would be forced to consider a much more deep commitment to the development and deployment of additional weapons."

Second to the President, the man who is likely to have the greatest influence on these critical decisions is Harold Brown, 49, a veteran Defense intellectual and armchair warrior who brings more expertise to his spacious, third-floor Pentagon office than any of his 13 predecessors. Brown, like the President, is on record with a warning to Soviet military strategists: "If [the Soviets] continue to increase the size and effectiveness of their strategic forces, this country beyond question will respond to ensure that our forces continue to provide a deterrence that is credible."

The deployment of some new weapons may be limited or actually prohibited, however, by their huge price tags. A new 91,000-ton Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, for instance, costs $2.2 billion to build and equip, excluding its complement of 100 warplanes. That is six times the price (adjusted for inflation) of World War IPs U.S.S. Lexington.

Another crucial factor in any arms-procurement decision will be how the new weapon contributes to the U.S. arsenal's several missions. As Pentagon planners analyze the situation, there are three principal tasks:

1) DETERRING A SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK: Effective deterrence, Brown told TIME Pentagon Correspondent Bruce Nelan, can be defined as "the likelihood that a strike on this country would be retaliated against in such a way as to do grave and fatal damage to the Soviet Union." Most U.S. defense experts believe that the best deterrence is obtained by deploying a "triad" of nuclear delivery systems--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Minuteman; missiles, like the Polaris and Poseidon, launched from submarines; and bombs and missiles delivered by piloted planes like the B-52.

The U.S. now has at various stages of development new "follow-on" generations of weapons systems for each of the components of the triad. If it seems that any of the existing systems are losing their effectiveness, new strategic weapons can quickly be authorized to strengthen the weak link. For example, concern about the growing vulnerability of the nation's 1,000 Minutemen to a surprise Soviet missile attack could move the Administration to develop a less vulnerable missile.

2) FIGHTING A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WAR: Says Brown: "We cannot ignore the possibility of renewed warfare on the Korean peninsula or the need to support the Republic of Korea in the event of an attack." In Western Europe, there is growing concern that NATO'S conventional forces are not capable of slowing and then repelling a nonnuclear invasion by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact nations. In Brussels this week, Brown is expected to emphasize, as Carter did last week, that NATO must improve its combat readiness and upgrade the training and equipment of its forces. "The main message I'll take to that meeting," the Secretary remarked, "will be that with the advent of rough parity in strategic forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we can't rely solely on nuclear weapons" to deter a conventional attack against Western Europe. Brown has already begun bolstering U.S. conventional forces by adding some $600 million--to improve, among other things, maintenance facilities and shelters for U.S. aircraft in Europe--to a budget that he had slashed by an overall total of $2.7 billion.

In the event of a European war, the U.S. would be responsible for keeping NATO's forces supplied with arms and munitions. Some materiel and reinforcements could be rushed overseas in massive air transports, like the C-5A Galaxy, which can carry to Europe 345 troops with their personal equipment or a load of sixteen trucks. But most of the gargantuan quantities of supplies required by any future conventional war that are not already prepositioned at depots in Europe will have to be sent by ship. This means that the U.S. Navy will need enough forces to keep the North Atlantic's sea lanes free from the increasingly threatening armada of Russian warships.

3) RESPONDING TO BRUSH FIRES: The U.S. might find itself engaged in conflicts outside its principal theaters of operations, notably perhaps in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the Caribbean. To handle such contingencies, says Brown, the U.S. must retain the capability of reacting overseas with "speed and flexibility." This may best be achieved by keeping some troops abroad, either at land bases or aboard aircraft carriers. At times, a simple show of force, like ordering a naval task force to steam toward a potential trouble spot, can be enough to protect U.S. interests and prevent an outbreak of fighting.

Some critics of Pentagon policies argue that the U.S. is no longer capable of fulfilling these three imposing tasks, especially that of deterring a Soviet nuclear attack. Major General George Keegan Jr., recently retired as the Air Force's chief of intelligence, has charged that "the Soviets are capable of initiating, waging, surviving and emerging with a unique advantage from a global [nuclear] war." As evidence, he points to the Russians' allegedly extensive civil defense program and the impressive numerical superiority they have achieved over the U.S. in some key categories of weapons. It is true, for example, that the U.S.S.R. has 1,549 land-based and 842 submarine-based nuclear missiles, compared with 1,054 and 656 respectively for the U.S., that it outnumbers the U.S. in tanks by 45,000 to 10,000, and that it leads in artillery tubes by 19,000 to 5,000. It is also true that the Soviets have many more men under arms than the U.S. has: 3.9 million, v. 2.1 million (the lowest U.S. figure since 1950).

Yet Brown vehemently challenges Keegan's conclusion and insists that "we and the Soviets are now in a position of rough equivalence." This, Brown says, gives the U.S. the ability to pursue its national policies successfully. Almost all defense experts second Brown's assessment. Richard Burt, associate director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, notes that America's dynamic and innovative technological base gives it an important qualitative advantage that blunts much of the Soviet preponderance in numbers. Example: the Soviets can launch more powerful rockets and enjoy a sizable lead over the U.S. in the total megatonnage of their warheads. But the U.S. can put more warheads on each of its rockets and also achieve devastating accuracy. Thus in actual nuclear warheads, the U.S. outnumbers the Russians 8,500 to 3.500. And, while the Soviets have a greater number of strategic submarines (62, v. 41) the U.S. underwater warships are more efficient and quieter, making them harder to detect.

While most experts are confident that a military balance now exists between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., they are far less sure about the future. Since the CIA warned last winter that the Soviets were seeking not merely parity with the U.S. but outright "strategic superiority," this worry has deepened. A concerned Barry Blechman, chief defense analyst at Washington's Brookings Institution, notes that the U.S. "frittered away massive military resources" in Southeast Asia, then cut its defense budgets. In the past 13 years, he argues. Soviet arms spending has increased at a rate of 3% annually; on the other hand, the U.S. military outlay last year--when adjusted for inflation--was 18% below the 1964 level.

One immediate danger of an unanswered Soviet arms buildup is that it could prompt other countries to bow to Moscow's demands in some future diplomatic crisis. Explains London's Burt: "If the U.S. decided not to keep pace with the Soviets in strategic competition, it could signal a lack of resolve to America's allies." Another danger is that the Soviets may try to take advantage of either a real or merely a perceived superiority and expand their sphere of influence. Says General David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff: "In many parts of the world, the Soviets have a local advantage in conventional arms. If we had less than rough [strategic] equivalence, I think the Soviets would be willing to be a bit more adventuristic, test a little more, than if there were a rough balance."

There are dissenters from the view that the Soviet drive for superiority is genuine--and ominous. "On any given day, every day we are tremendously more able to strike than they," argues Yale Political Scientist John Steinbruner. "It's true that the Soviets have increased their strategic forces. But they did it after we had already increased ours, and now they are trying to catch up. We are still substantially ahead."

Nonetheless, a number of top Administration leaders have come to the conclusion that the estimates of a Soviet military buildup are essentially correct. These officials are known to include the President, CIA Director Stansfield Turner (who, though he took over the agency after last winter's intelligence report was released, agrees that the military balance is "gradually eroding" in the Soviets' favor) and Harold Brown.

But the Defense Secretary is by no means panicked--in fact, he warns that overreaction by the U.S. could lead to an unwarranted and dangerous new leap in the arms race. Nonetheless, Brown argues: "Military superiority on the part of the Soviet Union--real or perceived --is not a condition that the U.S. and its allies can or need accept." The goal, he feels, is to stabilize the current U.S.Soviet balance through arms negotiations. A new American ICBM, for example, might no longer appear necessary if the Soviets dismantle some of their monster rockets.

Because observers expect no early breakthroughs at SALT, however, the U.S. is almost certain to expand its arsenal. No crash programs will be necessary, since the new generations of arms are already in the pipeline--designed, developed and tested. The problem for the Administration will be to decide which of the new missiles, ships, tanks, artillery, helicopters and communications systems the nation needs, and how much it can afford. In addition. Brown must weigh carefully whether any of the new weapons--by the very fact that they might substantially unbalance the arms scale--will create unnecessary obstacles in reaching future SALT agreements with Moscow.

Among the key weapons awaiting a Brown decision, and the congressional controversies that will follow:

B-1 BOMBER. The Air Force is asking for 244 of these new supersonic warplanes, and there is general agreement that they o would make an excellent replacement for the aging B-52s, most of which are nearly 20 years old.

Even in this missile age, many experts argue, it is valuable to have a weapon that can be launched if an attack seems imminent and recalled if the alarm turns out to be false. The problem with the B-l is the staggering price tag for the entire fleet: roughly $21 billion without armament. As a much less expensive alternative, critics of the plane suggest modernizing several hundred B-52s and arming them with cruise missiles so that they can penetrate Soviet air defenses and reach their targets. The critics argue that the time gained--into the 1990s--could be used to develop and test an eventual replacement for the B-52 that would be even more advanced than the B1.

Although Brown intends to send his recommendation on the B-1 to the White House next month, he has not yet made up his mind. His final decision, he says, will depend in part on his "judgment on what the range and effectiveness of Soviet air defenses are going to be ten years from now. Then we'll see whether the same amount of our money will produce better effectiveness if invested in something else." Pentagon insiders are betting that Brown will compromise: recommending procurement of only 100 to 200 Bls plus a B-52 modernization program.

CRUISE MISSILE. As a result of the controversy that this small, versatile, relatively inexpensive (less than $1 million apiece for the air-launched version) subsonic drone has stirred around the negotiating table, its mass production and integration into the U.S. arsenal ranks as Brown's second most pressing weapons decision. Arms controllers dislike these missiles because they are hard to count (they can be easily concealed) and to identify (long-range, nuclear cruise missiles look exactly like shortrange, conventional cruises). But the missile's advocates insist that it makes an ideal second-strike retaliatory weapon; since it is so difficult to locate, it cannot be wiped out in a surprise attack. Brown must decide how to deploy the weapon and whether to limit its range. His decision may not come until late this year; by then he will know whether a SALT agreement would regulate the cruise.

MX. This is the designation for an experimental missile that could, in the mid-1980s, become the Sunday punch of the U.S. arsenal. Not only will it be capable of launching fifteen MIRVs --which means 15 different Soviet targets can be hit--in contrast to three from a Minuteman III, the MX will not be nearly as vulnerable to silo-busting Soviet missiles in a surprise attack. Reason: mounted on a flatcar, the MX would be shuttled back and forth, perhaps through a covered trench twelve to 20 miles long, stopping at random "aim points" along the way. It would take 20 to 40 Soviet warheads to target each trench--a total of 6,000 to 12,000 warheads if, as proposed, the Air Force builds 300 MXs. That is two to four times the number of warheads in the entire Soviet arsenal.

One problem with the MX is its cost: $34 billion for the 300-missile network. Another is that its near invulnerability, its sheer destructive power (three megatons per missile) and its accuracy would all give it great potential as a "counterforce" or first strike weapon. Thus, its deployment might well serve to stoke the Soviets' paranoia and lead them to fear a U.S. surprise attack. Such apprehensions can lead to dangerous new tensions between Moscow and Washington. Carter has publicly offered to halt development of the MX if the Soviets scrap their own mobile SSX-16 missile.

Brown confronts a host of other less costly and complex decisions as well. The Air Force is now testing the F16, and the Navy is developing the F18, two lightweight, inexpensive fighters that will enter service in the early 1980s. By then, the Army will have begun receiving the first of its 4,000 new XM1 tanks (costing about $1 million each) and 3,000 new mechanized infantry combat vehicles ($370,000 each). In the same period, the Navy plans to expand to 600 ships (up from 464 today), including two Nimitz-class supercarriers currently under construction. While the Administration has canceled yet another Nimitz carrier, pressure to reinstate the ship is mounting from Congress and the venerable Admiral Hyman Rickover (see box).

The total price of such ambitious modernization programs is dear indeed.

Brown has already requested $120.4 billion for the Pentagon for fiscal year 1978, beginning in October. According to projections Brown inherited from his predecessors, defense spending could climb to some $146 billion by fiscal 1980 and $167 billion by 1982 (both figures projected for inflation). Carter and Brown say they are determined to keep spending considerably below this level, but without cutting into the Pentagon's muscle. During the presidential campaign, Carter seemed to promise that he would trim defense spending by $5 billion to $7 billion. He has since explained that he meant to promise not an absolute cut in the Pentagon's budget, but merely a slowdown in its rate of growth and a reduction in unnecessary expenditures.

To save money, Brown plans to 1) consolidate and close some of the 4,208 military installations scattered across the country, 2) reduce the frequency with which officers are transferred (at considerable expense) from one post to another, 3) cut training costs, and 4) reform the military's generous pension programs. The largest sums are to be saved in personnel costs, which constitute about 55% of the Pentagon's total outlays. The strategic arsenal, by contrast, accounts for less than 10% (or $10.6 billion in fiscal 1978).

Although the volunteer army has contributed somewhat to the increase in personnel costs (from $47 billion to $60 billion since the draft was ended in 1973), the Administration is not inclined to recommend a return to conscription--even though there has been some congressional pressure in that direction. Few voices are being raised today, moreover, to complain about military morale. An important, intangible factor in every fighting force, morale seems to have improved noticeably since the last years of the war in Viet Nam, when racial tensions and widespread use of hard drugs severely handicapped the fighting effectiveness of the G.I. In West Germany, where the U.S. forces were suffering severe morale problems just a few years ago, heroin usage is way down, racial problems are minimal, and there is a renewed sense of purpose. Sums up Second Lieut. Michael Hall, a 23-year-old West Pointer who is stationed with the Eighth Infantry Division near Mainz: "I've only been over here two months, but if there were action now, I could take my platoon and know exactly where to go." There are also signs that soldiering as a profession is gradually regaining some of the esteem it lost in the American public's mind as a result of the unpopularity of the Viet Nam War.

As enormous as the financial burden of maintaining the American arsenal may be, the fact is that U.S. military spending in the past decade has accelerated at a slower rate than Government outlays for social and welfare purposes. For example, since 1968, defense costs have climbed 41%, while federal spending for health has soared 445%. For the past four years, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has topped the Pentagon as the Federal Government's most expensive department. When measured by dollars adjusted to eliminate the impact of inflation, Pentagon spending has decreased every year between 1967 and 1975.

Because, as Brown says, "we cannot have a situation where the U.S. is clearly inferior militarily," such spending seems likely to begin growing again in real terms. This is a prospect Brown contemplates with equanimity--but not relish. "We probably have lived off our earlier investments longer than we should have," he says. "We have some catching up to do."

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