Britain's Owen-a Fresh Start

Although South Africa's leaders remain intransigent about black rights, there were some new signs of hope for Rhodesia. The problem there has been how to arrange a transition to majority rule by the 6.2 million blacks in a way that is acceptable to the 270,000 whites. Prime Minister Ian Smith and his party, the Rhodesian Front, have accepted the principle of majority rule, but a first round of settlement talks in Geneva foundered last January over the makeup of an interim government for the breakaway colony.

Last week U.S. and British diplomats were working on a new approach that would guarantee transfer of power to blacks while offering whites financial inducements to stay on. The proposals may be presented at a Rhodesian constitutional conference, either in London or somewhere in Africa, possibly in June. The U.S.-British joint plan differs from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's ill-fated program in one key respect: the makeup of an interim caretaker government will be tackled only after the question of a constitution for majority-ruled Zimbabwe (as blacks call Rhodesia) has been settled.

If the conference does get off the ground, much of the credit will belong to its prospective chairman, British Foreign Secretary David Owen, 38. Last week the neurologist-turned-diplomat returned to London from an eight-day fact-finding trip to Africa. He impressed both white and black leaders with his candor, youthful idealism and realistic understanding of the Rhodesian impasse. Rhodesian diplomats, who were angered by the cold aloofness of a team led in January by Britain's U.N. Ambassador, Ivor Richard, described Owen as "tough" and "refreshing." He is hopeful that the heads of the front-line states--Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia--can persuade Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe of the anti-Smith Patriotic Front to attend the new conference. Last week Owen discussed his views on Rhodesia with TIME London Bureau Chief Herman Nickel. Excerpts:

Q. Your trip has renewed the search for a Rhodesian settlement. To what new elements do you attribute this?

A. The new element is that I was not just giving British views. I was giving proposals which have been worked out jointly with the United States Administration. That was easily the most significant new factor. The new U.S. Administration has a very real commitment to Africa and to the principles which the African nationalist leaders themselves have been espousing over many years.

Q. Do the front-line Presidents still want a negotiated settlement?

A. Yes. All five of the front-line Presidents are basically men of peace and all would far prefer a peaceful transition. [On the other hand] they will not use their influence to call off the armed struggle until they are absolutely certain that majority rule is coming in Rhodesia and that there will be an independent Zimbabwe. They are not going to accept words. They're looking for concrete specific actions. Wherever I went in Africa I met a wall of disbelief about virtually any words that were spoken by Mr. Smith. So I put it to Mr. Smith and the Rhodesian Front that they could make a start by changing now the racial discrimination that they have in their legislation.

Q. Will the Presidents help persuade the Patriotic Front to attend the talks?

A. I think they probably will. Many of them have put a lot of political capital into trying to get talks going for the last 15 years or so. I went into Africa quite convinced that I wasn't in any mood for vetoes on anyone's side, whether white or black. That's what's bedeviled the whole issue. The Patriotic Front have always made it clear that they should be the only representatives. I explained to them--and the five Presidents agreed--that it's one thing to be the representatives of the armed struggle and quite another to say that you're the only people that should be consulted on a constitution which, hopefully, 6 million or more black and white Rhodesians would live under. They've all got the right to be consulted.

Q. How do you move from the adoption of a constitution to a transfer of power?

A. The crucial point is going to come some time in 1978. When you've agreed on a constitution and on a democratic process for elections and some structure of a caretaker government, then one would have to go to Mr. Smith and say, "Now you must give us power and you must transfer power to the caretaker government." And at the same time, you'd also go to the Patriotic Front and you would say, "Now you must forsake armed struggle and fight democratic elections." At that time you'd go to the United Nations and ask them to lift sanctions. But unlike many of the other proposals, you're not asking anyone to make his final decision till he's able to show that the constitution is reasonable, that the election process is fair and that some provision will be made to ensure post-independence stability.

Q. If the Patriotic Front refused to participate, what effect would that have on the conference?

A. It would gravely weaken such a conference, and if any significant body of opinion would not come to the conference, then the United Kingdom and the United States will hesitate and want to consider very carefully whether the conference has got any chance of success. But of course we'll have to take account of the chances. The chance is not very high anyhow. We haven't made any secret of this. This is a high-risk operation, trying desperately to get a peaceful transition against the odds, knowing that the consequences of a violent transition would be very destabilizing for the whole of Africa. So you're prepared to take risks, but you're not prepared to take absurd risks because that could be very damaging.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.