The SALT Standoff

Is detente dead or dying? Is SALT finished? Is Jimmy Carter's new open foreign policy, with its emphasis on human rights, really working?

Alarmist questions? Perhaps. Nonetheless, they were raised last week in the wake of the Administration's first face-to-face encounter with the Russians. It was an obvious setback. Cyrus Vance returned from his visit to Moscow as Secretary of State shaken by the Soviets' brusque dismissal of two U.S. proposals for reviving the long-stalled SALT talks (TIME, March 28).

It was only the first round in a long game of negotiations. Moreover, the Soviets have a tradition of testing new U.S. Presidents. Washington had anticipated a Kremlin rejection of its proposals, but apparently miscalculated the mood and intention of the Russian leaders. Thus Soviet Boss Leonid Brezhnev's almost hostile veto of the U.S. proposals came as a shock. His frosty attitude and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's sarcastic comments at a Moscow press conference suggested U.S.-Soviet relations had plunged to the lowest level since the start of detente.

Carter moved to forestall fears that a crisis with the Soviet Union was about to erupt. He met with congressional leaders and told a hastily called press conference he still hopes "that the Soviets will agree to drastic reduction and strict limitations" of nuclear weapons. Vance meanwhile told newsmen as he left Moscow that "relations will continue to be good." He did not sound convinced. Still, Vance and Gromyko will get together in May in Geneva to continue probing for an arms solution. In addition, Vance and the Russians agreed to set up study groups to deal with pressing global issues.

Rough Going. At his news conference, Carter dismissed a suggestion that his almost evangelical concern with the human rights issue was the key problem. He declared: "I can't certify to you that there is no linkage in the Soviets' minds between the human rights effort and SALT. We have no evidence that this was the case." Nonetheless, Soviet officials and journalists had been telling Americans in Moscow that the Kremlin bitterly resented what it considered Washington's interference in Russia's domestic affairs. As Gromyko put it at his press conference, the rights campaign "hurts the political atmosphere for discussion of other issues, including arms limitation." The Russians had basic quarrels with the bold new U.S. proposals. But SALT may continue to face rough going if Carter presses the human rights issue too hard.

The confrontation that so stunned the U.S. delegation took place on the third day of Vance's visit, in Brezhnev's Kremlin conference room, which once had been Lenin's study. As Vance and the Soviet leader faced each other across a 50-ft.-long table, the mood in the room was so strained that even normally dour Andrei Gromyko tried to lighten the atmosphere with a few lame attempts at humor. TIME Correspondent Christopher Ogden, who had previously reported from Moscow and was back last week covering the Vance trip, was struck by the Soviet leader's physical appearance: "Brezhnev's health had failed terribly since I last saw him in 1974. His cheeks and jowls were puffy, his eyes deeply receded, his hair was dry and standing partly on end."

No and Goodbye. Vance had expected the session to last at least two hours; he had come prepared to bargain over the SALT proposals he had tabled at the start of his visit. But in a mere 55 minutes it was all over. As an American participant later remarked: "It doesn't take very long to say 'nyet and do svidaniya [no and goodbye].' " Without even making a counteroffer, Brezhnev rejected the American proposals out of hand, because, according to Vance, "they did not coincide with [the Soviet] view of what they thought was an equitable deal." At the end of the curt meeting, Vance and his aides stuffed their papers into their briefcases and dashed back to the U.S. embassy to telephone the bad news to Jimmy Carter.

The Secretary's visit began somewhat more auspiciously than it ended. The U.S. delegation included Paul Warnke, who is chief delegate to the SALT talks, Under Secretary of State Philip Habib, William Hyland of the National Security Council and Lieut. General Edward Rowny of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had been greeted cordially by Gromyko at Moscow's Vanukovo airport; during the ride into the capital, Brezhnev called Vance on the car phone to extend his own welcome. That evening, after celebrating his 60th birthday with champagne and cake presented to him by his staff, Vance joined Gromyko at a Bolshoi Ballet performance of Anna Karenina.

The U.S. delegates, of course, expected that their trip would have its rough moments. They anticipated a verbal roasting for the Administration's strong statements about human rights in the U.S.S.R. and other countries. At the first of the six negotiating sessions, Brezhnev condemned the American human rights crusade as a completely unacceptable interference in Soviet internal affairs. Reading a prepared response, Vance pointed out that the Soviet Union was not the sole target of the campaign and that Carter's concern for human rights was universal. Gromyko returned to the human rights theme in a luncheon toast. The issue was not raised again, but its presence lurked in the wings during subsequent talks.

Vance also miscalculated the timetable for presenting his SALT proposals. Finding no opportunity to raise them during the opening round as he had planned, he had to wait until after lunch; by then Brezhnev had gone, leaving Gromyko in charge. Vance insisted that Brezhnev's absence "was not all that significant," but observers recalled that the Soviet leader had personally directed nearly all previous major discussions about arms limitation.

The Vance presentation offered the Soviets a choice of two alternatives for concluding SALT II. One was the "deferral option," which called for both sides to sign a SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok guidelines. It would defer the controversial issue of how to deal with the U.S. cruise missiles (see box) and the U.S.S.R.'s Backfire bomber. As Vance explained it to newsmen in Moscow, the virtue of this option was that it enabled the two sides to "sign what had been agreed at Vladivostok, put aside [the other issues] and get on with SALT III."

Nuclear Arsenals. The other alternative offered by the U.S. was what American diplomats called the "comprehensive package"--a sweeping reduction in nuclear arsenals that goes far beyond anything ever tabled during nearly eight years of SALT talks. It would, among other things: 1) set total ceilings of between 1,800 and 2,000 for strategic launchers; 2) ban mobile land-based intercontinental missiles because spy satellites cannot keep track of these weapons if the launchers are moved from site to site; 3) allow only six test flights of strategic missiles annually; 4) restrict the range of both the cruise missile and Backfire bomber. When it was Gromyko's turn to present a Soviet proposal, he repeated an offer that Henry Kissinger rejected more than a year ago. It calls for the ratification of the Vladivostok ceilings and applies them to the cruise missile but not the Backfire. Referring to the comprehensive package, Gromyko charged that the U.S. was trying to sidestep the Vladivostok agreement by presenting an entirely new position.

There was no discussion of SALT on the second day of the Moscow conference, but Vance kept looking for the bright side. "I'm glad it didn't come up today," he said. "I'm glad serious consideration is being given to it." Instead the delegations discussed a number of international problems: the Middle East, southern Africa and the stalemated NATO-Warsaw Pact talks on reducing force levels in Central Europe. The two sides agreed to set up study groups that will focus on such key issues as a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, the burgeoning global trade in conventional arms and the possibility of providing advance notice of missile test-firings.

At the start of the third day, Vance still hoped for an encouraging response to the American SALT options. Anticipating a rejection, he cabled Washington, asking whether he should modify the proposals to make them more acceptable to the Kremlin (Carter's answer: no). But Vance appeared unprepared for what happened at the final meeting with Brezhnev.

Carter was initially deeply worried by the speed and brusqueness of the rejection. He huddled with his advisers and studied the cables from Vance. For a while, he feared that Moscow was permanently slamming the door on SALT. This was allayed after new cables from Vance reported that he was still going to meet with Gromyko in May. The President's next move was to find the right kind of public response to the Soviet rejection. It was clear he would have to show that he had the backing of Congress. This he won during a briefing of congressional leaders in the Cabinet room. Sitting at the far end of the imposing mahogany table, Democratic Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson reflected: "We must stand firm as one. The Soviets understand unity." Added Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd: "This is no time to show weakness." The Republicans agreed. Howard Baker of Tennessee cautioned against letting the Soviets pick apart the U.S. positions in piecemeal fashion. Buoyed by the leaders' backing, the President said: "Don't worry, I intend to hang tough."

The President then decided to explain the situation to the White House press corps because--according to a presidential aide--"he clearly felt that the newsmen needed a look at him. He wanted to show that he wasn't going to flinch and wasn't going to overreact."

At his snap press conference, he stressed that because the talks will continue in May, it cannot be said they have collapsed. Carter also argued that the Soviets refused to accept the American package because they "simply need more time" to consider it. A senior British diplomat in London agrees: "It would have been most unusual for the Soviets to react positively the first time the Carter people put their proposals on the table." But did the Russians have to react so negatively? Why, moreover, did they not ask for more time to study the U.S. options? To these questions, Administration spokesmen had no convincing reply.

At the press conference, the President also indicated that he was not about to abandon his human rights campaign in the face of Moscow's chilly new attitude toward the U.S. Said he: "I will not modify my human rights statements [which] are compatible with the consciousness of this country ... [and] are not an intrusion into other nations' affairs."

Later, in a chat with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Carter elaborated: "We don't want to interfere in other countries, but at the same time, there are basic principles and values we must continue to support. That's terribly important to the American people, but it's perhaps been quite a shock to the international diplomatic community.

"We made a drastic proposal, we realize that," Carter added. "These sorts of restraints [on weapons systems], substantial reductions and agreements not to go ahead with certain systems are something very new and serious. I can understand that [the Soviets] will want to think about them." He then repeated his conviction that there is still "the possibility of eventual agreement along the lines of our position."

Carter displayed both confidence and a firm grasp of the issues in his separate meetings with congressional leaders and newsmen. The performance --his most impressive so far in dealing with foreign policy issues--also regained something of a public relations initiative for the U.S. on the SALT standoff.

The Kremlin evidently felt that it had to explain away what world opinion was beginning to regard as a Soviet rejection of an important U.S. disarmament proposal. Standing before the Moscow press corps in the Kremlin version of a news conference, Foreign Minister Gromyko read a speech for 81 minutes and then for another quarter of an hour responded to questions that had been submitted in writing. Thumping the table with a finger, waving a pencil and rolling his eyes toward the ceiling in exasperation, he clearly acted the injured party. He blasted the U.S. SALT proposals for being "a revision of the agreement reached in Vladivostok" and an attempt to introduce issues "to make things more difficult." Alluding to the human rights issue, the Soviet official exclaimed: "No kind of noise, squeal or screech will detract us!" Despite his heavy sarcasm and studied anger, Gromyko was careful to emphasize that SALT was not dead. Said he: "The Soviet leadership has a lot of patience, we have enough patience to continue the talks. We stand for good relations with the U.S."

One test of Gromyko's words will come in May at his scheduled meeting with Vance. He may, of course, simply replay the Moscow script and call for a ratification of the Vladivostok accord. By demanding that the ceilings apply to cruise missiles, the Soviets have made this versatile and lethally accurate U.S. weapon the heart of the SALT dispute. But Moscow's demands for controls on cruise are certain to be rejected by the U.S. For Washington to accept cruise limits, Moscow would have to offer something of comparable importance --such as restrictions on Backfire, along with reductions hi the number of mammoth missiles. These monster rockets are a potential threat to the U.S., because once they are armed with MIRVS, they could--unlike cruise--be used as an effective, disarming first strike.

High Level. The Soviets seem to feel that the new package asks more of them than of the U.S. In one sense, they are correct. The Russians now deploy more strategic launchers than the U.S. They would have to destroy a greater number of them to get below the American-proposed ceilings. A virtue of the Vladivostok limit from the Kremlin's viewpoint is that it creates parity between the two sides at the relatively high level of 2,400 launchers, thus requiring no drastic slash. U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown pointed out at a breakfast with newsmen last week in Washington that "concentrating exclusively on the numbers of launchers is a mistake." The extra power of the Soviets' heavy missiles "would give them a much higher increase in the number of war heads" if they were armed with MIRVS.

Whether the Administration can persuade the Kremlin to accept a major SALT agreement depends in large part on the success of Carter's foreign policy. That carefully thought out policy is based on a set of assumptions--all of which are debatable and all of which involve dangers. They are:

1) The American people will support detente in general and SALT in particular only if they feel the Administration is assertively defending basic American values at the same time that it pursues better relations with the U.S.S.R. In this area Carter has partly succeeded. According to a recent survey conducted for TIME, he is supported by 55% of those polled on his criticism of Soviet repression of human rights.

2) The Soviet Union has long maintained that peaceful coexistence with the U.S. by no means ends competition (the Soviets use the word struggle) in the ideological sphere. Thus American official outspokenness on human rights is consistent with what has been a longstanding Soviet disclaimer about the limits of detente.

3) The Soviet leadership badly needs access to Western technology and markets, and it badly needs a cap on the arms race in order to devote more of its economic potential to improving the standard of living of its own people. These needs are so acute that despite its threats and protestations, the Kremlin will live with the new outspoken U.S. policy once it becomes convinced that the Carter Administration is irrevocably committed to that policy--and cannot be intimidated into backing down.

4) SALT must ultimately entail arms reduction rather than just arms control, since the arsenals have already grown dangerously. While the Soviets find the idea of deep cuts hard to swallow, substantial reductions require at least as much of a sacrifice by the U.S., if not more. Thus there is nothing inherently unacceptable to Moscow about the main Carter package.

An obvious novice at dealing with the Russians, Carter has taken certain risks--some of them possibly unnecessary--in carrying out that policy. In light of cynical Soviet votes at the United Nations and other forums against alleged repression in other countries, the President has ample reason for attacking human rights violations in the Soviet Union. Still, it is one thing to state principles in a speech, and quite another to challenge Brezhnev directly by writing a letter to Andrei Sakharov. Carter should know if he plays tough, he must be prepared for the Russians to do the same. In the long run, there is also the danger that if all the rhetoric about human rights fails to change anything, disillusionment will set in.

Another continuing question concerns Carter's open diplomacy, his public offers and proposals on highly delicate issues. Are they, as many think, a bracing shock that will force movement on long-stalled problems? Or will they make it harder for Soviet leaders and others to compromise and thus lead to more deeply entrenched positions? The latter danger is a real one, but it is too soon to tell how serious. Some observers pointed out that even Gromyko paid oblique tribute to Vance's open and detailed presentation of the U.S. proposals--a departure from tradition in arms negotiations.

The President is not about to back down or away; indeed, it is he who seems to be testing Brezhnev, not vice versa. He told last week's press conference that he would consider "the development and deployment of additional weapons" if a SALT II agreement is not reached. If he gives the green light to the cruise missile, the M-X missile and the B-l bomber, U.S. defense spending could increase by about $2 billion annually. For their part, the Soviets would probably continue the rapid pace of arms buildup they have maintained for the past few years. This would not mean the two powers would be on the verge of war. But it would certainly lead to a grave increase in tensions and spell the end of detente.

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