Still Strong Enough to Block a Blitz?

The dawn quiet of central Germany is suddenly shattered by the thundering explosions of tens of thousands of Soviet rockets and artillery shells. Then thousands of Soviet tanks, with dozens of motorized rifle divisions behind them, crash across the frontier into West Germany. Far to the south, Warsaw Pact forces blast into Turkey and through Yugoslavia toward Italy, while the Soviet Fleet moves in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic to neutralize NATO's warships.

But the Western alliance is ready. Warned of the enemy buildup by spy satellite photos, NATO'S divisions are at full strength and alerted. Using only conventional weapons, NATO is able to absorb much of the punch and launch selected counterattacks, thus slowing the advance sufficiently to give the alliance a chance to reinforce its divisions, to search for diplomatic solutions and--most important of all--to have time to assess when, if and how nuclear weapons should be used.

For nearly a decade, this has been NATO's standard scenario of an East-West war. Today, however, concern is mounting, especially among West Europeans, that this is dangerously outdated. After a recent inspection of NATO installations, Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett of the Senate Armed Services Committee charged that Soviet forces in Europe could now mount a surprise attack, blitz their way past NATO's defenses and reach the Rhine in 48 hours. Reported the Senators: "Should the NATO alliance fail to improve its conventional war-fighting capabilities ... the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies soon may be invited by NATO weaknesses to launch a major conventional invasion of Western Europe ..."

While this assessment may be a bit shrill, many Western military men agree with it. Similar views are certain to punctuate this week's separate meetings of the alliance's Defense Ministers and Foreign Ministers at NATO headquarters near Brussels. A classified combat effectiveness report, prepared for NATO Commanding General Alexander Haig, will serve as a tough briefing paper for the meetings. Haig's conclusion: the alliance's conventional ground forces are weak and must be strengthened. Because of the Soviet buildup, warns Haig, "NATO will have less and less warning of a potential Soviet offensive." The most charitable assessment that one NATO ambassador can offer about the organization: "It is a healthy cripple."

This is not the first time that the 15-nation alliance has been racked with doubts about its ability to repel or even sufficiently deter a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe. Yet NATO's present concern over its battlefield limitations is probably more valid than ever.

To be sure, there is nothing in the state of East-West relations today that would make a Soviet attack likely. But Western strategists cannot afford to rule out the possibility of a sudden change in Moscow's policy. In case of a sudden military threat, NATO could not mount a credible deterrent--at present force levels and with the present economic and political weaknesses of many Western governments. In terms of numbers, the alliance today is outmanned, outgunned, out-tanked and out-planed. This is primarily the result of the massive buildup of Soviet armed forces that began ten years ago and has yet to slacken (TIME, March 8). A top NATO official points out that the U.S.S.R. now turns out a new submarine every five weeks and 800 warplanes a year. This year alone, it added 2,000 new tanks to its arsenal, while America's tank force grew at only about one-fifth that figure. This arms imbalance is especially dangerous in NATO's north-central region, stretching from the Baltic to the Alps, where numerous areas of excellent tank terrain offer an inviting route of march from the Elbe to the Rhine or over the English Channel.

While NATO, with about twice the industrial and 1 1/2 times the manpower base of the Warsaw Pact, maintains an undeniable advantage in its ability to slug through a lengthy war, its only substantial quantitative edge in combat-ready power in Europe is its 2-to-l superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. Its 7,000 atomic warheads, kept in Europe by the U.S., are theoretically to be delivered by plane, cannon and missile against relatively limited targets like supply depots or massing tanks. In practice, however, the U.S. would have to hesitate before crossing even a tactical nuclear threshold, for that could be the first step toward triggering a global atomic exchange. If Warsaw Pact troops were to push into and occupy West German urban areas, NATO would face the agonizing prospect of unleashing a tactical atomic barrage against the cities and towns of its own member.

To reduce this uneasy dependence on nuclear weapons, NATO'S members- adopted in 1967 a strategy of "flexible response." This doctrine calls for NATO first to employ conventional forces against an invader. But if peace negotiations should fail or it appears that West Germany will be overrun, the American President would authorize the use of tactical and then perhaps strategic atomic arms.

This strategy has made sense to NATO, even though the alliance is so heavily outgunned on the battlefield. For one thing, NATO would be on the defensive, thus requiring significantly fewer troops than an attacker. NATO also benefits from advanced technology. Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks serves as a good example of NATO'S superior equipment: although the mammoth Soviet T-62 is heavier than its Western rivals--the U.S.'s M60, Britain's Chieftain and West Germany's Leopard--it is less accurate, slower, and sports a vulnerably exposed rear fuel tank. The West also leads in developing precision-guided munitions (the so-called smart weapons) like the infantry-or helicopter-fired TOW tank killer. Still, very few of these are presently deployed on the front line of defense. NATO officers need not worry as much as their Russian counterparts about the loyalty of their units. Speculates a senior U.S. officer in West Germany: "If you were a Soviet general, would you feel comfort able about Polish, Czech, Hungarian --let alone Rumanian--troops?" (However, pacifism and far-left loyalties in several Western European countries are also a concern.)

Despite such NATO advantages, the flexible response strategy has become less attractive as Soviet forces have increased to a level where they may be able to spring an attack without giving much warning. NATO is poorly prepared for the kind of short, ferocious rocket, tank and artillery blitz that Moscow could launch. Indeed, the Soviets would launch no other kind, for their 75%-to-25% ratio of combat troops to support troops (the U.S. puts 50% in logistics and support) is predicated on a fast-moving front. In a discomfiting break from tradition, Moscow is now training its air force to support advancing ground units. The SU-19 Fencer, recently deployed in East Germany, is the first Soviet fighterbomber designed specifically to engage ground targets. Thus, before Washington even has time to decide whether or not to use tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Army and its allies might be deep into West Germany, at the Gorizia and Thrace gaps in southeast Europe and into Norway.

What can NATO do to enhance its capabilities? Among the suggestions:

WEAPON COMPATIBILITY. NATO may be wasting as much as 30% of its effectiveness through duplication. It deploys, for instance, 31 different antitank missiles, six types of recoilless rifles and 41 varieties of naval guns. Within the Warsaw Pact, standardization is achieved because Moscow designs and produces nearly all of the weaponry. NATO's multiplicity of arms makes battlefield resupply a logistician's nightmare and vastly complicates coordinated combat. During NATO exercises last year, a number of the alliance's planes were "shot down" by friendly forces because the radios of one nation's aircraft could not communicate with another's.

At this week's conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will argue strongly for Increased standardization of the alliance's weapons. All present are certain to applaud him enthusiastically. But it is just as certain that any significant progress toward compatible weapons will be slow. The reason: each country prefers to keep its own scientists and production workers employed on technologically advanced programs. Even so, there have been some encouraging steps. Among them: a new rocket mine-laying system that will use a U.S. mine and a West German rocket, the U.S. purchase of the Belgian MG-58 machine gun, the interchangeable key components of the new U.S. XM--1 tank and the West German Leopard II tank.

REDEPLOYMENT. U.S., British and West German units would be in better positions closer to the front. Large units of the American forces that are now concentrated in southern Germany could be shifted to reinforce the British Army of the Rhine in the more vulnerable north. But any troop shift must overcome formidable civilian obstacles, ranging from lengthy litigation to buy land to the outraged cries of conservationists. The U.S. is soon to assign a 3,800-man brigade to the Bremerhaven area; the negotiations for the base's lease took two years.

FIREPOWER. NATO needs more artillery, tanks and battlefield missiles. At a minimum, the U.S. should replenish the reserves of armored personnel carriers, howitzers, antitank missiles and tanks that were shipped from Europe to Viet Nam or Israel. Confesses Haig: "For a long period of time, we were sneaking supplies out of Europe." Allied arms depots should be better dispersed to make them less vulnerable to enemy attack. Most U.S. supplies are stored within 30 miles of West Germany's Kaiserslautern.

MOBILIZATION. The alliance's response time must be shortened. Says a Washington weapons analyst: "It's not just a question of Al Haig pushing a button. The Danish parliament never gets a four-fifths majority on anything, but that is what is needed to move its Jutland divisions into proper positions in the south. In some cases the ammunition for units is five to six hours away."

Any such bolstering of NATO will not come cheap. To take a 1,200-man U.S. battalion out of its World War II-vintage barracks and billet it closer to the front costs about $35 million. Hundreds of millions of dollars more would be needed to increase combat-ready manpower. But the trend in the past decade has been for nearly all NATO states to cut back their defense outlays. With the economic outlook for Western Europe remaining murky, it is unlikely that the leaders of many NATO states are going to find 1977 an expedient year to hike defense spending. Beleaguered Britain (see box) is almost certainly going to be forced to slash its military budget. An important improvement in NATO's position would follow from Western Europe's economic revival, social accord and recovery of confidence. In purely military terms, NATO has sought for the past three years in its negotiations with the Warsaw Pact in Vienna to reduce forces along the East-West front according to a formula that would eventually result in parity. Moscow has shown no willingness to forgo its increasing numerical superiority. If this superiority persists and is plainly perceived by West Europeans, the real danger the West faces is not so much an invasion by the pact but political intimidation by the Soviets. As Western capitals conclude that NATO could not thwart an invasion, West European leaders will be increasingly reluctant to press policies that would antagonize the Kremlin. Warns a top NATO diplomat: "The Soviet Army in Central Europe is a hammer hanging over democratic Western Europe. The larger the hammer gets, the more attention the Europeans have to pay to it. They don't necessarily have to be hit over the head with it."

* NATO consists of the U.S., Canada, Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Turkey, Italy and Portugal. France and Greece have withdrawn from the military command, but are still members of the political alliance. The Warsaw Pact is made up of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.