Behind the Scenes, a War About Peace

It was, after all, a predictably mercurial meeting of the Arab League. As long as the television lights were turned on and the TV cameras were running, leaders of 20 Arab states (plus the Palestine Liberation Organization) who gathered at league headquarters in Cairo spoke glowingly of Arab solidarity. Once the switches had been turned off, however, the conferees stopped smiling and disappeared into closeted quarters. There for two days they argued bitterly about the plan to end Lebanon's bloody 18-month civil war that had been agreed on at an Arab summit in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia (TIME, Nov. 1). At that meeting, the league members most involved in the Lebanese cease-fire --Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the P.L.O.--had agreed to a new 30,000-man peace-keeping force and to enforce the Cairo accord of 1969, which constricts Palestinian movement within Lebanon.

The main problem in Cairo was that too many of the Arab states distrust each other's intentions in Lebanon. Specifically, many of the leaders were unhappy about the 21,000-man Syrian force that President Hafez Assad had dispatched to Lebanon; initially sent to impose an armistice between the warring factions, the Syrians later sided with the rightist Christians in battles against the Moslem leftists and their Palestinian allies. In Riyadh, the Arab leaders agreed that some or all of the Syrian troops would be part of the new peace-keeping force, which is to be bankrolled largely by the Saudis (estimated cost: $90 million in the first six months) and supervised by Lebanese President Elias Sarkis.

That plan ran into difficulty in Cairo as soon as the meeting was brought to order. Iraq's Foreign Minister Saadun Hammadi, whose government had sent 2,000 troops into Lebanon on the Palestinian side, demanded the full withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country. He denounced the Riyadh pact authorizing them to become part of the post-armistice force. Hammadi's demands plunged the first major Arab summit in two years into a bitter dispute.

Syrian Uniforms. In the end, however, the clout of the leading moderates won out--sort of. Egypt, which is the overwhelming political power in the region, Syria, which currently has the military strength, and Saudi Arabia, which has the money, hung together to insist on ratification of the Riyadh agreement. Syria's President Assad, who until the Riyadh meeting had been at odds with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, spoke glowingly of "this good land of Egypt" and praised "my brother Sadat." Lebanese Delegate Najib Dahdah attacked Hammadi for interfering in the internal affairs of his country--ignoring the fact that Syria has interfered considerably more than Iraq. In the end, the Arab League members--with Iraq voting against the Riyadh endorsement--agreed on a plan that will allow Lebanon's President Sarkis to choose soldiers from any state that offers them. So far, troops have been offered by Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Libya and the P.L.O. The expectation is, however, that when the force is finally drawn up, the bulk of its members will be wearing Syrian uniforms.

The Cairo summit was less successful in dealing with what has suddenly become a nagging second element of the cease-fire agreement in Lebanon. Although the 56th truce in the civil war was holding fairly well in northern sections of the country, Christian Lebanese forces continued fighting in the south, capturing at least a dozen leftist-controlled villages, including the key town of Marjayoun near the Litani River. The Christians acknowledge having received considerable help from Israel --ranging from arms and ammunition to armored vehicles and even tanks. Un der the terms of the Riyadh agreement, Palestinian guerrillas must withdraw from the Beirut area; many would normally return to the Arkoub region of southern Lebanon, from which commandos in the past have launched at tacks across the border at Israel. But with the Christians in control of the area, the Palestinians have been unable to go back. The Israelis for their part have no intention of letting their border be threatened by the fedayeen again. Yet the Syrians reportedly have begun allowing small numbers of Palestinians into the South as evidence of their intention to implement the agreement. If this proves to be more than symbolic, it could produce new flash points in the South.

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