G.O.P. DONNYBROOK

"Electable"--that will be the buzz word dominating the bitter Republican struggle, probably right down to the convention floor in Kansas City, Aug. 16. The argument will be whether Gerald Ford or Ronald Reagan will have a better chance of beating the formidable Jimmy Carter in November. The very fact that doubts are being cast on the electability of a sitting President with the traditional advantages of incumbency is a measure of the trouble Ford is in. It is also a measure of how far Reagan has come from a shaky start, with no credentials in foreign affairs and with an essentially ideological appeal.

The jarring primary struggle that ended with the presidential nomination still maddeningly eluding both contenders obviously was only a prelude to Phase 2 of the 1976 campaign--an intense, even frantic pursuit of a relative handful of delegates who now may determine the nominee.

Reagan's strength in that search was strikingly demonstrated last Saturday in Springfield, Mo., when he inflicted yet another grievous wound on President Ford's hopes for the nomination. In a humiliating rout, with both real and psychological impact, Reagan won 18 of Missouri's 19 at-large delegates. When added to the Missouri delegates already won by Reagan, the 18-1 victory gave him control of the 49-member Missouri delegation, with 30 votes to Ford's 16 (and three uncommitted). The only Ford delegate to survive Reagan's weekend charge was Governor Christopher S. Bond, who himself suffered a setback in the Ford defeat: when Missouri hosts the Republican National Convention in Kansas City in August, the Governor will not even be chairman of the delegation.

By waging internecine warfare, Ford and Reagan create the risk that when the prize of the nomination is finally won, it will not be worth much. But both men have brought to that problem the philosophy of a baseball manager whose team is down three games in the World Series: win today or there'll be no tomorrow.

In last week's Super Bowl primaries, Ford swept up 88 delegates in Ohio to Reagan's nine, though Reagan won 45% of the popular vote--more than expected. The President also captured New Jersey's 67 delegates. But Reagan won all 167 delegates in California's winner-take-all primary.

In soundings by TIME correspondents after last week's voting, uncommitted delegates who really favor one candidate or the other were allocated to their favorites. This process reduced the pool of genuinely uncommitted delegates to 67, brought Ford's total to 1,012 and Reagan's to 921, with 259 delegates yet to be chosen (see chart).

With the delegates yet to be chosen in twelve states, Reagan appears certain to close the gap and prevent Ford from reaching the 1,130 total required for nomination. In the view of Reagan strategists, he may very well sweep the 127 delegates to be chosen at state conventions in Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and Washington--all in the Western heartland of Reagan country. After splitting North Dakota's 18 votes with Ford and picking up eight in Minnesota to ten for Ford (an estimate that observers believe exaggerates Reagan's strength), Reagan will try to pick up ten more in Connecticut and Delaware, 18 in Iowa, plus four each in Idaho and Texas, bringing his total to 1,066 against Ford's 1,039. Thus uncommitted and undecided delegates could find themselves vested with the power and responsibility of determining the Republican candidate.

The Ford camp naturally disputes the projections. Giving "every benefit to Reagan," Ford Adviser Mel Laird insists that Ford will enter the convention with 1,114 delegates at a minimum, Reagan with 1,058 at best. Thus Ford would be only 16 away from the "magic number." This "worst case projection," says Laird, assures Ford's nomination, since "I have absolute confidence, 100% certainty," that Ford will win the support of at least 75% of the theoretically uncommitted.

Most party experts are resigned to a hectic convention, with a battle over the party platform as well as the nominee. Reagan's forces are likely to insist on strong planks on defense of the Panama Canal, against abortion and against detente. Should Ford win the nomination, he could find himself running on a Reagan platform. In such a situation, his advisers say he would simply ignore the platform.

"I guess we'll go right into the convention without a candidate," sighs Robert Hughes, Republican chairman of Ohio's populous Cuyahoga County. Why? "Purists," says Ford Backer Hughes. "They want their view of a conservative candidate. And it doesn't much matter whether the man can win or not."

That clearly expressed the Ford line for the crucial days of delegate-wooing--a line he believes was effective in his Ohio primary victory. It emphasizes the thesis that Reagan is unelectable, and that he will drag Republican candidates for offices from governor to alderman down with him. He reminds Republicans of "the tragedy of 1964 ... until that election, in the House of Representatives we had about 185 Republican members. After the election, we had 140." "Surely," he continues, "you're not going to let that happen again by letting the wrong person lead the ticket in November."

Reagan gave Ford his opening for the "extremist" charge by indicating, in response to a newsman's question two weeks ago in California, that he would not rule out sending U.S. troops to Rhodesia if asked to do so by that African nation's white minority government (TIME, June 14). Instead of letting Reagan simply suffer the consequences of his gaffe, Ford men junked the President's California TV commercials, substituted new ones playing on the theme that "Governor Reagan could not start a war. President Reagan could." The overkill did not benefit Ford in a state he had no chance to win in any event.

Although agreeing that Reagan cannot win the election, even so devoted a Ford adviser as Mel Laird seemed to take issue with the tactic of painting him as an extremist. "I don't consider Reagan an extremist," said Laird. "I think he's got greater popularity inside the Republican Party than any other candidate. Reagan is much more popular than Ford in the rank and file, but you can't win the election in that area. Declared Republicans make up only 17% to 19% of the electorate." The remark about Reagan's popularity was a startling admission from a member of the Ford inner circle.

While Ford plays his "Reagan can't win" record for the delegates, Reagan and his men argue that the precise opposite is true. They point to private polls that persuaded Reagan to enter the race in the first place. The polls showed Reagan ranking well ahead of Ford among Republicans on such personal traits as leadership and decisiveness.

Undeniably, Ford has rarely succeeded in appearing sufficiently "presidential." His huge budget deficits have doubtless offended many deep-dyed Republicans, and he has positioned himself on both sides of such embattled issues as tax reduction and antitrust enforcement. But he has also won support for his obvious decency and openness, and for the fact that the nation is at peace. If anything, he has not received enough credit for the surging economy. The fact that he is President has been reason enough for many Republicans to vote for him.

A far more polished campaigner, particularly on TV, Reagan appeals to a constituency that believes the U.S. has been "pushed around" because of a soft, conciliatory foreign policy. He is also perceived as more likely to penetrate the wall of unresponsiveness that many believe surrounds Washington--something that Ford, as a member of Congress for 25 years before becoming Vice President, either cannot or will not do. Reagan's campaign manager, John Sears, correctly senses another Reagan advantage and a Ford liability in the querulous mood of the country: "This may be a year when people don't know what they want, but they know they don't want what they've got."

Reagan also argues that Carter's anti-Washington appeal will work against Ford, but not against him. He points to sizable Democratic cross-over votes that enabled him to blank Ford in the Texas primary, and to his support elsewhere by the now leaderless Wallace following. By carrying California and Texas, in both of whose primaries he swamped Ford, and picking off some Southern states he has demonstrated that no other Republican could wrest from Carter, Reagan insists the Republicans would have a better chance to win with him as the candidate.

Although it is conceivable that Reagan could carry North Carolina and Virginia--and possibly Mississippi and Texas --against Carter, it is by no means certain. Should he also carry California, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, Indiana, South Dakota and Nebraska, in all of which he has strong but by no means unchallengeable strength, he would still be 117 electoral votes short of winning. He would be forced to make up some of that deficit in the electoral-vote-rich Northern and Midwestern industrial states, where his appeal seems weakest.

Finally, Reagan tries to sell himself as the only candidate with the campaigning skills and ability to articulate the issues that will be effective in a campaign against Carter. Ford seems to bolster that argument of Reagan's with virtually every campaign appearance. For example, last week in Ohio the President added to his repertory of feckless rhetorical mannerisms by constantly referring to himself in the third person--"I'm confident that President Jerry Ford can be elected." Commented a telephone company executive in Findlay, Ohio: "He sounds like he's delivering a 'man who' nominating speech for somebody else."

In polls, Ford generally fares better than Reagan among all voters. In fact, in a Mervin Field poll published last week, Ford trailed Carter in California only 41-40, while Reagan was eight points in arrears--46-38. But both appear threatened by serious Republican defections to Carter. A New York Times/CBS survey of voters in Ohio and California and a Times survey of New Jersey voters showed that an astonishing 35% of Reagan and Ford supporters plan to vote for Carter if their own favorite fails to win the G.O.P. nomination. This percentage would seem certain to shrink as passions cool following the nomination.

Supporters of both men scoff at the notion that a Democratic victory in November is anything like a foregone conclusion. Ford Campaign Chairman Rogers Morton insists that "fundamentally, this experience [the primary battles] has not been harmful to the President. It has given him a chance to demonstrate his ability to communicate with people, and his personal warmth."

Such an optimistic view runs counter to those expressed privately in the White House, which hold that the primaries have dangerously divided an already undersubscribed party, in which the conservative element has swollen in influence as moderates have fled the party. The very real fear of a number of Republican professionals is that President Ford, in painting Reagan as an extremist who cannot win, and Reagan, in depicting the President as too weak and indecisive to lead the nation effectively, may both turn out to have been all too persuasive.

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