The Final Days: Hanoi's Version

Two Hanoi newspapers have lately been publishing a serial account of last year's conquest of South Viet Nam. Written by North Vietnamese Chief of Staff General Van Tien Dung--second in military command to Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap--the remarkably candid narrative offers an intimate glimpse of North Vietnamese thoughts on the successful offensive. Some of Dung's main disclosures:

> The planning for the final offensive began fully a year before the attacks that signaled the end for Saigon. During a series of meetings in the spring of 1974, Hanoi's generals decided that the balance of military power in Viet Nam had swung in favor of the North. Though they were confident of eventual victory, the North Vietnamese did not expect the offensive to reach a climax until 1976. The abrupt collapse of Saigon's forces surprised Hanoi almost as much as it did everyone else.

-- Dung admits that beginning in 1974, Hanoi broke the Paris accords by transporting massive reinforcements to South Viet Nam: "Great quantities of such materiel as tanks, armored cars, missiles, long-range artillery pieces and antiaircraft guns ... were sent to various battlefields." In addition, a 1,000-kilometer all-weather supply road was built to the south, as well as a concealed 5,000-kilometer gasoline pipeline. Accompanying the supply effort was a recruitment drive in the North that funneled "tens of thousands" of new troops into Hanoi's army.

>Hanoi recognized the reduction of U.S. aid to the Saigon government as a key factor in the war's outcome. Says Dung: "Nguyen Van Thieu was forced to fight a poor man's war." He adds that Saigon's "firepower had declined by nearly 60% because of bomb and ammunition shortages. Its mobility was reduced by half, owing to the lack of aircraft, vehicles and fuel."

> A "heated discussion" took place in Hanoi regarding the possibility that the U.S. would reintervene in the South. In the end, however, Hanoi determined that the U.S. would probably stay out. One important factor: Watergate. Says Dung: "The Watergate scandal had seriously affected the entire U.S. and precipitated the resignation of an extremely reactionary, imperialist President--Nixon."

> Hanoi knew the South Vietnamese expected the first attack of the offensive to be either in Tay Ninh province, near the Cambodian border, or farther north in Pleiku. Hence the Communists' decision to launch the initial thrust against the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot. That came as a complete surprise to Saigon and led President Thieu to his hasty decision to withdraw his forces from the Central Highlands. Dung calls Thieu's decision a "grave strategic mistake." Thereafter, he says, Hanoi's main problem was moving fast enough to maintain the military initiative. For example, the Communists sent a commander from Hanoi to take charge of the battle for Danang on March 26. Much to Hanoi's astonishment, the city fell only three days later--without a fight.

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