Kneeling to Allah, Not to Leonid

Through most of a 3-hr. 15-min. stem-winder to Egypt's People's Assembly last week, President Anwar Sadat was in an amiable mood. But in the final five minutes he turned sternly serious, and then he dropped his bombshell. "The Soviet Union," he declared, "is trying to bring us to our knees. But I will get on my knees before no one but Allah." Amid ringing cheers, Sadat then demanded that the parliament unilaterally abrogate Egypt's treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union because Moscow is no longer providing the military support that the 1971 pact was supposed to guarantee.

Moscow was plainly surprised--and embarrassed. The Soviet press retorted weakly that Sadat's move was meaningless because the treaty was "paralyzed" in any case. There was no mention of the fact that only last month at the 25th Party Congress, Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev had dismissed rumors of rift and pledged to strengthen Soviet-Egyptian relations. The U.S. was quietly delighted by Moscow's discomfort, especially because Cairo editorials likened the Soviet failure to honor the treaty to an old debacle in Egyptian-U.S. relations: the refusal by John Foster Dulles two decades ago to arm Egypt or finance the Aswan High Dam, which prompted Gamal Abdel Nasser to turn East and open Egypt to Soviet influence.

By turning West again, however, Sadat is subtly pressing Washington--just at a time when such pressure might affect a U.S. presidential campaign. Specifically he is looking for U.S. military equipment and assistance to replace the Russian aid denied him. In Israel, the idea of Washington arming Egypt has raised angry protests. U.S. Jewish voters, too, are disturbed and uncertain about Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's proposal to sell a package of six C-130 cargo planes to Egypt for $50 million. Supporters of Israel see the C-130s as only the first item on a long list of sophisticated equipment for Egypt.

Cairo seeks new arms because the Soviets have provided virtually none since the 1973 war, while generously refurbishing the Syrian army and advancing $1 billion in military goods to an Arab wild man, Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. Moscow intimates that Egypt's staggering debt for previous goods and services--still about $6 billion, including commercial loans--is a reason for the slowdown. Sadat in private conversations gives probably a more accurate reason. He accuses the Soviets of attempting to overthrow him by generating unrest in Egypt in revenge for his participating in U.S. step-by-step diplomacy.

Sadat justified his diplomatic moves last week by pointing out that "99% of the cards of the Middle East game are in the hands of America." To escape dependency on the Soviets and remain in the game, Sadat last month wheedled substantial aid out of oil-rich Arab allies during a trip to the Persian Gulf. He was promised $750 million outright by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf emirates, as well as $700 million more in an unannounced gift from the Saudis to pay for Western arms; he also has pledges from the oil-producing states of another $12 billion over four years in long-term loans, provided Egypt improves its fiscal position. In addition, Sadat has a quid pro quo from the U.S. for taking part in the Sinai negotiations with Israel. Following successful second-stage Sinai disengagement talks last summer, President Ford acknowledged that Washington and Cairo were discussing arms aid and that "there is to some extent an implied commitment."

At the heart of the commitment is a subtle shift in U.S. thinking. Before the Sinai talks, Washington sought to prevent war by keeping Israel unmistakably stronger than the Arabs in order to discourage attack. Now, in a period of reduced hostility, the Administration feels it can also provide arms to Arabs without shifting the military balance. In the case of Egypt, such arms will mollify military leaders and insure against Sadat's overthrow by less moderate rivals. The U.S. also helps Sadat and improves its own leverage in the Arab world by not abandoning him to critics after he has boldly moved out of Moscow's orbit and opted for peacemaking.

Israeli Aid. Another consideration in the Administration's decision is that Sadat, particularly since he has cash, is bound to get arms somewhere. For instance, War Minister Mohamed Abdel Ghany Gamassy left for France last week to talk about Mirage fighters and ground-to-air missiles. The U.S. might as well try to provide arms and regulate the flow.

None of these arguments satisfy Israel or its backers among U.S. Jews, even though continuing heavy U.S. military aid to Israel ($2.3 billion this year) has once again made the Israeli army the strongest in the Middle East. Last week a dozen representatives of American Jewish organizations visited the White House to question military support for Egypt. They found President Ford friendly but unyielding. He insisted that "nothing else of significance" was currently planned beyond the C-130s--which Kissinger, who sat in, dismissed as "six lousy airplanes." Ford told the group he intended to follow a dual policy of concern for Israel's security and support for the "courageous" Sadat. "The election won't change things," said one of the Jewish representatives resignedly after the meeting. "This is going to be U.S. foreign policy and it doesn't matter who is President."

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