Clouds of Black Mist

Reverberations from the Lockheed scandal echoed across Japan last week in angry newspaper headlines and outraged television commentaries. The affair was the country's most explosive political issue since ex-Premier Kakuei Tanaka resigned 15 months ago under charges of shady financial dealings. Fearful of voter reaction, the ruling Liberal Democrats now plan to put off until the fall parliamentary elections that were expected this spring. After marathon sessions with worried party members from the Diet, Premier Takeo Miki ordered an investigation by a lower-house committee, which this week will hear testimony from key principals in the case.

The Lockheed payoffs are clearly an example of what the Japanese poetically refer to as kuroi kiri (black mist), or corruption. Ironically, Premier Miki could profit from the public anger; he has earned a reputation as his party's Mr. Clean. But Tanaka, who remained a major behind-the-scenes power in the Liberal Democratic Party after his resignation as Premier, is almost certain to be tarnished, directly or indirectly, by the new scandal.

It's lucky we picked Miki," Liberal Democrats were telling each other last week. That is a new sentiment. As recently as last December, Miki's administration received an abysmal 26.6% popularity rating in a public opinion poll. His ambitious reform program had made little headway. Promised antitrust legislation ended up pigeonholed in the Diet. Inflation was slowed to a manageable 9%, but the government failed to stop price rises on necessities like rice, oil and electric power. The party's hawkish right wing blocked Miki's attempts to ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Miki seemed weak and ineffective; there were whispers that prior to the next elections he might be replaced as party boss by a stronger man--possibly even Tanaka.

The Lockheed disclosures changed all that. Miki still has his reputation for integrity; he has never been associated with the right-wing, big money elements in the party. Thus it now seems virtually certain that he will serve out his full term as party leader, until 1977. Tanaka, on the other hand, has apparently had his wings clipped once again. The brash, unrepentant politician promised the nation a full answer to questions about his financial dealings when he resigned in 1974, but no explanation has ever come forth. He is still rich, head of his party's biggest faction, and a major architect of Liberal Democratic strategy. But the Lockheed affair is a vivid reminder of the cloud of suspicion that still surrounds Tanaka.

The Tanaka connection, if indeed one exists, involves two Lockheed sales coups in the fall of 1972, while he was Premier. One was the decision of All Nippon Airways, Japan's principal domestic carrier, to buy six Lockheed TriStar jetliners instead of McDonnell Douglas or Boeing competitors; the order later grew to 21. The other was a government decision to consider purchasing Lockheed P-3C Orions instead of developing a Japanese-made antisubmarine aircraft. The anticipated order, for at least 50 Orions at $13 million each, was shelved last week, as opposition leaders in the Diet charged that Lockheed had bribed government officials to push the Orion purchase by the Maritime Self-Defense Force. They also accused the Tanaka regime of pressuring All Nippon Airways to buy the TriStars. Tanaka admitted last week that he met with Lockheed President A.C. Kotchian in January 1972, but he denied that it had anything to do with the bribery scandal.

The Liberal Democrats have resisted opposition demands that Tanaka testify under oath about the two deals. One close Tanaka confidant is scheduled to testify--Multimillionaire Hotel King Kenji Osano, who was named in the U.S. Senate investigations as one of Lockheed's friends in court in Japan. Also subpoenaed, but ill at home, was Yoshio Kodama, the right-wing, militarist eminence grise whom Lockheed has paid $7 million since 1958. Kodama reportedly collected $2 million in 1972 alone, the year of the TriStar and Orion decisions.

Tanaka does have a plausible excuse for both 1972 favors to Lockheed. Two months before the decisions were made, he met with President Richard Nixon in Hawaii; Nixon is thought to have argued strongly for Japanese purchases from Lockheed, which his Administration had bailed out of near-bankruptcy in 1971.

Though Miki and his small "progressive conservative" faction of the party will probably emerge from the scandal stronger than before, the Liberal Democrats as a whole stand only to lose. They have been in power since 1955 and have become virtually identified with the interests of big business in Japan. The party has a comfortable majority of 70 seats in the lower house, but only a slender nine-vote majority in the upper house. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats' share of the vote has declined steadily for the past decade, and they will need to restore public confidence before risking an election.

Yet there is a suspicion in Japan that a thoroughgoing investigation would enshroud more than just the ruling party in the black mist. Many Japanese firms customarily give to both the Liberal Democrats and the opposition parties, apparently to hedge their bets should the opposition ever come to power. International buyers of influence may well have done the same. In any case, the Socialist, Communist and Komeito (Clean Government) parties seemed fearful last week that a public inquiry might delve too deep. They agreed to the Liberal Democrats' proposal that this week's investigation in the Diet be limited, at least at first, to two days. The opposition seemed happy to ensure that there would be no time to expose any embarrassing peccadilloes closer to home.

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