Now, a War Between the Outsiders

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) delivered some devastating military blows to its opponents last week. With Cuban "freedom fighters" doing more and more of the fighting, the Marxist-oriented regime of Agostinho Neto in Luanda seemed on the verge of eliminating one of its rival factions and at least neutralizing the other.

In the north, Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola seemed virtually finished. The scattered F.N.L.A. forces were withdrawing slowly through dense jungle toward the Zaire border, blowing up bridges and destroying guns and ammunition that they could not carry with them. At week's end Cuban-led M.P.L.A. troops had pushed the F.N.L.A. to within 50 miles of the Zaire border. It was apparently only a matter of time before Roberto's army lost control of Santo Antonio do Zaire, Sao Salvador and Maquela do Zombo--the last three major towns still in F.N.L.A. hands.

From his sanctuary in Zaire's capital of Kinshasa, F.N.L.A. Leader Roberto made occasional forays into his shrinking beachhead in Angola. His top lieutenants, however, were already resigned to the prospect of reverting to guerrilla warfare--the minings, ambushes and hit-and-run raids that they used to practice (without much success) against the Portuguese.

Suicidal Move. For its part, the M.P.L.A. pledged to stop at the Zaire border, hoping to deter Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko--a strong supporter of the F.N.L.A.--from making a retaliatory move against the oil-rich northern enclave of Cabinda. In any case, the M.P.L.A. has stationed 2,000 of its best troops in Cabinda, helped by some Cubans and armed with Soviet T-54 tanks. Thus it is unlikely that Mobutu could overrun Cabinda even if he tried.

Also in Kinshasa last week was Jonas Savimbi, leader of the third warring faction, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Savimbi spoke grandly of airlifting some 5,000 UNITA troops from the south to reinforce the crumbling F.N.L.A.--an obviously suicidal move, if he really means what he said. Savimbi's forces were giving ground to intensified M.P.L.A. attacks, which were also led by Cubans. At the same time, the infamous and disorderly F.N.L.A. "Chipenda column," a semiautonomous force of some 1,200 that is supposedly allied to UNITA, was doing more in the way of fighting with UNITA troops, robbing banks and terrorizing civilians than holding back the M.P.L.A. offensive.

Major Setback. In fact, the M.P.L.A. captured the town of Cela, just 100 miles north of the UNITA capital of Huambo. That is a major setback for UNITA and its South African allies, who used the city as their principal forward supply base. Further to the east, UNITA commanders near Luso claimed to have repulsed an attack by 1,000 M.P.L.A. troops, spearheaded by 500 Cubans and backed by Soviet advisers. At both Cela and Luso, South African artillery supporting UNITA troops played a major role in blocking M.P.L.A. advances.

With the Cubans and South Africans both so actively engaged, one Western intelligence source argued that "the war is increasingly out of the hands of the locals." UNITA commanders at Cela reported that "there are virtually no African faces in the enemy ranks." Soviet arms, including shipments of 122-mm. multiple rocket launchers, T-34 assault tanks and helicopter gunships, were largely responsible for the Cuban-led M.P.L.A.'s advances. Meanwhile, reinforcements continue to arrive on daily flights from Havana. There are an estimated 10,000 Cuban troops now in Angola; at the rate they are arriving, there could be 14,000 by next month.

South African assistance to UNITA is on a much smaller scale. There are perhaps 1,000 regular South African soldiers near the fighting fronts and 2,000 to 3,000 further back, based at Sa da Bandeira or near the Cunene River. Nonetheless, their involvement in the civil war is crucial to UNITA's survival. The South Africans man the heavy equipment--principally Panhard armored cars, 130-mm. artillery pieces and Puma helicopters--that provides UNITA with mobility and firepower.

Last week the South African Cabinet met twice in preparation for the opening of Parliament, where some lively debate on the Angolan intervention was expected. Some South African government leaders favor a unilateral pullback. They worry that their involvement in an uphill struggle will destroy the fragile detente the country has achieved with some black African states and severely drain the economy. Others argue that the prospect of an outright M.P.L.A. victory in Angola, and the presence of militantly anti-South African Cubans in the country, requires an uncompromising stand. Though Pretoria has announced the biggest reserve call-up since World War II, State President Nicolaas Didderichs told Parliament at week's end that armed force can bring no lasting solution in Angola, leading to speculation that South Africa might make a partial troop withdrawal.

Military Stalemate. Some South Africans hope that with their help, UNITA can hold the M.P.L.A. to a military stalemate. That in turn might induce M.P.L.A. Leader Agostinho Neto to accept a power-sharing agreement with Savimbi, who is solidly backed by the Ovimbundu, Angola's largest tribal group. In that case, Pretoria could offer to withdraw its forces on condition that the Cubans and Soviets do the same.

Such a deal would probably have the support of moderate leaders like Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda and perhaps even Zaire's Mobutu, who are worried that an outright M.P.L.A. victory would give the Soviet Union too much influence in Angola and the rest of central Africa. A compromise would also, of course, spare the country more violence and bloodshed. At week's end some estimates of the death toll in the civil war had risen to as high as 100,000--a devastatingly large figure for a country with only 5.5 million people.

The big question was whether the M.P.L.A. and its Communist allies would consent to a deal. At week's end it was unclear whether Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had made any progress, during his Moscow visit in persuading the Soviets that their continued intervention in the struggle was a threat to detente. As for the M.P.L.A. and its Leader Neto, they were unlikely to even discuss a political settlement as long as a military victory seemed so close.

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