Moscow's Own Viet Nam?

For 15 years, Moscow has been supplying military aid and training to pro-Soviet guerrillas, some of whom formed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.). But some high officials in the Kremlin--and in Cuba as well--are growing increasingly skeptical about the wisdom of that commitment. The muted echoes of the debate that is now under way on the issue were picked up from Western intelligence and Soviet sources last week by TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold Schecter and Correspondent Strobe Talbott. Their report:

The Soviets have learned the hard way--in Egypt, Uganda and elsewhere --that military aid is an uncertain political investment in Africa. Thus the nationalism of the M.P.L.A.'s leaders causes skeptics in Moscow, including some at the Politburo level, to question whether the Kremlin might be throwing away its rubles in Angola. They argue that there is no way to guarantee that sizable Soviet backing will buy an obedient satellite state or even produce a trustworthy ally. Moreover, even if the Soviets were to gain naval and air bases in Angola, giving them a long-coveted foothold on the West Coast of Africa, skeptics maintain that the strategic advantages would not be worth the damage done to Soviet-American relations and East-West detente.

In Havana, Western sources say, there is "demoralization and discontent" among high-level military and civilian officials over the Castro regime's commitment of regular army troops to fight in a foreign conflict. Indeed, a Western official reports that Cuba sent the troops to Angola only "with the greatest reluctance and as a result of Soviet arm twisting." The Soviets feared that the M.P.L.A. would be unable to use the sophisticated weaponry that Moscow was supplying. Since the Russians were unwilling to send in troops themselves, they pressured the Cubans into doing so. But the Cubans have suffered considerable casualties, and their Ilyushin 18 and Bristol Britannia transports have been flying home with dead and wounded. Says a Western intelligence officer: "Morale among the Cubans in Angola and back in Havana is very bad."

As far as is known, no Russian leader has yet told the U.S. Government of even a conditional willingness to reduce Soviet involvement in Angola. Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin continues to insist in private talks with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Russian support of the M.P.L.A. has nothing to do with detente. But the doubts in Moscow may be growing, and whether they prevail may well depend largely on U.S. policy. Explains a Western official: "The Soviets are backed into a corner, so part of their problem is to save face. If there's any chance of getting them out, the U.S. will have to help by not trumpeting the retreat as a great victory for American pressure."

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