The Battle Over Angola

"A deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends on the United States." That was how President Ford described the Senate's vote last week to cut off U.S. military aid to two Angolan factions that have been waging a bloody civil war for months with the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.). At stake was only $37 million in aid. But the debate was also the latest in a long series of battles fought between Congress and the Administration, with Congress trying to control not only the making of foreign policy but its execution. Thus the defeat was bitter for Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. At a press conference called at week's end, Ford also lashed out at Cuba, declaring that its infiltration of some 6,000 troops into Angola "ends any efforts at all to have friendly relations" with the Castro government. Soviet activity in Angola, added the President, "doesn't help the continuation of detente."

First Step. Having already funneled $25 million into Angola and with $8 million for aid still on hand, the Administration sought the additional $37 million to help the anti-Soviet National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Both are also supported by South Africa.

But a growing number of Congressmen fear that U.S. involvement in Angola may be the first step toward another Viet Nam-style quagmire. Declared California Democrat John Tunney, leader of the Senate's fight to halt the aid though not noted for his expertise in foreign affairs: "For the past 30 years, we have given the military adventurists what they wanted and they have gone everywhere and done everything, getting us involved in everybody else's business from Asia to Latin America and now, so it seems, Africa." Republican Senator Charles Percy of Illinois complained that the U.S. was "getting in bed with South Africa."

After three days of debate, Tunney & Co. won, 54 to 22. The House vote will probably come next month. During the holiday recess, however, the Administration probably will try to come up with a compromise that will win enough votes to permit a limited U.S. involvement in Angola.

It was not exactly a "tragedy." The Administration's case for aid to Angola did make sense, especially in view of the fact that Zaire and Zambia, relatively stable and friendly countries in the area, asked that the U.S. take action. But Angola is scarcely a crucial zone of U.S. interest. The congressional move, however, certainly further weakened the U.S. postures in the world and raised serious questions about whether the present Congress is willing to allow the Administration any kind of latitude in its foreign operations. Part of the opposition professed to quarrel with the covert nature of U.S. help to Angola. But in the world as it exists, some capacity for secret operations (under due congressional oversight) is essential. Besides, even had Angolan aid been made public from the start--and the

Administration may well have been able to make a good case for it--Congress was in no mood to go along with that either.

The Chicago Tribune argued that "Angola would provide a foothold for the spread of Russian influence in Africa." On the other hand, CBS Newscaster Walter Cronkite felt that Angola could become another Viet Nam and began a series on the U.S. involvement "to try to play our small part in preventing that mistake this time."

While it is inevitable that the secrecy, the downright deceit and the huge buildup from small beginnings in Viet Nam are bitterly remembered, the comparison between Angola and Viet Nam is alarmist and simplistic. For one thing, or so the Administration argues, the levels of aid differ enormously. In 1954, the year the French pulled out of Indochina, for example, the Eisenhower Administration asked Congress for $500 million to aid the region's anti-Communist fighting forces. Ford and Kissinger have assured Congress that the U.S. will not send advisers or troops to Angola, and Washington's goal has been not to win a war but to provide the anti-Soviet factions with only enough help to fight the M.P.L.A. to a standstill, thereby encouraging a negotiated settlement. Explained a senior U.S. official: "If this were the Congo in the early 1960s, we might be able actually to turn the situation around militarily. But our wings are clipped in too many ways. Now the best we can hope for is a holding action."

Moreover, in the Administration's view, the Angolan aid issue is a basic test of American will in the face of Soviet expansionism. Kissinger argued that only because of the U.S.-supplied equipment, the anti-Soviet groups in the former Portuguese colony have so far managed to thwart Moscow's desire for a foothold on the southwest coast of Africa. Among other things, Soviet air and naval bases in Angola would give the Russians the capacity to intercept Western supertankers en route from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the U.S.

Less Committed. Actually, Western intelligence analysts predicted the Angolan civil war might turn out to be another Viet Nam--but for Russia, not the U.S. (see box). Explained one of them: "The U.S. is still much less committed there than the U.S.S.R." Added another official, using language reminiscent of the early 1960s: "If we don't blink now, I think that they will blink."

Whether the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. was the first to step up military aid to the Angolan factions is unclear. But the Soviets were in the field first; they began supplying military equipment and training to Angolan guerrillas at least as far back as 1960. Early in 1975 the U.S. sent a small sum--roughly $300,000 --to one of the anti-Soviet groups. By last summer the Soviets had sharply increased their aid to the M.P.L.A. as the Portuguese prepared to pull out. U.S. experts estimate that Moscow's aid this year has totaled more than $100 million. According to both British and American experts, the Soviets have sent the M.P.L.A. an air-defense system of SA-7 missiles, substantial numbers of T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, antitank guns, heavy artillery and 107-mm. and 122-mm. rockets.

The more than 6,000 combat troops that Cuba has provided at the Russians' bidding are led by no fewer than seven officers with the rank of brigade commander (roughly equivalent to brigadier general). They are believed to include Senen Casas Reguiero, who was first deputy minister of the Cuban armed forces and chief of the general staff, and his brother Julio, a top logistics expert.*

Secret Program. According to Ford Administration officials, the U.S. began sending significant supplies in August to the anti-Soviet factions at the urging of Angola's neighbors--Zaire, Zambia and South Africa. As required by law, the Administration informed eight congressional committees and subcommittees about the operation, but the program remained a secret to most members of Congress until this month. So far, the U.S. aid has brought the anti-Soviet forces mostly small arms, mortars, machine guns and light artillery.

The aid has given neither side a decisive edge. Reported TIME Correspondent Lee Griggs, who regularly covers the fighting: "The importance of the aid is chiefly that it enables the war to continue at an escalated pace. No victory is yet possible for either side in this huge, underpopulated country, where the people really just want to be left alone. The outlook is for a long and bloody stalemate, though withdrawal of outside support on all sides might eventually force the three groups to stop fighting and start talking."

-Israel's U.N. Ambassador Chaim Herzog reported last week that approximately a brigade of Cuban troops--usually about 3,000 men--has been with the Syrian army facing Israel on the Golan Heights for two years. This even though Fidel Castro's government last July formally disavowed the export of revolution.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.