A Questioning of Conduct

Unless Richard Nixon decides to bare all in his memoirs, some of Watergate's few lingering mysteries seem destined to remain unresolved. Precisely what were Nixon's men after when they decided to bug Democratic National Headquarters in 1972? Did Nixon know in advance about the breakin? Who deliberately erased 18 1/2 minutes of a key Nixon tape? What did Nixon's pal, Bebe Rebozo, really do with $100,000 in campaign funds donated by Billionaire Howard Hughes? Last week, after 28 months of investigation, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force issued its final report --and shed no light on these questions. But the bland and incomplete report, prepared under the direction of the third special prosecutor, Henry S. Ruth Jr., who is retiring, did fine tune, for better or worse, the reputations of several men who played major roles in the drama.

The 277-page document left no doubt that Nixon would have been indicted after his resignation for various crimes, notably the cover-up of White House involvement in the wiretap-burglary. He was saved only by President Ford's pardon.

Delayed Delivery. The report implicitly raises questions about the professional conduct of Nixon's principal lawyers: James St. Clair, J. Fred Buzhardt and Charles Alan Wright. It alleges that they, as well as former White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, repeatedly impeded the work of the prosecutors, first Archibald Cox and then Leon Jaworski. They did so, according to the report, by delaying the delivery of evidence, sometimes claiming they could not find it, until courts required that it be produced. Wright, a law professor at the University of Texas, was specifically cited for having vouched in court for Nixon's assertion that one tape could not be supplied because it contained information affecting the nation al security. Wright had not heard the tape himself, and when the White House finally yielded it, the tape was found to contain no shred of such conversations.

Most surprising of all was the report's unflattering portrayal of the role of one of Watergate's ostensible heroes: former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, now U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain. The document concedes that Richardson acted conscientiously in resigning rather than bowing to Nixon's orders to fire Cox. But until then, the report claims, Richardson continually urged Cox to limit his investigation and to stop pushing so hard for evidence.

The report relates that the White House began challenging Cox's authority when the press printed unfounded stories that Cox was pursuing the possible misuse of public funds on Nixon's San Clemente estate. Richardson warned Cox that this might be beyond the special prosecutor's jurisdiction. Cox conceded only that no such probe was under way. But a week later, according to the report, Richardson asked that the Justice Department be allowed to "screen" any avenue of Cox's investigation to decide whether it was proper. Cox refused. Later, Richardson tried to dissuade Cox from interviewing Secret Service agents about the handling of White House tapes and Nixon Aide Tom Charles Huston about his illegal plan for domestic surveillance of political dissidents. Cox resisted--and prevailed.

Richardson, directed by the White House, kept pushing Cox. According to the report, Richardson suggested that the special prosecutor's charter should be rewritten and made more restrictive. For example, he thought Cox should not look into White House wiretapping of newsmen and Administration aides. Richardson asked that Cox accept a White House-supplied expert on national security as a consultant. Cox agreed, but on condition that the adviser be accountable only to him. Richardson then dropped the proposal.

In London last week, Richardson said he thought that he and his good Boston friend, Cox, had always worked out any differences in "a spirit of mutual understanding" and that "there were no confrontations at any point." This implied that he had not really expected Cox to accept his White House-initiated suggestions.

Historic Work. Looking ahead, the report had no particularly imaginative suggestions for avoiding Watergate-like agonies. It opposed creating a permanent special prosecutor's office, but said that any illegal acts and improper pressure exerted by White House officials normally should be investigated by the Justice Department. To shield the Justice Department from politics, the President should not nominate and the Senate should not confirm as an Attorney General anyone who has served as a top presidential campaign aide.

The report also suggested that Congress ought to clarify whether a President can be indicted for a crime while in office. Since there is a legal controversy over whether the Constitution permits this, it would take either a Supreme Court decision or a constitutional amendment to resolve the argument.

The report marked the end of the special prosecutor's most historic work, but the office will continue to handle unfinished business. The staff now has its fourth head, Charles Ruff, 36, a former official with the Justice Department's criminal division, who has been with the special prosecutor's staff since July 1973. He will oversee the arguments against those among the 50 individuals and corporations convicted of Watergate-related crimes who are appealing to higher courts. Most prominent among them are John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman and Robert Mardian.

Under Ruff, the special prosecutor's job will become only a part-time assignment. Clearly the historical pressure that once burdened the office has been relaxed. Long gone are those Nixonian days when the special prosecutor's staff was so distrustful of the White House that as the final report indicates, its members secreted vital documents in safe deposit vaults in two Washington banks and even buried copies of papers in Virginia's Blue Ridge Mountains.

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