Close to the Call in a Giant Poker Game

Nine months of laborious negotiations over a second-stage disengagement in Sinai have taught Egypt, Israel and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger one lesson. Gone is the euphoric mood of "guarded optimism" that surrounded negotiations at the outset and fathered fruitless hopes that a settlement was imminent. Last week as the talks intensified once again, the participants took extraordinary pains to deny rumors that the deal so long hoped for had been reached.

In Alexandria, after a visit to the summer home of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Editor William Randolph Hearst Jr. and Correspondent Kingsbury Smith reported Sadat as saying that "the basic terms for a Sinai settlement have been worked out." Egyptian officials quickly declared that Sadat had been misquoted, and the offending sentence did not appear in local accounts of the Hearst interview. Kissinger, as he left Washington for a European trip that included talks with Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin, maintained that "we are not anywhere near the point of agreement." Rabin, en route to West Germany on an official visit (see following story), cautioned strongly against speculation. "There are no deadlines, no dramatic events," he said.

One Key Fact. All three principals, however, would probably agree on one key fact: the Sinai talks were indeed closer to a make-or-break point than ever before. Both Egypt and Israel were anxious to reach an accord, although even small details in dispute could stall any agreement. But with two weeks remaining before the expiration of the latest mandate for United Nations peacekeeping troops in Sinai, there was still time for additional "clarification"--or for more hands to be played in what one Israeli diplomat called "a giant poker game with stupendous stakes."

The biggest problem outstanding, as Rabin and Kissinger met at week's end at Schloss Gymnich, a guesthouse outside Bonn where Rabin had been installed by his West German hosts, was control of the Sinai passes. Egypt has insisted all along that Israel must completely withdraw from the Mitla and Giddi passes (see map), the most strategic points on the peninsula. Israel has similarly insisted, for internal politics as much as for anything else, that its defense requires a military presence in the passes. Jerusalem suggested a partial pullout and electronic surveillance on either side, a proposal Sadat rejected. The agreement being hammered out last week would allow Israeli troops to remain in brigade strength on the eastern rim of the passes; thus both sides could argue that their conditions had been met. At issue was where on the slopes of the passes the Solomonic lines should be drawn between the Israeli brigades and the U.N. forces that would hold the passes as a demilitarized zone.

Other points had been largely settled during President Ford's summit talks with Sadat at Salzburg, the Ford-Rabin meeting last month, and a series of exchanges between Kissinger and Rabin that have been under way since then, with Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz as the somewhat fatigued courier. These points include:

TIMING. Israel had insisted on a longterm, step-by-step agreement, ideally eight years, minimally three. Sadat held out for short-term extensions of the

U.N. mandate, which came into being with the first-stage disengagement agreement after the October war. At Salzburg he was persuaded by Ford to accept a series of one-year extensions that add up to three years.

THE OILFIELDS. Besides withdrawing from the passes, Israel will turn back to Egypt the Abu Rudeis oilfields; since being captured in the Six-Day War, they have furnished 50% of Israel's domestic petroleum requirements. Egypt will resume operation of the fields, acquiring access to them over an Egyptian-controlled highway along the Gulf of Suez coast. Israel will service its troops remaining in the area by means of a parallel road. In places where the two roads come close to each other, Israel will build detours in order to avoid incidents. The U.S., meanwhile, will guarantee Israel alternative oil supplies.

AID. Israel had requested $2.5 billion in military and economic aid from the U.S. in the current fiscal year. That request has been blocked since the shuttle ended in March because of Ford's "reassessment" of U.S. Middle East policy. A "substantial" amount of the request--about $2 billion--will now be forthcoming. This will include sophisticated F-15 fighters and surface-to-surface Lance missiles. Egypt will receive an estimated $300 million in U.S. aid to ease its domestic financial strains.

DIPLOMACY. Though Cairo will be allowed to insist otherwise for the sake of its relations with Arab allies, Kissinger has assured Israel that no "linkage" will be required between the Sinai negotiations and major movement on the Golan Heights and on the future of the West Bank. Washington will continue its refusal to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization until the P.L.O. accepts Israel's right to exist and stops terrorist acts like the bomb blast in Jerusalem two weeks ago that killed 14 people. (In revenge, Israeli forces last week attacked Palestinian camps in southern Lebanon, killing at least eleven people.) The U.S. will consult with Israel before making new peace proposals for the region.

PROPAGANDA. Cairo will tone down anti-Israeli propaganda, and will search for loopholes to permit investment in Egypt by foreign firms that are on the Arab League boycott list for dealings with Israel. Israeli cargoes, but not ships, will be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal. The U.S., meanwhile, will try to block anti-Israeli moves in the United Nations General Assembly and UNESCO.

Some of these points had been agreed on, in principle at least, before Kissinger's shuttle flights between Jerusalem and Cairo were grounded by deadlock. But political changes since that time have helped nudge the principals closer on remaining issues. One change is that Rabin's government, too weak in the spring to risk a final yes to Egypt and survive criticism at home, is stronger now. Ironically, the principal reason for its strength is public approval of Rabin's earlier decision to say no to Kissinger because Israel was not completely satisfied with the terms.

A more significant change in the situation, however, was the shift in the U.S. role in negotiations after March. Instead of being simply a mediator, Washington became what Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon last week described as "the third side of a triangle." The U.S. turned active participant, for instance, by promising aid to either side in return for compromise and by guaranteeing oil to Israel. Still undecided at week's end was whether Washington would play an even more central role. Cairo had proposed that U.S. technicians take over operation of the Israeli electronic monitoring posts above the passes. Israel was against the idea but open to argument.

Kissinger may be reluctant because the presence of U.S. troops would require congressional approval--and that, at the present time, Kissinger cannot guarantee. He is still far from popular with Congress, even though he can properly claim much of the credit for getting the disengagement talks back on the track after the shuttle talks broke down. He sensed that step-by-step talks were still the best route to disengagement. Rabin admitted last week: "Sadat and I both consider that the U.S. is the only power that can build the necessary bridgeheads." Thus the Secretary of State carefully orchestrated new discussions, leading up to Salzburg and Rabin's Washington talks.

Geneva Specter. At the same time, however, Kissinger provided pressure where needed, particularly on Israel, which he considered primarily responsible for the breakdown. The U.S. policy reassessment was ordered and aid halted until the re-examination was completed. Kissinger even invoked the specter of the U.S. leading the way to a Geneva conference it really did not want, proposing border changes that Israel at least was not keen on. He knew that neither Egypt nor Israel wanted that route because it would bring the Soviets, other Arab nations and the P.L.O. into the discussions, broadening and complicating what seemed to be a comparatively simple Sinai negotiation. The Russians did not press Kissinger for a return to Geneva. Last week Kissinger met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in that city, primarily to discuss nuclear disarmament. On the Middle East, Gromyko indicated that the Soviets would not impede Kissinger's negotiations--provided that all parties agreed to return to Geneva for formal ratification of any pact.

If all the nagging, last-minute complications can be worked out, the results will be worth the work. Three years of disengagement will allow Israel to get through a general election scheduled for December 1977 and Egypt to improve its sagging economy. The only danger will be if any of the sides of the triangle forget that Sinai is still only a beginning and not an end. Too many other negotiations remain before the Middle East can be considered truly at peace.

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