Bear Hugs and Kalashnikovs

"This conflict is a godsend for the Soviets," said a Western diplomat in Moscow about the Middle East's long no-war, no-peace situation. "If it didn't exist, they would have to invent it." Certainly Moscow has made diplomatic, political and military headway in the Middle East by encouraging unsettled conditions between Israel and the Arab countries. Ever since the U.S. rebuffed Egypt's President Nasser by refusing to sell him weapons in 1955 and, a year later, withdrawing financial aid to build the Aswan High Dam, mammoth development projects and sophisticated Soviet weapons have flowed freely into the Arab world.

The returns from this massive investment can be seen in striking ways. There are an estimated 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Iraq, as well as hundreds of civilian technicians. Another 1,000 civilian technicians are in Syria. Despite Anwar Sadat's 1972 expulsion order, as many as 2,000 Soviet technicians and an equal number of dependents remain in Egypt.

A palpable sign of the quid pro quo exacted by the Soviets for its Black Sea fleet can be seen on any map of the Middle East. Cruisers bristling with missiles and advanced communications equipment put in regularly at Alexandria; Latakia, Syria; Berbera and Mogadishu, Somalia; and the island of Socotra in the Indian Ocean. Though Moscow and Tripoli deny it, Middle East watchers expect the Soviets to soon expand to some prime Libyan military bases in exchange for the weapons deal just concluded.

If the Arab states have proved a profitable mine for the Kremlin, they have also been costly in unexpected ways. One is the military equipment provided on a longterm, low-interest basis: Egypt lost as much as $1 billion in Soviet materiel in the Six-Day War; Syria's armor and air corps were so shattered by the 1973 war that the Russians had to send Damascus $2 billion more.

More than that, since the 1973 war the Soviets have watched uneasily as Washington began playing both sides of the Middle East street. To get a share of the mediator's role, Moscow is now trying to restore the links with Israel. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko has declared that the Soviet Union would guarantee Israel's existence in return for its withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. Soviet delegates have visited Jerusalem to discuss renewing diplomatic relations. Israeli leaders are pleased but are keeping details of the discussions to themselves.

Meanwhile, the Russians are also realizing that close friendship has its hazards. Iraq and Syria, whose rival Baath parties have been quarreling for years, are now involved in an even more feral argument over sharing the Euphrates' water; the Soviets are damned if they take sides and damned if they don't. Moscow is also faced with an inevitable conflict between Communism and either Arab nationalism or Moslem theocracy, or both.

Sadat, of course, threw the Russians out of Egypt when, in his view, they limited his ability to purchase offensive weapons and bullied his officer corps. Iraq, which could afford access to the Persian Gulf and a lever against the Shah of Iran's growing muscle, has been cosseted with such goodies as Scud surface-to-surface missiles and supersonic TU-22 bombers. Yet the oil-rich Iraqis (TIME, May 19) are technologically at the point where they are turning westward for advanced expertise.

The Palestinian guerrillas are a particular thorn. They appeared to be the archetypal liberation group, and Moscow reacted with bear hugs and Kalashnikovs. But with peace negotiations under way and U.S.-Soviet detente being explored, the Palestinians and their steadfast refusal to recognize Israel have become something of a hindrance. In his last visit to Moscow, P.L.O. Leader Yasser Arafat was relegated to a back seat at the Red Square May Day parade and denied an interview with Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev.

There is yet another dilemma for the Soviets. As TIME Correspondent John Shaw reports from Moscow, Western neglect of the Arabs, which enabled the Soviets to gain entree into the region, has ended. This apparently touched off a Kremlin reassessment of Middle East policy even more urgent than the Washington review ordered by Secretary of State Kissinger. The situation could change swiftly in the Soviets' favor, however, if the Ford-Sadat-Rabin talks lead nowhere and the Arabs conclude that the U.S. is unwilling or unable to "deliver" the Israelis.

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