Haig: 'The Most Crucial Time'

A professional soldier who served as a foreign policy aide to Henry Kissinger, General Alexander Haig reluctantly gave up his job as Army Vice Chief of Staff to become chief of staff of Richard Nixon's White House after H.R. Haldeman was forced to quit. In that thankless assignment, Haig played a pivotal role as Nixon left office and, for all practical purposes, was the acting President in Nixon's last anguished days. After helping Gerald Ford settle into office, last October Haig was picked by the new President to be Supreme Allied Commander Europe, following a succession of geopolitically minded U.S. generals that began with Dwight Eisenhower. Criticized for his service under Nixon, Haig has aimed "to learn my job, keep my mouth shut and direct my energy to helping make policy." Last week in his first on-the-record interview with a U.S. newsman since he became NATO commander, Haig met for 60 minutes with TIME Correspondent Dean Fischer at NATO headquarters in Belgium. Excerpts:

Q. Is there a feeling in Europe that in the wake of events in Southeast Asia, the U.S. word is distrusted?

A. There has been a growing consciousness that the U.S. will inevitably have to be more concerned about Europe. In that sense, you could detect a sigh of relief in Europe that the war had ended. But what we cannot forget is that the full ramifications of events in Southeast Asia have yet to be felt. Because that is so, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the short-term benefits of U.S. withdrawal will not be put to a very severe test as the historical consequences of a fundamental shift in power relationships in Southeast Asia become clear. And they will.

Q. What effect does the renewed focus on the Western alliance have on detente with the Soviets?

A. There is a growing skepticism in Europe about detente. It is viewed from two vantage points. One is almost emotional and psychological, caused by confusion about priorities for defense and security. The second one is reflected in the attitude of people like Scoop Jackson. The thesis of their attack is that detente is a one-way street, we are providing technological and economic advantages to the Soviet Union and we aren't receiving reciprocal benefits.

Q. Is it possible to pursue detente and simultaneously maintain a strong military and political alliance within the NATO framework?

A. It complicates the task. But it is a problem of maturing to a fundamentally changed strategic environment. The West, including the U.S., has not been very adept at this. The West has got to understand the alternatives to detente. We have to be forever tough in getting quid pro quos and farsighted in assessing what those quid pro quos are.

Q. How severe a problem was Watergate in foreign policy?

A. It had a major negative impact. It had a major impact on the outcome of events in Southeast Asia, especially in terms of time. It had an impact on Executive and Legislative Branch cooperation at a time when there needed to be close cooperation. I think that the negative impact of Watergate has ended, but the consequences of it will be felt for decades.

Q. How bad a problem is the weakness of NATO'S southern flank?

A. Both Greece and Turkey are geopolitically situated in such a way that their ultimate best interests will lie with continued association with the West. We can only hope that American politics will facilitate that understanding. In that sense, I've been propounding the shortsightedness of the Turkish aid cutoff.

Q. What will happen in Portugal?

A. The situation is very tough to predict. But we know the subjective view of the Portuguese people. What remains to be seen is whether the pluralistic, moderate majority is capable of organizing itself against a hardcore, externally trained minority dictatorship.

Q. What is the attitude of the NATO troops toward military service?

A. The attitude of young people has shifted very fundamentally from an anti-Establishment stance. This change of opinion does not mean a return to the status quo. I think it probably is a realization that revolutionary tactics are not the best way to achieve reform.

Q. What then do you perceive as the fundamental problem?

A. The most fundamental danger to NATO and Western society is the socio-economic phenomenon. The aspects of this problem are far graver than some have interpreted them to be. For the first time there are definite limitations to raw materials, especially energy. Beyond that, there are rising expectations, which are largely the product of our success in a market economy. These expectations are referred to as egalitarian economics, and they pose a dilemma for Western governments. If qualitative excellence has been abandoned in favor of an egalitarian approach, that is a built-in contradiction to a market economy.

Q. How do you view the world now?

A. This is the most crucial time in the postwar history of the free world. I describe it as a period of the double imperative. The imperative for unified security arrangements is clearly justified by the continuing improvements in Soviet military capability. The second imperative is to maintain the climate for cooperative endeavors in the socioeconomic area. To me, the dangers facing the West in that area are more immediate and more intense because we are talking about the entire Western way of life.

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