Monday, Jun. 02, 1975

Israel's Senate Majority

On the eve of President Ford's meeting in Salzburg with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, 76 U.S. Senators--25 Republicans and 51 Democrats--last week staunchly sided with the Israelis. The Senators sent the President an open letter in effect urging that the Administration not significantly reduce military and economic aid to the Jewish state. Noting that Ford's foreign aid requests for fiscal 1976 would soon reach Congress, the letter said: "We trust that your recommendations will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs." Jerusalem has requested nearly $2.5 billion in aid, about three times what it received in fiscal 1975. The Senators also asked Ford to adhere to U.S. policy since 1967 that the Arab-Israeli conflict "be settled on the basis of secure and recognized boundaries that are defensible and direct negotiations between the nations involved."

The letter was drafted by 19 Senators, including Democrat Birch Bayh of Indiana and Republicans Jacob Javits of New York and Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. But South Dakota Democrat George McGovern, another signer, warned that it would be foolish for Israel to conclude that the message supported Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Still, the letter undercut Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's assertions to the Israelis that congressional support for them was waning.

Double-Edged. Among the 23 Senators--mostly Republicans and Southern Democrats--who refused to sign was Illinois Republican Charles Percy. He has been strongly criticized by some leaders among ins fairly large Jewish constituency for drifting away from ins previous steadfast support of Israel. Explained Percy: "I do not believe that an expression of concern for the interests of only one party to the conflict is adequate at a time when American good will toward all the parties is required in order to facilitate a fair and equitable settlement."

The Senators' letter deeply disturbed Arabs, many of whom argued that it would undermine the effectiveness of the U.S. as a mediator in the Middle East. The Israelis were naturally delighted, but the letter could turn out to be double-edged. Although it confirmed Israel's almost mystical belief in rockbed U.S. support, that confirmation could prove to be too emphatic. Kissinger may resent tins tactic as a not-very-subtle personal rebuff. Sadat is likely to be dismayed at such overwhelming support of ins foe. If so, Ford's talks with inm may prove to be difficult indeed.

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