WHAT NOW FOR HENRY?

At his press conference last week, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had an answer ready for one question he was not asked. The question: "Will you resign because your Middle East shuttle failed and American foreign policy is in disarray?" The answer: "No."

Indeed, Kissinger had decided on his response even before he could gauge firsthand the reaction in the U.S. to the collapse of his attempt to negotiate another Israeli-Egyptian disengagement. During a stopover at London's Heathrow Airport, he assured British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan that "if the President wants me to stay, I shall regard it as my duty to do so." As far as anyone can tell, Kissinger retains Gerald Ford's full support. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State faces a time of testing and questioning.

His failure in the Middle East was initially greeted with far more sympathy than might have been expected. Europeans, many of whom had not expected the shuttle to succeed, were disappointed but not surprised. Said a West German Foreign Ministry official: "It was a good try. He did all that was humanly possible." A top official in Canada's Department of External Affairs agreed, "He came closer than anybody in a quarter of a century toward an agreement in the area." An editorial in the Guardian reminded Britons, "No one wins every poker game, not even Metternich, not even Henry Kissinger." Egyptians and Israelis generally retained a great admiration for him.

In the U.S., too, reaction was restrained. Kissinger received a grateful, even enthusiastic reception from congressional leaders when he briefed them at the White House. Later, after Kissinger appeared at a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Jacob Javits said that he was "enormously encouraged" by Kissinger's evenhanded explanation of the problems he had encountered, though not by his message of frustration. A high State Department official who has been critical of Kissinger in the past said, "Henry did everything that he could over there, and his mission failed through no fault of his own."

Not all the reaction was so friendly. Conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina demanded Kissinger's resignation, arguing that his "usefulness as a negotiator is ended and his diplomacy is in ruins." An aide to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused Kissinger of fishing for sympathetic support: "He's playing the aggrieved party again, moping around, looking hurt and betrayed and talking about Greek tragedy." Recalling Kissinger's description of himself to Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci, the aide added, "So the cowboy in the white hat and on the white horse has become the Greek tragic hero cursed by the gods."

Such personal gibes were perhaps inevitable. Far more significant, the failure of his negotiations in the Middle East is bound to intensify debate over his style and role as Secretary of State. Some diplomats, politicians and academics maintained all along that shuttle diplomacy was unwise because a settlement was impossible unless the Russians were allowed a role in the negotiations. But it remains to be seen whether a settlement is possible with the Russians, and the step-by-step approach was certainly worth trying.

A more important criticism of shuttle diplomacy is that it required the commitment of far too much of Kissinger's time and prestige. One of his problems is that he is unwilling to delegate authority, and he takes on too many jobs. Often he has acted as both the planner and executor of foreign policy, giving the impression of a troubleshooter rushing from one crisis to another.

He happens to be exceptionally good at it, but it forces him to neglect other tasks. Furthermore, because the U.S. President has been so long removed from the foreign policy arena -- first Nix on because of Watergate, then Ford because of inexperience -- Kissinger has been forced to act, in the eyes of the world, as a sort of deputy President for international affairs. As a result, pol icy failures implicate him personally and intensify the loss of the aura of infallibility that had once made him appear to be the magician of world diplomacy. Says a high British foreign service officer: "Henry has become the prisoner of his own legend."

Kissinger, moreover, has too often failed to cultivate his relations with Congress. Oddly, although he is a skillful compromiser and has a remarkable feeling for the interplay of power overseas, he has been unable to deal with Senators and Representatives at home. A case in point was his emotional argument last week that Congress, by holding back on Administration requests for additional and relatively small amounts of military aid, was largely responsible for the worsening situ ation in Indochina. That line only exacerbated the debate and reopened old wounds.

Kissinger is obviously still deeply and emotionally involved with Viet Nam and believes sincerely that the U.S. has a moral commitment to continue aiding South Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu. Yet Kissinger's critics argue that had he pressed harder for a political settlement in Viet Nam during the past year or so, the present situation might have been averted, regardless of his previous achievement in extricating the U.S.from the war.

But neither his flaws nor his damaging setback in the Mid dle East have destroyed Kissinger's effectiveness as Secretary of State. He will remain a conduit for the various belligerents in the Middle East, negotiating among them quietly or in the more public forum at Geneva. He hopes to persuade the Russians to moderate the Arab demands, while he preaches restraint to both sides, and he may have some success.

Kissinger's greatest accomplishment has been detente with the Soviets, and it seems not in jeopardy though in need of much future building. He knows that Moscow wants U.S. technology and credits, and he is lining up some big U.S. bank loans for the Soviets. In return, they may be willing to make some concessions. Major negotiations are coming up with the Soviets: on nuclear-arms control, on trade expansion, on the framing of a European security treaty. In all of these, the U.S. and its major adversary have high stakes, and Henry Kissinger has quite a few cards to play.

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