The Debate: Key Issues and Answers

The key issues raised by the current debate over aid to Indochina:

How did the U.S. get involved in Cambodia?

In March 1970, a coalition of military officers, students, urban intellectuals and businessmen mounted a successful coup against Cambodia's neutralist chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Until then, the U.S. had limited (and sometimes severed) ties with Cambodia. A month after the coup, Phnom-Penh's new regime appealed to the U.S. for help in fighting the Khmer Rouge, which was then a ragtag Communist-led insurgency movement. Washington refused. On April 29,1970, U.S. forces invaded Cambodia to destroy "sanctuaries" used by North Vietnamese troops. The move, said Washington, was partly designed to help Phnom-Penh's struggle against the insurgents. After that, the Nixon Administration acted as if there were a U.S. commitment to aid the Phnom-Penh regime, although most experts disputed that assumption. U.S. bombing of Communist positions in Cambodia continued until it was finally halted by congressional pressure in August 1973.

What is the present government of Cambodia?

It is a republican regime headed by Marshal-President Lon Nol, a leader of the 1970 coup. Cambodia has a one-party Senate, National Assembly and Cabinet; the Premier is Long Boret. Although partially paralyzed from a 1971 stroke, Lon Nol wields nearly absolute power as head of the government. The 80,000 combat and 145,000 support troops under Phnom-Penh's command control approximately 25% of the country's land, about 60% of its 7.6 million inhabitants and all but two of its major cities and towns.

Who opposes the Phnom-Penh regime?

After the 1970 coup, more than 5,000 Cambodian rebels who had been training in North Viet Nam returned to their native country and recruited a like number of local Communists. They today form the core of the 60,000 Khmer insurgents (commonly known as the Khmer Rouge) fighting Lon Nol's forces. The non-Communists are primarily conscripted peasants, who Western military observers believe are serving under duress. Prince Sihanouk, who has been living in Peking since 1970, is the nominal head of the insurgents, although little is known about the rebels' real leaders. It is assumed that the heads of several factions (such as the nationalists and the doctrinaire Communists) are rivals for power. One leader is Khieu Samphan, a French-educated economist in his 40s, who is the deputy premier of the Khmer Rouge shadow government and commander in chief of its army.

Who supports the insurgents?

China provides most of their weapons, North Viet Nam transports them to Cambodia and food is confiscated from peasants in "liberated" areas. Although North Vietnamese troops at first fought alongside the Khmer insurgents, Hanoi's forces since 1972 have served only as advisers. Soviet aid has been minimal.

How is the U.S. supporting the Lon Nol regime?

The increasingly dangerous U.S. airlift (by private airlines contracted by the U.S. Government), which has already cost more than $7 million for logistics alone, flies ammunition, petroleum and food from Thailand and South Viet Nam to the besieged capital. For the current fiscal year (ending June 30), U.S. military aid totals $275 million; almost all of it is exhausted. Since 1970, the U.S. has given Cambodia $1.8 billion in military and economic assistance. The Administration has requested $222 million in supplemental aid for this fiscal year to provide the government with bullets, artillery shells and bombs.

What does the Administration hope to gain by sending the extra aid?

The U.S. is trying to buy time. The supplemental aid might allow the Phnom-Penh government to withstand the insurgents" siege until July, when the Mekong River, swollen by heavy rains, will overflow, making it difficult for fighting to continue at its current level. Washington believes that the Khmer insurgents, who have suffered heavy losses in the long assault on the capital, might recognize that it would be better to negotiate than to gird up for yet another bloody dry-season offensive in the autumn.

Are Washington's hopes realistic?

Probably not. There is no reason to expect that the insurgents will be more willing to settle for anything less than total victory this year than they were in 1974, when the Mekong floods also ended their dry-season offensive. By fall, the rebels will have replenished their stockpiles and will be rested and ready for a new campaign against the capital. Thus, opponents of U.S. aid can plausibly argue that sending more supplies will not lead to negotiations but merely prolong Cambodia's agony.

Why have there been no talks with the insurgents?

The Administration claims that the insurgents have no incentive to talk so long as they feel certain of victory on the battlefield. State Department officials recently disclosed that the U.S. made six attempts in the past year (variously using Peking, Hanoi and Moscow as intermediaries) to open a dialogue with the rebels. "All our efforts have been rebuffed," complained President Ford. The Khmer insurgents' leaders refuse to negotiate while Lon Nol continues to head the Phnom-Penh government. Moreover, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger apparently made no attempt during any of his seven visits to Peking to meet with Prince Sihanouk.

Would an insurgents' victory lead to a bloodbath?

No one can be sure, but most experts think not. The insurgents have burnt entire villages that they have captured; there are reliable reports that Khmer Rouge troops have killed and strung up scores of civilians in areas they have "liberated." (Both sides have treated prisoners brutally.) On the other hand, the rebels' clandestine radio promises that only Lon Nol and six of his top colleagues ("the seven traitorous chieftains") would be executed; all others who cooperate with the new government have been assured of pardons. If the capital falls, the U.S. is prepared to evacuate the regime's top leaders.

How would the fall of Lon Nol affect South Viet Nam?

Saigon would suffer a severe psychological blow; ARVN morale might drop if its officers and troops began to worry about continued U.S. assistance to South Viet Nam. It is also possible that arms and ammunition now going to the Khmer insurgents would be redirected to the Communist forces fighting Saigon. Militarily, not much else would be changed, since the North Vietnamese have been using sanctuaries in Cambodia with impunity for several years.

Is the U.S. commitment to South Viet Nam different from that to Cambodia?

Surely it is. Washington backs the Lon Nol regime but played no known role in helping the Marshal seize power. The conflict there is primarily a civil war; even though Hanoi is aiding the rebels, there are serious doubts that the North Vietnamese would dominate a Khmer Rouge government.

In contrast, the U.S. played a key role in establishing South Viet Nam as a separate entity in 1954. Since then, U.S. Presidents have consistently pledged support to Saigon governments. The Communist insurgency in South Viet Nam also began as a civil war and to some extent it still remains one--in the sense that both North and South Vietnamese are part of what used to be one country. But U.S. officials and significant numbers of South Vietnamese have long seen the North as an outside force trying to impose its will on the South (an issue that has nothing to do with the quality of the Saigon regime). While this may have justified America's initial involvement in South Viet Nam, it does not mean that the U.S. should feel committed to continue its aid indefinitely.

How much aid does Saigon receive from the U.S.?

In the current fiscal year, South Viet Nam has received $700 million in military aid and $420 million in economic assistance. The White House has urged a supplemental grant of $300 million for military supplies. Although comparisons are difficult, a U.S. intelligence memorandum released last week estimates that in 1974, Soviet and Chinese aid to North Viet Nam totaled $1.57 billion compared to the $1.28 billion Saigon received from Washington.

What is the U.S.'s goal in continuing to aid Saigon?

Washington believes that three more years of military and economic aid--totaling from $3.5 billion to $4 billion--would enable Saigon to establish a battlefield equilibrium. This would set the stage for political talks between the opposing sides, as called for in the 1973 Paris Peace Accords.

Could Saigon survive if the U.S. stopped all aid?

Almost certainly not. According to Pentagon officials, it would only be a matter of time before South Viet Nam's forces would be forced to surrender to the Communists; at best, Saigon might be able to negotiate a settlement, but only on Hanoi's terms.

Why have the Paris Accords failed to bring peace?

By attempting to increase the areas under their control, both Hanoi and Saigon have violated the accords, which provided for a standstill ceasefire. Experts agree, however, that the Communists have much more frequently and flagrantly violated the agreement. The International Commission of Control and Supervision, consisting of four nations, has been paralyzed because the Communists refuse to help pay for the organization's expenses and will not allow its members to visit areas controlled by North Vietnamese troops to investigate alleged cease-fire violations.

What impact would the fall of Saigon have on the rest of Southeast Asia?

With both Viet Nams under Communist control, Laos and Cambodia would probably be doomed to becoming satellites of the Vietnamese. Other nations of the region would have to make some accommodations with the powerful Vietnamese, like adopting a more neutral foreign policy. There seems little evidence, however, to substantiate fears that Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines would fall to the Communists like dominoes. In Thailand, the small insurgency movement might gain at least moral support from new Communist governments in the region; but Bangkok would probably try to prevent that by moving quickly to improve its relations with Peking and Hanoi.

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