Monday, Feb. 24, 1975
Sinai: A Border for Israel
To dramatize the strategic importance of the Mitla and Giddi passes, the sites of bitter battles in three wars between Israel and Egypt, the Israeli government last week flew U.S. newsmen accompanying Secretary of State Henry Kissinger by helicopter to a promontory on the Sinai front from which they could see all the way to the Suez Canal. Diplomatic Editor Jerrold L. Schecter, who was on the helicopter tour, and TIME'S Daniel Drooz, who earlier made a visit to the vital passes, reported on the scene:
The Mitla Pass, cabled Schecter, is no narrow cowboy-and-Indian ambush site. It stretches for 15 miles between granite outcroppings, the quickest route into the Sinai from the canal. With the low ground beneath him and the demilitarized zone nine miles in front of him, General Jacob ("Jacke") Evan, 40, made his pitch, stressing the importance of controlling the high ground and maintaining an effective "electronic alert." Evan, deputy commander of Israel's southern front and an armored expert who fought at Mitla Pass in '67, declined to explain what he meant by the term, but Israeli radar and listening devices round the Mitla are said to be so effective that they can detect Egyptian MIGs preparing for takeoff at bases several miles west of the Suez Canal.
Evan swung his pointer across a map board, from the Mitla through the desert to the Giddi Pass 30 miles north. "If we stay in this area," he said, "we can conduct a good defensive operation without putting the whole army in." By controlling the passes, he said, the Israelis have a 7-to-l manpower advantage over the Egyptians. The Mitla Pass outpost seemed lightly manned. Only a few squads of soldiers were camped amidst the crushed granite and sand bars. "Why don't we see any tanks or artillery?" the general was asked. He smiled. "This is an outstanding place for concealment." He added, "This is not a border to defend Sinai but a border to defend Israel. I, as a military man, would like to remain in this area."
Israel's generals, at least, have worked over the monotonous rock-strewn desert since the October war as if they intended to remain, transforming the area around the passes into a powerful redoubt. In fact, reports Drooz, the Israeli government has spent $60 million on the Sinai defenses since the end of the October war. Entire battalions of armor have been buried in laagers--scooped-out shelters covered with camouflage nets. It is startling, as Israeli troops run through practice drills, to see an M48 suddenly rear into view, moving from laager to firing platform or swiveling its 105-mm. gun as it goes churning across the dunes. The mountains, meanwhile, have been honeycombed with miniforts and electronic snooping stations.
There is no doubt that the thrust of any battle in another Sinai war will center on the passes. "This chain of mountains is the most important geographic factor in Sinai," explains a senior Israeli commander. "North of the passes is soft sand, which makes hard going for armor. To the south are high granite mountains that make large-scale maneuvers impossible. From here we can defend all of Sinai."
The most visible evidence of the new fortifications system is a 13-story observation tower, almost identical to a tower built by the Egyptians on their side of the demilitarized zone. Israeli soldiers man the crow's-nest continually, logging every movement on the other side. The Israelis estimate that the Egyptians have built enough bunkers for a force of five to seven infantry divisions, which could be transported across the canal within six hours, along with fire-control centers and launching sites on the east bank of the canal. In addition, there are at least 250 artillery pits and 75 armored personnel carriers, many of them equipped with Sagger antitank missiles.
To throw back such a force, the Israeli army in Sinai has switched tactics. There are no more forts like those that dotted the prewar Bar Lev Line along the canal. "We've changed our style," says one army commander. "We're basing our defense now on armor, mechanized troops and self-propelled guns that would move quickly to any trouble spot." Israeli armor is on constant alert. About the only time the engines of the 155-mm. and 175-mm. self-propelled gun carriers are turned off is when Soviet spy satellites are about to pass overhead. The engines are shut down eight hours before the pass-overs so that infra-red sensors on the satellites will not pick up motor-engine heat, thereby disclosing Israeli strengths and dispositions.
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