The Intervention Issue

Such is his impact on international affairs that almost anything said by Henry Kissinger is bound to attract widespread attention and comment. Last week--perhaps inadvertently, perhaps not--the Secretary of State managed to trigger a worldwide uproar. In a lengthy Business Week interview, Kissinger responded to a question about possible U.S. military intervention against the oil producers by cautiously noting that this would be "a very dangerous course." But then, using a complicated--not to mention cryptic--triple negative, he added: "I am not saying that there is no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price, it's another where there's some actual strangulation of the industrial world."

Although the remark on possible intervention was just a very small part of a lengthy interview, it was picked up and headlined by newspapers and wire services around the world. Standing alone, the statement almost seemed as if Kissinger were already mobilizing troops. The reaction was immediate, emotional and sharply negative. "A colonialist enterprise doomed to failure," thundered Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, reacting to his own reading of the Kissinger statement. "Gunboat policies," ridiculed Pravda. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat warned that the oil-producing Arab nations would blow up their wells rather than let them be seized by U.S. forces. Rome worried that American intervention might risk nuclear war with the Soviets. In London, political leaders of all parties were privately troubled by what they felt was Kissinger's flirtation with "brinkmanship." Only the Israelis expressed satisfaction. "It was a good statement," said former Intelligence Chief Harm Herzog. "It makes the Arabs think twice."

Doomsday Prospect. Under close analysis, the Kissinger statement did not seem to warrant such a reaction. In a sense, it merely expressed the obvious. It is hard to see how Kissinger could have ruled out military action absolutely under any circumstances. A sovereign power must retain the option of using force if and when its survival, or that of its essential allies, is at stake. "Any individual, or country, carries in the back of his mind the idea that if his life or livelihood is threatened, he will use all the means at his disposal to protect himself," observed Harvard Professor of Government Nadav Safran. Kissinger's remarks only repeated what he had said before on a "background" basis. They also were consistent with his earlier statements about the doomsday prospect facing the industrialized democracies of the West because of "economic strangulation"--that is, national bankruptcies and the possible collapse of representative government as a result of continued high oil prices or a new embargo.

Despite their public stance last week (taken to appease the Arabs), a number of European officials privately agreed with Kissinger. They acknowledged that if their economic situation became "extreme," they would not oppose U.S. military action to avoid "actual economic strangulation." One major European government reportedly has already prepared a contingency plan to support U.S. intervention.

Contingency Plans. During the past year there have been dozens of seminars at universities and think tanks at which the pros and cons of American military action against the oil exporters have been discussed. Several armed forces institutes have held contingency planning sessions to which expert civilians were invited. Recently, some of the discussion has become public.

Perhaps the most exhaustive analysis in print of the possibility of U.S. armed intervention in the Middle East is an article by Robert W. Tucker in the January issue of Commentary. A professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Tucker has been a prominent advocate of a reduced U.S. role in the world. Now, however, he argues that the U.S. ought not to rule out automatically "the meaningful threat of force." While not actually advocating an invasion of the oil exporting countries, Tucker analyzes that possibility and concludes that it might be tried with much less risk than is widely assumed. He believes that U.S. forces--in a quick strike--could take control of 40% of the world's proven petroleum reserves by seizing a narrow, 400-mile coastal strip along the Persian Gulf, running from Kuwait through Saudi Arabia to Qatar. Tucker notes that because this militarily unprotected area "has no substantial centers of population and is without trees, its effective control does not even bear remote comparison with the [American] experience of Viet Nam in combatting guerrillas."

But would the Soviets allow the U.S. to take over the wells? Tucker's answer is that "the Russians simply do not have the interest [in that area] that we do" and thus would be "less prone to take the risks we would be prepared to take." Moreover, the Soviet navy still lacks the capability to fight an effective battle for control of the Persian Gulf. Tucker concludes that while the U.S.S.R. probably would not directly challenge a U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, the Soviets would undoubtedly seek some gains from the situation; Russian occupation of Iraq is one distinct possibility.

As to the argument that the Arabs would destroy their oil wells if faced with occupation, Tucker reckons that the U.S. has the technology to restore production at damaged wells in less than four months. Meanwhile, existing oil reserves in the West would be sufficient to provide most of the world's energy needs, especially since it is doubtful that all members of OPEC would participate in a retaliatory embargo. Tucker believes that Venezuela and Iran, for example, would probably continue pumping and shipping oil. He concludes that there are some troublesome uncertainties involving U.S. military action in the Middle East but, he adds, "the present course also has its uncertainties."

Experts--including those sympathetic with Tucker's general argument--question whether a military operation would go as smoothly as Tucker assumes. "Once you start a war, it is awfully hard to predict which way it will go," cautions Aaron Wildavsky, dean of Berkeley's Graduate School of Public Policy. In fact, landing troops and capturing the oil wells could be just the beginning. After that, according to a Pentagon aide, "Sabotage! Guerrillas!" Harvard's Safran notes that with the workers the U.S. would have to bring in to rebuild and operate the wells, plus the soldiers to protect and supply them, the action "could mean half a million troops. Then you would have to supply these guys with every cup of water they drank and every cucumber they ate."

Last Resort. Tucker may also be too sanguine about the Soviet response. While it is not likely, Moscow does have the capability of squeezing West Berlin and increasing tension all along Europe's East-West frontier. The Arabs' retaliation need not be limited to attacks on the occupying forces; terrorists could hit targets in the U.S. as well. Air and sea routes could be disrupted; American residents in Arab countries could be taken hostage.

Kissinger clearly stated that American intervention in the Middle East would be a last-resort step. But in the face of the outrage, far from retracting his statement that intervention remains a U.S. option, he even added that President Ford agrees with him. Ford last week reaffirmed that support (see NATION). Kissinger's remarks, therefore, may have been a calculated signal to the oil exporters, warning them that they cannot remain adamant much longer on high petroleum prices. So far there is no indication that this signal has been heeded in the Middle East, nor is there any evidence that there is much confidence anywhere that a policy of intervention could now succeed.

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