A Diplomatic "Illness" Raises Hopes

"When Anwar Sadat talks to an American leader, he talks of peace. When he talks to Brezhnev, he talks war." So said an Egyptian official, as he looked ahead to the long-scheduled mid-January visit to Cairo of Soviet Communist Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev. Last week it appeared that the Egyptian President still preferred to talk peace rather than talk war on Russian terms. After a flurry of Egyptian and Soviet diplomatic activity, Brezhnev postponed indefinitely his state visits to Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In light of the Soviet Union's unmistakable desire to increase its influence in shaping a Middle Eastern peace settlement, the postponement was a clear setback for Moscow. It also provided new hope for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's strategy of careful, step-by-step negotiations involving Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Hunting Lodge. What prompted Brezhnev to call off his trip? Aides to Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and newly appointed Minister of War General Mohamed Abdel Ghany Gamassy, who saw Brezhnev last week, insisted that the Soviet leader was in poor health. There were also reports that the Egyptian Cabinet members met him at a health sanatorium outside Moscow. It is quite possible that Brezhnev, 68, who has had a grueling series of diplomatic encounters, including trips to Paris, Mongolia and Vladivostok, may have a touch of grippe, which is--as usual in winter--widespread in Moscow.

Nonetheless, there is strong suspicion that Brezhnev's "illness" was more diplomatic than physical. TIME Moscow Correspondent John Shaw reported that Fahmy and Gamassy did not meet Brezhnev in a sanatorium but were driven in a high-speed, police-escorted convoy to Brezhnev's hunting lodge at Zavidovo, about 80 miles north of Moscow.

Such a diplomatic illness may have been caused by the inability of the Egyptians and the Soviets to agree on the future course of Middle East negotiations. Brezhnev told Fahmy and Gamassy that before he would go to the Middle East, Cairo must accept the Geneva Conference as the sole route for reaching a negotiated peace. As the conference's co-host (along with the U.S.), the Soviet Union would be able to exercise a powerful, direct influence on the negotiations and perhaps even deadlock them. Sadat apparently balked: he wants to give Kissinger another chance to pressure Israel into returning more of occupied Sinai to Egypt as another positive step toward settlement. Unwilling to suffer what might appear to be a rejection of his own brand of personal diplomacy, Brezhnev put off his trip. Although Moscow has relatively few policy differences with Syria and Iraq, Brezhnev could hardly visit those nations and skip Egypt; that would be a much harsher public slap at Sadat than the Soviet leader probably wants to administer.

Faint New Hope. Fahmy and Gamassy went to Moscow, partly in hope of convincing Brezhnev that the Soviet Union should resume large-scale arms shipments to Egypt. Since the end of the October war, the Soviets have poured massive supplies of arms into Syria, while Israel, thanks to the U.S., has more than replaced its materiel losses. Egypt, on the other hand, has been left without adequate replacements for its Russian-made arms. One condition Moscow sets for arms shipments: a return of Soviet advisers to Egypt.

With the Brezhnev visit now delayed indefinitely, there is a new opportunity for Kissinger to push ahead with talks leading to a further pullback of Israeli troops on the Sinai and Golan fronts. Cairo's mood last week reflected a faint new hope that he might succeed.

The first step may be taken this week when Israeli Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon sees Kissinger in Washington. During a December visit to the U.S., Allon told Kissinger that in return for Egyptian concessions, such as a declaration of nonbelligerence, Israel was prepared to give up as many as 50 miles in some parts of occupied Sinai. Sadat rejected this proposal as "unacceptable," on the ground that the Israelis were not willing to surrender either the strategic Mitla and Giddi desert passes or the captured Egyptian oil wells at Abu Rudeis, which supply Israel with about 60% of its petroleum.

The big question is: What will Allon propose now? Officials in Jerusalem hint that Israel might return the oilfields if it received a guaranteed substitute source (possibly the U.S.) for the 25 million bbl. Abu Rudeis now pumps out annually. Israel might also give up the passes, according to these officials, if: 1) the area were demilitarized, 2) the term of the disengagement ran for several years, 3) Israeli cargoes (though not necessarily Israeli ships) had rights of passage through the Suez Canal, and 4) Egypt tacitly agreed to some kind of assurance of nonbelligerence. Egypt may find some of these points more acceptable than Allon's December proposals.

Since progress toward a settlement has been stalled for so long, Kissinger is likely to lose little time in ascertaining Egypt's response to whatever Allon brings to Washington. Thus it is expected that either Fahmy will visit Washington soon after Allon departs, or that Kissinger will fly off to the Middle East for another round of shuttle diplomacy. At week's end, though, several Arab states, as well as Iran, reacted angrily to a Kissinger statement that, "in the gravest emergency," the U.S. might consider using military force against Middle East oil producers.

Underlying Reason. Sadat badly needs visible evidence of progress toward peace. He has come under consistent criticism from Arab militants for trusting Kissinger so much. Last week he had to face mounting criticism at home. On New Year's Day, rioting and violence erupted in downtown Cairo for the first time in nearly two years. More than 500 workers from the Helwan industrial complex massed in front of the Interior Ministry demanding a rollback of food prices, which have soared an estimated 20% in the past year. Although police disbanded the mob with clubs and tear gas, protesters roamed through the center of the capital, stoning buses and smashing windows at Libyan Arab Airlines and Air France.

Although the protest was ostensibly aimed at inflation, the underlying reason for the riots was a growing fear that the Middle East may be drifting back to the tense and economically costly "no war, no peace" situation that followed the Six-Day War of 1967. In fact, as a reminder that tension still plagues the region, on three consecutive days last week Israel sent commandos into southern Lebanon. They raided villages, destroyed houses, and seized five villagers as alleged terrorists. Lebanese officials reported that four civilians and one soldier had been killed. Israelis said that the raids were merely "preventive and reconnaissance operations" designed to "confront the terrorists" before they crossed into Israel.

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