How Kissinger Handled a War

Yet when he is out there on the stage, being cheered as a global lion-tamer, he cannot resist the temptation to join in the applause. Once at a large Washington dinner a man walked up to him and said, "Dr. Kissinger, I want to thank you for saving the world." "You 're welcome," he replied.

So concludes the introduction to Kissinger, a breezy, sometimes biting but largely admiring and affectionate portrait of the Secretary of State in action to be published August 23 by Little, Brown. Its authors are CBS Correspondents Marvin and Bernard Kalb, and their aim is not history or biography, but careful journalism with final judgments held to a minimum. Marvin, 44, and Bernard, 52, have followed Kissinger around the world for CBS and have had access to a wide range of sources, including Kissinger himself, though the Secretary had no part hi the book's writing or editing. Their account of Kissinger ranges across his full career in the Nixon Administration, but the freshest and most controversial of their chapters deals with Kissinger's handling of the 1973 war in the Middle East. It is a vivid picture of the Secretary of State at work under fire, juggling policies and priorities.

The Kalb brothers assert that "on Sept. 22 [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat informed [Soviet Party Chief Leonid] Brezhnev that the war would begin on Oct. 6. As far as one can tell, the Russian leader raised no objections." Although "there was a steady flow of intelligence indicating plans for an imminent Egyptian-Syrian attack, the political leaders of Israel and the United States, incredibly, failed to recognize it." On Oct. 5, Kissinger was at the Waldorf Towers in New York City for the General Assembly session. He did not receive a report from Ray Cline, then head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, concluding that the war would start the following day or even sooner because "no one wanted to take the responsibility for disturbing the Secretary in New York on a Friday evening after hours."

At 6 the next morning, Kissinger was awakened by news from U.S. Ambassador to Israel Kenneth Keating that war was imminent. Kissinger called the President and on Nixon's instructions telephoned the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers, urging "restraint." With Israel's Abba Eban, he added the extra warning: "Don't pre-empt."

First Blows. Kissinger remained dubious that the Arabs were going to attack, and at 7 a.m. he warned the Israeli charge d'affaires in Washington: "Don't ever start the war. Don't ever preempt. If you fire the first shot, you won't have presidential support. You'll be alone, all alone. We wouldn't be able to help you. Don't pre-empt."

As a double check, Kissinger instructed Keating to repeat his warning against initiating action to Premier Golda Meir. The Kalbs say that Keating reportedly told Mrs. Meir: "If Israel refrained from a pre-emptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the aggressors, then America would feel morally obliged to help." The Kalbs add: "No translation was needed that if Israel struck first, then the U.S. would feel no moral obligation to help. Israel would be alone." Mrs. Meir reversed 25 years of Israeli strategy and accepted the first blows.

Say the Kalbs: "Despite initial Arab successes in the first two days of the war, Kissinger retained his earlier confidence that Israel, even if attacked first, would quickly throw back her enemies. He expected a quick Israeli victory--in three or four days at the most."

On Sunday evening, Oct. 7, Kissinger met Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz and told him that Israel's decision not to pre-empt was "the right decision." Yes, replied Dinitz, but "that decision bestows a special responsibility on America not to leave us alone, as far as equipment is concerned."

Although Kissinger promised to help, the Kalbs say, he did not want to offend the Arabs or the Russians, and he spent the rest of the week in a sometimes delicate, often brutal balancing act in Washington while the fighting proceeded. Kissinger is depicted as constantly goading Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and the Pentagon to arrange to send supplies to Israel and implying to Dinitz that he was fighting Israel's battles in the U.S. bureaucracy.

With Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, say the Kalbs, Kissinger took a different though not necessarily inconsistent line. "Citing the demands from Capitol Hill for quick American aid to Israel and a reappraisal of the Administration policy of detente with Russia, he told the Russian envoy that he was holding back a rush of pro-Israeli actions. He appealed for Soviet cooperation in restraining the advancing Arab armies and in fostering a cease-fire in the Middle East."

But the warning had no effect, and on Tuesday, Oct. 9, Kissinger received intelligence reports of "an increase in the number of Soviet supply ships steaming toward Syrian and Egyptian ports."

Canceled. The next morning, Oct. 10, "American and Israeli intelligence picked up the first clear signals of a Soviet airlift into Damascus and Cairo." Kissinger and Dinitz discussed the situation, and Dinitz again pressed for supplies. Kissinger promised rapid results. "He called Schlesinger," say the Kalbs, "and asked him to organize civilian charters to carry American military aid to Israel as quickly as possible. The Defense Secretary showed little enthusiasm for the idea, but he offered no opposition. Kissinger wasn't sure at that point if Schlesinger intended to help."

That day a noon appointment for Schlesinger and Dinitz to discuss supplies for Israel was canceled, say the Kalbs, because Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements, "a wealthy Texas drilling contractor with close ties to the oil industry, had apparently persuaded [Schlesinger] that he needed more information about U.S. inventories before he could provide the Israelis with an exact timetable for deliveries."

By that afternoon it became apparent from urgent CIA reports that the Russian airlift was becoming massive. Late that night Kissinger, through the CIA, learned that three Soviet airborne divisions in Eastern Europe had been put on alert, and he could only assume that they were being readied "for possible deployment to the Middle East." Kissinger called Dinitz and recommended a 7:45 a.m. meeting on Thursday, but he did not tell Dinitz about the Soviet alert.

During the night Kissinger, relate the Kalbs, "had reached a major decision: Russia had to be stopped--not only to save Israel, but, in his mind, to spare the world from the possibility of a big-power confrontation. The Soviet airlift and alert had changed his attitude about Israel's capacity to win a quick victory. Just as he had misjudged prewar intelligence, so too had he misjudged the will and capability of the Arabs and the duplicity of the Russians. He was now determined to open a massive airlift of American military supplies to Israel. 'We tried to talk in the first week,' Kissinger later explained. 'When that didn't work, we said fine, we'll start pouring in equipment until we create a new reality.' "

The Kalbs say that "Kissinger told Dinitz to see Schlesinger about getting the equipment. He implied that this time Schlesinger would be more accommodating." Later on Thursday afternoon, they write: "Kissinger argued forcefully with Schlesinger about the need to correct the military imbalance in the Middle East. He again urged his colleague to charter 20 American transport planes to fly emergency supplies to Israel. Schlesinger resisted Kissinger's appeal. The Defense chief argued just as forcefully that even a limited American airlift to Israel would so infuriate the Arabs that they would impose an oil embargo on the United States. The argument was resolved only after Kissinger had won the President to his point of view. Nixon ordered Schlesinger to charter 20 transport planes.

Flabbergasted. "By 9:45 a.m. Friday, Oct. 12, Dinitz still had heard nothing about the 20 charters. A half-dozen Israeli planes had transported military equipment from the United States to Israel, but that was, as [Dinitz] put it, 'a drop in the bucket.'" When Dinitz called Kissinger to complain, the Kalbs report, "the Secretary seemed surprised and angry. Kissinger immediately called Schlesinger and, in the President's name, instructed him to arrange for the charter of 20 civilian transport planes. Schlesinger said the Pentagon had tried to hire civilian charters but failed. Most [airline] companies, he explained, did not want to get involved in the Middle East war. In that case, Kissinger snapped, get military planes, and get them quickly." Schlesinger disputes major points in this version of events (see box previous page).

"By midafternoon, Dinitz learned from Israeli intelligence that the Russians had mobilized three airborne divisions. He called Kissinger, who said the CIA had just received the same intelligence." Kissinger, report the Kalbs, "did not tell Dinitz that the CIA had received that intelligence two days before."

Finally, at 6 p.m. Friday night, Dinitz, accompanied by Israeli Defense Attache General Mordechai Gur, met with Schlesinger and Defense Department officials. Schlesinger, according to the Kalbs, "explained that 'political considerations' had caused the U.S. to 'slow down.' The U.S. did not want to destroy its 'position and image in the Arab world.' Charter companies feared Arab terrorism or reprisals and therefore refused to help Israel." U.S. military transports "would be permitted to carry military supplies to the Azores Islands, but no further." From there, Israel would have to make other arrangements to get the supplies to Tel Aviv. A flabbergasted Dinitz replied that if that was the case, Israel would not get the supplies "in time for this war."

By 11 o'clock Friday night, Dinitz was back at Kissinger's office in the White House with an ultimatum. "If a massive American airlift to Israel does not start immediately," Dinitz emphasized, "then I'll know that the United States is reneging on its promises and its policy, and we will have to draw very serious conclusions from all this." The Kalbs say that Kissinger quickly understood that the Israelis would soon tell the world what was going on in Washington and that an upsurge of pro-Israeli sentiment could have a disastrous impact. They quote a "high State Department source" as saying: "That's all [Senator Henry] Jackson needed. If Dinitz had gone public with everything he knew, it could have toppled the Administration." The Kalbs say: "Kissinger promised Dinitz that he would do 'everything in my power' to overcome 'bureaucratic difficulties' and launch a massive American airlift to Israel."

After checking with his deputy on the National Security Council staff to see whether the Pentagon had been dragging its feet, Kissinger, according to the Kalbs, called Schlesinger and "warned that the President would 'blow his top' when he learned about the delays. Accusing Clements, [then Assistant Secretary Robert C] Hill and [Deputy Assistant Secretary James H.] Noyes by name, Kissinger admonished Schlesinger for not 'taking charge' of the resupply effort. Schlesinger tried to defend his aides and refute the Secretary's charges, but Kissinger interrupted him with an order to get busy implementing the President's policy.

"When Kissinger finished talking with Schlesinger, he immediately called Haig. 'We must put the fear of God in Schlesinger and Clements,' he was quoted as saying. 'They are working against presidential orders.' Kissinger demanded that the problem of Israeli 'resupply' be solved 'urgently.'"

Quick Pickup. Later that Friday night, Kissinger met with Nixon for a review, and the President instructed Alexander Haig, say the Kalbs, to order Schlesinger to send ten C-130 planes loaded with military supplies to the Azores, to fly another 20 C-130s to Israel, and to facilitate a quick Israeli pickup of cargo left in the Azores.

At 10:30 Saturday morning, Oct. 13, at a White House meeting with Kissinger, Schlesinger, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Thomas Moorer, Haig, CIA Director William Colby and others, the President asked why there had been a delay in implementing his previous orders about supplies for Israel. Schlesinger tried to explain his difficulty in chartering civilian transport planes. 'To hell with the charters,' Nixon exploded, according to one eyewitness. 'Get the supplies there with American military planes! Forget the Azores! Get moving! I want no further delays.' "

After the meeting with the President, the Kalbs say, "Kissinger began to lean very hard on Schlesinger." Dinitz, still skeptical, said that if the transport planes were not airborne by sundown Saturday, "he would have to conclude that the United States, by failing to keep its word, had 'precipitated a crisis in Israeli-American relations.' "

Dinitz was again assured that there would be no crisis, and the planes left the U.S. at 3:30 p.m. Saturday. Dinitz cabled Mrs. Meir: "A massive American airlift" had begun. Kissinger had won what one of his aides later called "the battle of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue."

There were other battles ahead. Reinvigorated, the Israelis managed to improve their position in the field, pressing hard against Syria and establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the scramble for a cease-fire was on. At Brezhnev's invitation, Kissinger flew to Moscow, arriving at 7:30 p.m., Oct. 20. While airborne, he received an unusual signal from the White House, giving him what amounted to a "power of attorney" to sign any agreement in Moscow in his name. Kissinger realized later that the President was about to fire Archibald Cox in the Saturday Night Massacre.

Brezhnev and Kissinger worked out the basis for a ceasefire, which was declared. But by the time Kissinger was back in Washington on Oct. 23, at 3 a.m., after stopovers in Jerusalem and London, the Russians were complaining of massive Israeli cease-fire violations.

Kissinger called Dinitz. "What the hell is going on here?" he asked the ambassador, according to the Kalbs. Both sides had violated the ceasefire, but the Israelis were driving hard, having reached the outskirts of Suez and surrounded the Egyptian Third Corps. Kissinger knew that the Soviets could not allow a serious Egyptian defeat. The Egyptians and Soviets were pressing for a joint U.S.-Soviet peace-keeping force, a notion Washington resisted.

To Deter. On Oct. 24 at 9:25 p.m., while still trying to keep the Israelis in line, Kissinger received a phone call from Dobrynin, relaying the now-famous Brezhnev message. It warned that if the big powers could not act jointly, "we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally." The Kalbs relate that Kissinger called the President and told him that the "U.S. might have to alert its military forces as one way to deter any unilateral Soviet move. The President concurred."

At 11 p.m., Kissinger met at the White House with Schlesinger, Colby, Haig, Moorer and Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger's deputy on the National Security Council staff. Say the Kalbs: "There was in their view a 'high probability' of some kind of'unilateral Soviet move.'" (This version seemed later to have been partly disputed by Schlesinger, who said that the probability of Soviet troops actually being on the move "was considered by some to be low.") At 11:30 p.m. Schlesinger ordered the first stage of the alert.

Before leaving the White House, Kissinger called then British Ambassador Lord Cromer, who reportedly responded snippily: "Why tell us, Henry? Tell your friends--the Russians."

The country reacted with shock to the alert. The inevitable suspicion was that the alert, or at least its extent, was caused by a political desire to divert attention from Watergate. The Kalbs report that Kissinger later admitted, privately, that the alert had perhaps been on a larger scale than necessary. At any rate, as he and the Kalbs see it, the alert gave the Russians a clear signal of U.S. determination not to allow unilateral intervention in the Middle East and made possible a U.N. resolution for a peacekeeping force excluding the two superpowers. It was an illustration of Kissinger's belief that, in dealing with the Soviets, "we need a combination of extreme toughness, when we are challenged," with enough flexibility "to give them the option of going to a more responsible course" without losing face.

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