Strategy for a Long Haul

What has passed for peace in South Viet Nam since the cease-fire was signed 18 months ago would be called war almost anywhere else. Last week in the old "iron triangle," South Vietnamese units finally, after an agonizing battle, chased North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regulars from one of three outposts they had recently captured near Ben Cat, a strategically important district town 25 miles north of Saigon. The next day the Communists launched a strong counterattack, which ended in failure. In spite of repeated air strikes by South Vietnamese Skyraiders, however, the two neighboring posts remained in the hands of the Communists. From advance positions the North Vietnamese fired more than 40 122-mm. rockets at Bien Hoa airbase. The rockets hit a detention center for women prisoners, killing 18.

At the laconic military briefings in Saigon, ARVN officials claimed that nearly 63,000 enemy soldiers have been killed since the Paris accords were signed. The South Vietnamese admit losing more than 17,000 men during this period. Despite the intensity of recent fighting--a last-minute Communist flurry before" the monsoons set in--few in Saigon expect a major Communist offensive. Through interrogation of defectors, South Vietnamese intelligence experts have been able to reconstruct a major document based upon a North Vietnamese strategy directive. The document is Central Office for South Viet Nam (COSVN) Resolution 12, designed to inform cadres of party goals and methods.

The reconstructed and as yet un published directive emphasizes a longterm, cautious struggle to take over all of Viet Nam. Communist forces will try to force Saigon to implement the Paris accords ("a great victory") so that the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong guerrillas can nip off territory bit by bit. Says the document: "We will have to attack point by point, grasping partial victories and advancing to ward final victory."

The resolution makes only passing reference to Communist strengths. "Our regional forces and guerrillas are still feeble, with low morale. Cadre ideology has not developed enough to keep pace with the needs of the revolution. They hold pleasure-seeking, pacifistic or pessimistic attitudes. They are afraid of making sacrifices."

With a tacit bow to the effectiveness of Saigon's counterinsurgency forces in urban areas, the document admits that "our infrastructure has been lost completely. We were seduced by the illusion of peace and became inactive against enemy tricks. We have lost a certain amount of land and population in the Mekong Delta"--estimated by Saigon to be about 20% of the land held by the Communists at the time of the Paris accords.

The resolution acknowledges the strength of Saigon's American-equipped 1.1 million-man army. It also discusses weakness and instability in the Thieu government and refers to signs of a "serious crisis" in Saigon. With only a minimum of hyperbole, it talks of such chronic problems as "less rice, escalation of prices, people so hungry they commit suicide. U.S. aid is being reduced. There is not enough money to pay civil servants and soldiers. The single resource left is emission of bank notes ... These weak points are basic, lasting, difficult to overcome and increasingly serious."

Digging In. The Communists believe that the U.S. "intends to transform [South Viet Nam] into an outpost to prevent the revolution from spreading down to Southeast Asia." Because of congressional opposition, Watergate and economic woes, the Communists concede, "it is difficult for the U.S. to return to South Viet Nam." Nonetheless the directive cautions against ruling out the possibility.

Observes one longtime analyst of Vietnamese affairs: "What is remarkable about the document is its conservatism." Indeed, there are other indications that the Communists are digging in for the long haul. Apparently they have no strong hopes that they can topple the Saigon regime in the foreseeable future.

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