An Intimate Glimpse of a Private President

Apart from the evidence it provides about the President's critical conversations, the edited transcript furnishes a potpourri of marginalia that limn the style and character of the Nixon White House. A representative sampler:

NIXON ON OTHERS

The President's confidential assessments of other men in talks with trusted aides were tough, candid, and often brutal:

Senator Howard Baker. "A smoothy--impressive" but also possessed of a "thick skull."

Senator Sam Ervin. "[Expletive deleted] He's got Baker totally toppled over to him. Ervin works harder than most of our Southern gentlemen."

L. Patrick Gray III. "Oh, he's dumb ... he is just quite stubborn and also he isn't very smart."

Jeb Stuart Magruder. "Not a very bright fellow. I mean he is bright, but he doesn't think through to the end ... a very facile liar. Magruder's a sort of lightweight in a very heavy job."

Charles Colson. "Talks too much ... is also a name-dropper."

J. Edgar Hoover. "Well, Hoover performed. He would have fought. That was the point. He would have defied a few people. He would have scared them to death. He has a file on everybody."

Robert Kennedy. "Bobby was a ruthless [characterization omitted]."

WISHFUL THINKING

For a man proud of his political shrewdness, the President as revealed in the transcript was frequently slow to grasp the full seriousness of the Watergate matter, and he gravely misread the public mood on several important points.

"[Expletive deleted] it is a terrible lousy thing--it will remain a crisis among the upper intellectual types, the soft heads, our own, too--Republicans--and the Democrats and the rest. Average people won't think it is much of a crisis unless it affects them [unintelligible]." (March 13,1973)

Nixon was strangely sanguine even though the Senate Watergate Committee planned to hold hearings:

"Well, it must be a big show. Public hearings. I wouldn't think though, I know from experience, my guess is that I think they could get through about three weeks of those and then I think it would begin to peter out somewhat." (March 13,1973)

AS DECISION MAKER

Contrary to the President's carefully nurtured image as a cool and dispassionate leader accustomed to tough going, the transcript reveals an indecisive man often dazed by a confusion of conflicting data.

Haldeman's judgment easily prevailed over the President's in this discussion about whether or not to reveal the contents of Jeb Stuart Magruder's grand jury testimony:

P: And I think you should tell [John Connally] --would you tell him about Magruder?

H: Nope.

P: No, I guess not.

qed

P: I think with Bill [Rogers], though, you could tell him, don't you think?

H: Nope. I don't think I should. In the first place, I am not supposed to know.

P: This isn't from the grand jury. Bob.

H: No, I know. But Kleindienst is worried about John [Ehrlichman's] giving the information to anybody, and that--

P: I see. You're right. (April 14, 1973)

ASSESSING THE BLAME

While the President's conversations reveal a complete absence of outrage at his own subordinates for the Watergate imbroglio, he was quick to place the blame on people outside his circle:

"No, I tell you this it is the last gasp of our hardest opponents. They've just got to have something to squeal about." (March 13, 1973)

"They [the Democrats] are having a hard time now. They got the hell kicked out of them in the election ... But the basic thing is the establishment. The establishment is dying and so they've got to show that despite the successes we have had in foreign policy and in the election, they've got to show that it is just wrong just because of this." (March 13,1973)

THE KENNEDY SPECTER

In the view of Nixon and his men, Teddy Kennedy loomed large as the individual who might have the most to gain from the entire Watergate affair.

D: I am convinced that he [Senator Ervin] has shown that he is merely a puppet for Kennedy in this whole thing. The fine hand of the Kennedys' is behind this whole hearing. There is no doubt about it...

qed

P: Yes, I guess the Kennedy crowd is just laying in the bushes waiting to make their move. (Feb 28, 1973) On one occasion, Dean brought up an FBI agent's idea for collecting information on the Democrats. The President's reply:

"If he would get Kennedy into it, too, I would be a bit more pleased." (March 13, 1973)

The President and his immediate circle of advisers were also worried that Kennedy would exploit the Ervin hearings for his own advantage, going on television to give his version of the events.

qed

AS A LAWYER

Though an attorney himself, the President was often vague and uninformed on various questions of law raised by Watergate. At one point Nixon misunderstood the legal niceties involved in preparing the original Watergate defendants for their testimony:

P: Did Mardian coach them?

E: In some cases Mardian, I guess, was very heavy-handed about it, and--

P: Well, is there anything wrong with that?

E: Yeah, well there's something wrong with--

P: He was not their attorney is the problem?

E: Well, no, the problem--the problem is he asked them to say things that weren't true.

P: Oh. (April 15,1973)

P: What did he [Egil Krogh, deputy assistant to the President for domestic affairs] perjure himself on, John?

D Did he know the Cubans. He did.

P He said he didn't?

D That is right. They didn't press him hard.

P He might be able to--I am just trying to think.

Perjury is an awful hard rap to prove. If he could just say that I--Well, go ahead. (March 21,1973)

SPEAKING IN CODE:

In the Oval Office, Nixon and his closest aides often employed a kind of verbal code, a jargon clearly familiar to everyone present. It was a mixture of Madison Avenue, locker room and pop psych--the shorthand of the club:

"Stonewall, with lots of noises that we are always willing to cooperate, but no one is asking us for anything." (Dean, on how to reply to embarrassing questions, March 20,1973)

P: The reason I raise the question of Magruder is what stroke have you got with Magruder? I guess we've got none. (March 27, 1973)

D: If we go that route, sir, I can give a show we can sell them just like we were selling Wheaties on our position. (March 21, 1973)

P: All right, let's leave it this way--you will handle Baker now--you will babysit him starting like in about ten minutes? Alright? (March 22, 1973)

NIXON ON NIXON:

Occasionally in the transcripts, the President lapses into a personal assessment, a revealing aside on how he views himself:

"I believe in playing politics hard, but I am also smart." (March 27, 1973)

"I mean, after all, it is my job and I don't want the presidency tarnished, but I am also a law enforcement man." (April 14, 1973)

"And damn it I am that kind of person. I am not one who is going to say, look, while this guy is under attack, I drop him. Is there something to be said for that, or not?" (April 14, 1973)

"Nobody is a friend of ours. Let's face it! Don't worry about that." (March 13, 1973)

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.