Monday, Dec. 24, 1973

Kissinger: Less Fun But More Awe

TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold L. Schecter has closely followed the career and fortunes of Henry Kissinger. His appraisal of the Secretary of State today:

Kissinger knows that President Nixon is wounded, but he cannot admit the obvious. When he is in Washington, he still sees Nixon for a half-hour every morning, but the atmosphere of their meetings is more relaxed. Kissinger no longer has to prove his loyalty to the President, nor does he have to worry about being undercut by the White House palace guard. Nixon now allows

Kissinger a new latitude of near autonomy. As Sir Alec Douglas-Home said in London last week, Kissinger is no longer an agent of the President, but a "creative statesman" in his own right, "who has the support of the President of the United States."

When he moved to the State Department, there was speculation that Kissinger would institutionalize his policies. Instead, he has become the institution. In foreign affairs, Nixon is still commander in chief, but Kissinger has asserted himself as both strategist and tactician with such sweeping command that there is no one in the White House to challenge his power. The State Department, so often derogated by the President and his aides, has been relatively untainted by Watergate. Kissinger is known to believe that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct foreign policy from the White House in the present climate. But he is sensitive to Nixon's plight, and in defending the presidency, he indirectly defends him.

Overseas, there has been little impact so far from charges that Kissinger was responsible for raising the security concerns in the White House that led to the organization of the "plumbers" unit. Kissinger acknowledges that he had a sense of outrage when the Pentagon papers were published. Not only did he think that it was morally wrong for Daniel Ellsberg to leak the papers, but he was deeply concerned that their publication would destroy negotiations with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. Although Kissinger stressed the dangers of leaks in his talks with Nixon, he insists that he never in his wildest dreams believed that the White House response would be the plumbers.

The policymaking restraints imposed on Kissinger by domestic political matters and Nixon's re-election campaign have been removed. Now he can face more basic considerations: how to maintain American prestige and economic power in the world. Kissinger's biggest problem is his lack of economic expertise and an economic team; he has been late in building one. He has also moved late to take command in the field of international oil and energy. Kissinger remains a stern, demanding taskmaster with Teutonic thoroughness. He uses the department more than when he was only a presidential adviser, but the operation is still based on a small personal team. His demands for perfection have not altered: his NATO statement went through a dozen drafts.

Kissinger still takes time to trade quips with the press on his tours. The smiles and the charm are there, but there is a new caution, an extra moment of thought before he delivers his carefully phrased answers. There is less time for sleep (five hours a night) and more demands for him to fulfill the protocol role of office. The playboy of the West Wing has become the serious statesman.

While he is less fun to be with these days, Kissinger is unquestionably surer of himself. Those who have followed him sense that he is also more careful and more calculating. For the first time, even Henry Kissinger seems awed by the power and responsibility he holds as Secretary of State.

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