Tanaka's Life Buoy

Japan's tough, wary Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was positively lyrical last week as he ended a four-day visit to Moscow. Addressing a farewell press conference, he declared: "Our relations with the Soviet Union can be compared with the smooth, calm flow of the Moscow River. The atmosphere of our talks was as sunny as the fine weather here this week." It was, of course, an exaggeration, but understandable in the circumstances. The atmosphere during the first three days of Tanaka's talks with Kremlin leaders had more closely resembled a squall on the Black Sea. But on the last day Tanaka was buoyed by an important Soviet concession on some business left over from World War II.

The first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Moscow since 1956, Tanaka was primarily interested in discussing the return to Japanese control of four islands north of Hokkaido that were seized by the Soviets at the tail end of the war. Though small geographically (4,244 sq. mi.), the islands--Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotani and Habomai*--loom large politically. The Diet has been pressing Tanaka to assert Japan's rights to the islands. If Tanaka could arrange their return under a belated peace treaty with Russia formally ending World War II, it would be a major and much-needed personal triumph.

The Soviet Union, however, has been reluctant even to discuss the issue, fearing that any settlement might set a bad precedent in its dispute with China over territory along the Manchurian border. During the first rounds of Tanaka's negotiations in Moscow, it seemed that a dialogue of the deaf was in the making. While Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev expanded at length on specific opportunities for Japanese participation in Siberian development, Tanaka tenaciously stuck to the island issue.

The impression of stalemate deepened when Brezhnev, presumably preoccupied by the Middle East crisis, failed to show up for a luncheon given by Tanaka. The deadlock persisted through more talks, often heated, with other Soviet officials. But just before Tanaka was scheduled to depart, the impasse was broken. An intentionally vague joint communique committed the Russians to continuing the discussions in 1974 for the purpose of signing a peace treaty and resolving "various outstanding questions left over since World War II." Though not mentioned specifically, the four disputed islands are clearly to be included.

That, of course, does not mean that the Soviets will ultimately give them back. But the communique marked the first time that the Kremlin had even admitted that they were a subject for discussion. For Tanaka, the concession, however small, resembled a life buoy. Not only had his Soviet visit started poorly; his preceding twelve-day journey through Europe had been somewhat less than exhilarating.

On visits to Paris, London and Bonn, Tanaka had been eager to show West Europeans that Japan is no longer content with its traditionally low diplomatic profile. As the world's second largest trading power, Japan wants to be involved in the shaping of new relationships between the European Economic Community and the U.S. But the Europeans were at best lukewarm toward Tanaka's visions of a "more balanced triangle." In Paris, the first stop on Tanaka's itinerary, Georges Pompidou agreed to send the Mona Lisa to Tokyo and to cooperate with Japan in a uranium enrichment project, but at the same time, he let it be known that Tanaka's dream of a larger political role for Japan in the West simply did not interest him. To many in Japan, it seemed that Tanaka had had the door slammed in his face, an impression that West German Chancellor Willy Brandt rather undiplomatically confirmed. Even before Tanaka arrived in Bonn, he summed up the German position by saying that "the tricornered hat has two corners only for the time being."

*Habomai actually consists of five tiny islands and adjoining reefs totaling less than 39 sq. mi.

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