Black October: Old Enemies at War Again

The sirens began to wail while all Israel was observing Yom Kippur, the holiest and also the quietest day of the Jewish year. By tradition, tens of thousands of servicemen were home on leave; Israeli Broadcasting had shut down for the day; and just about the only vehicles on the highways were ambulances.

As crowds of worshipers emerged from synagogues at the end of the five-hour-long morning services of atonement, they found the streets filled with speeding trucks, buses and Jeeps. The Israeli radio was back on the air. All afternoon its broadcasts of news bulletins and classical music were interrupted by such incongruous phrases as "meat pie," "sea wolf" and "wool string"--military codes calling reservists to duty. By late afternoon, virtually every Israeli--and much of the rest of the world as well--knew that what Defense Minister Moshe Dayan defiantly called "all-out war" had begun again.

Blue Point. The fighting erupted when Egyptian troops surged across the Suez Canal and Syrian soldiers struck in the north on the Golan Heights. Both forces swept through Israel's front lines and punched their way into Israeli-held territory under the glare of an afternoon sun. Backed by heavy artillery and strafing jets, they maneuvered with tanks and armored vehicles. Helicopters carried some Arab troops into battle. United Nations observers reported seeing Egyptians crossing into the Sinai Desert at five points along the 103-mile canal front; Syrian troops were spotted moving into Israel over the central section of the Golan Heights cease-fire line by other U.N. teams. The Syrians were soon stopped, but the Egyptians claimed that within hours they occupied nearly all of the east bank of the canal--a claim quickly denied by the Israelis. Though both Egypt and Syria insisted that invading Israeli troops had started the war, the evidence clearly indicated that the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 25 years had been launched by a massive Arab invasion. Within 24 hours, Israeli troops had stemmed the Arab thrust and were delivering a brutal counterattack.

News of the invasion sent Israeli civilians cleaning out their bomb shelters, filling their bathtubs with water and taping their windows for blackouts. At several synagogues, services were interrupted as the sextons stood up and called out the names of young men who were being summoned to duty; other worshipers, on hearing the news, quickly folded their prayer shawls and departed; some returned later, in uniform, to bid their families goodbye. That day, Israeli warplanes buzzed Israel's principal cities, perhaps as a signal for air force call-ups; but it was a curious occurrence, because planes had never flown over Israel during Yom Kippur before.

The suddenness of the fighting created some curious anomalies on both sides. Despite a blackout, the shop-window lights on Tel Aviv's fashionable Dizengoff Street and Allenby Road snapped on automatically at sundown; shopkeepers quickly turned them off. In Cairo, which lies but seven minutes by jet from the canal, the streets were brightly lit for hours after sundown. "You mean," demanded a sidewalk vendor in disbelief, "that we are fighting Israel with all these lights on?" By late evening, when the government ordered that all electric lights and headlights be daubed with blue paint, the war reports seemed more convincing.

Odious Lie. From the beginning, the Israeli government maintained an outward calm that made a convincing show of its self-confidence. Prime Minister Golda Meir went on the air in late afternoon to assure her countrymen that "grave losses have been inflicted on the enemy." Her voice was firm, but she spoke in more measured and deeper tones than usual. "We have no doubts as to our victory," she said. "But it is our belief that this renewal of Egyptian-Syrian aggression is an act of madness."

Defense Minister Dayan, who addressed the nation some hours later, was even more optimistic. "The Arabs will take no advantage from this war before the cease-fire goes into effect," he said. "The people of Tel Aviv will be able to sleep well tonight." He said that bridges would remain open to Jordan and traffic between the west and east banks of the Jordan would be permitted as usual. Any Arabs who wished to go to work in Israel, he declared, would be allowed to do so.

Dayan admitted that Israeli defense forces had been stretched thin along the canal, but maintained that the size of the Sinai Peninsula afforded the major cities of Israel sufficient security against Egyptian attack. Egyptian forces would be expelled from the Sinai, he insisted, as soon as Israeli reservists joined the battle. "It won't take months or weeks to wipe them out." As for the Syrians, said Dayan, their evident objective was to recapture the Golan Heights, which Israel seized during the Six-Day War, but, he added, "this they will not do."

In New York, where he was attending the U.N. General Assembly, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban branded the Arab contention that Israel had started the war as "the most odious lie in the history of international relations." Noting that Yom Kippur is the most revered holiday in the Jewish calendar, Eban said that the Arabs' decision to use that day for their invasion was cynical and blasphemous. "In Israel there is inevitably a relaxation of normal tensions during Yom Kippur," he said. "All the logistics of a complex society are on a low pulse. Even in the armed forces the general atmosphere has its effect--even the forward posts are manned at a lower establishment than usual. In short, it is a good moment to win some transient advantage at Israel's expense, a good moment for those whose hatred and malice have no restraints or human respect or spiritual decency."

While his indignation was understandable, Eban's rhetoric was overblown. The fact is that the Arab attack did not come as a surprise. Israeli intelligence reported having observed the Egyptians and Syrians reinforcing their border units.

A spokesman for Eban admitted as much when he told reporters: "The likelihood of such an attack became apparent some hours before, and information was given to the U.S. and other governments together with an assurance that Israel would not make any preventive move and would favor action by interested parties to warn Cairo and Damascus against carrying out what was clearly their intention."

U.S. intelligence sources supported reports that the Egyptians had nearly doubled the number of their troops along the canal to at least 120,000. On the Golan Heights Syrian troop movements in recent days had been observed within view of the Israeli border ten miles away. In fact, on the day of the Arab attack the Israelis had begun to call up their reserves at 10 a.m., at least four hours before the fighting began, and the Israeli Cabinet was already in session by the time word of the invasion reached Jerusalem.

Rapid Strike. When the fighting broke out, President Richard Nixon was at his home in Key Biscayne, Fla., where he was awakened at 6 a.m. Saturday by a telephone call from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Nixon was kept informed of developments through the day by calls from Kissinger as the Secretary of State sought to get the two sides to stop shooting at each other. After trying vainly to work out a peace formula with the Israeli and Arab Foreign Ministers in New York, where he was conferring with diplomats attending the U.N. General Assembly, Kissinger flew to Washington. In a spasm of telephone calls, he talked to every permanent member of the Security Council. That evening he chaired a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, a "crisis management" team made up of representatives of the State and Defense departments, the CIA and the National Security Council. But there was, in truth, very little that the U.S. could do to stop the bloodshed.

In Tel Aviv, Israeli leaders met in a heated Cabinet session to discuss reaction to the crisis. Defense Minister Dayan, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Minister of Commerce Haim Bar-Lev won the support of Prime Minister Meir for a policy to hit back hard at the Arabs. Dayan argued that merely to repulse the Egyptian-Syrian invasion would be no victory, merely a stalemate. The Arabs had to be punished, he insisted, by Israeli counterpunches into their territory. The Cabinet approved. Few Western military observers had doubted that Israel had the force to do it. What left many of them in doubt was what the Arabs had hoped to gain by fighting the tough Israelis, who three times before had beaten Arab forces.

One theory had it that Egypt and Syria had decided on a quick show of strength--a rapid strike across the canal followed by a rapid withdrawal--as a way of breaking the longstanding deadlock over negotiations on the territory captured in the 1967 Six-Day War and still held by Israel. Given Israel's well-known stubborn refusal to bow to force, such a plan seemed to be hardly credible.

More likely was a strategy that called for the Arabs to recapture some territory lost in 1967 and then quickly to accede to international demands for a ceasefire. That would leave the territory in Arab possession--and Israel in the uncomfortable position of being condemned if it did not stop fighting. Though few Western observers believed that Israel would put down its arms before defeating the Arabs, strategists in Cairo and Damascus may have thought that the chance of Israel's succumbing to international pressure was worth the gamble and eventually might lead to a settlement favorable to them.

But the timing was, to say the least, peculiar. The Arabs of late were winning the propaganda war. Israel had been losing world sympathy in recent months because of its strident reactions to Arab terrorists and inflexible determination to hold onto the occupied territories. Austria's decision last week to close down the Schoenau camp for emigrating Soviet Jews (see following story) was just one example of Israel's declining favor among other nations. Zaire broke off diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv last week in protest over Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory; it was the eighth African country to do so in five years. Israel's contacts with black Africa had represented a significant link with the Third World.

More and more people, especially young leftists in all countries, were expressing concern for the plight of Arab refugees. Even the U.S. recently joined with the majority in the U.N. to condemn Israel's forcing down of a civilian Iraqi Airways Caravelle jetliner in search of Palestinian guerrillas. Additionally, the threat that oil-rich Arab nations might begin to withhold their fuel from nations too friendly with Israel was causing petroleum-needy Western countries to reconsider their relationship with Israel. With all those trends going for them, it was a mystery to observers why the Arabs would risk their newfound popularity by a reckless military foray that could only swing much of world opinion back in favor of a besieged Israel. In fact, the common conclusion was that the Arabs could have done nothing to help the international position of Israel more.

Some Arab analysts believed that the invasion had been discussed at last month's summit meeting in Cairo between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad. Indeed, that could have been the primary purpose of the meeting, though at the time the more important achievement seemed to be the Arab leaders' reconciliation with Jordan's King Hussein. The following week, Hussein had courted further favor from his Arab brethren by suddenly pardoning and releasing from prison 970 Palestinian guerrillas and other political prisoners.

But Hussein showed no inclination to get involved in the latest fray, particularly after Dayan publicly warned him to avoid a "black October." Lebanon likewise remained studiously neutral. But 17 Arab leaders sent messages of support to Egypt's Sadat. Among them was a telegram from King Feisal of Saudi Arabia: "We stand beside you with all our potential and capabilities"--an apparent implication that he was prepared to use oil diplomacy, if possible, in the battle.

Better Clue. For once, neither superpower was directly involved. The Administration, in fact, had seemed to be uncertain about how much credence to give early intelligence reports that told of the buildup of Arab forces a week before the war. In his discussions with Arab Foreign Ministers before the war, Secretary of State Kissinger remarked, not one had indicated that the military buildup was a prelude to a resumption of fighting; instead, the discussions had centered on finding a means for new negotiations.

The Soviet Union may well have had a better clue to what was going on. A few days before the fighting began, the Soviets reportedly removed their advisers--an estimated 3,000 strong--from Syria. No public explanation was offered, but some observers believed that Moscow took the action after failing to convince the Damascus government of "the futility of embarking on military adventures." Nonetheless, Moscow publicly supported the Arabs. A Pravda article said that the war was "carefully prepared and planned in Tel Aviv."

Considering the shortcomings of the Arab attack, it could have been. On both the Suez and Golan Heights fronts, the Arabs placed emphasis on artillery, armor and infantry troops. They made no attempt to knock out the Israeli air force, their single most deadly enemy. Nor did they bomb Israel's population centers--partly, no doubt, for fear that Israel would retaliate by bombing their cities. Once Egyptian troops were committed east of the canal, they had no way to retreat as long as Israeli jets prowled the waterway.

Despite the glaring weaknesses of their strategy, the Arabs committed a formidable army to battle. In the north, Syria had about six divisions with a total of perhaps 100,000 men and 1,300 to 1,400 tanks. In the south, the Egyptians' 120,000 men were backed up by 1,800 to 2,000 tanks and 600 to 700 aircraft.

During the early hours, the heaviest fighting was at the canal, where the Egyptian forces established east-bank bridgeheads in the area leading to the Gidi Pass and in the vicinity of Port Fuad and Ismailiya; the Ismailiya crossing near the center of the canal was dug in and causing the Israelis the greatest concern. The Egyptians also tried to land at Ras Sudr, but lost ten of their troop-carrying helicopters to the Israelis in the attempt; the copters each carried 30 to 40 men. Copters also landed commando units in the northern Sinai in an attempt to cut Israeli roads and supply lines, but apparently made little headway; the Israeli army said it was "busy engaging them." In the air, the Egyptians said they shot down 27 Israeli planes but lost 15 of their own. The Israeli claims were 30 Egyptian planes shot down and four Israeli planes lost.

At the Golan Heights, the Israelis managed to stop the Syrian forces with antitank guns and ditches. The area was the center of heavy dogfighting as Syrian planes penetrated Israeli airspace, strafing farm villages. Some of the dogfights could be watched clearly by residents of Kiryat Shemona in upper eastern Galilee. In one such clash, a formation of 21 Syrian MIGS was seen heading in the direction of Kiryat Shemona; then one plane fell to earth and shells littered the area.

Curious Battle. Off the Syrian coast, the first naval encounter ended in a clear-cut Israeli victory: missile boats armed with the highly touted Israeli-made Gabriel missile attacked and sank four Syrian missile ships of the Russian Komar class and one small motor torpedo boat.

In the Red Sea, the Israeli navy sank three Egyptian boats carrying troops preparing to make a beachhead, and a fourth Egyptian vessel was destroyed northeast of Port Said.

By Sunday morning, after nearly a day of intense fighting, Israeli forces had seized the initiative on both fronts. The Egyptians began to fall back, having failed to put enough tanks across the canal during the night. They also failed to dent Israel's air supremacy, and in the early hours of the second day of fighting, the Egyptian air force did not even take to the air to support ground troops. Israeli planes penetrated deep into Egypt, knocking out missile systems and other defenses. Defense Minister Dayan said that the mop-up might take several days, but he predicted that the curious battle of Yom Kippur was already decided.

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