The Tariff Trade-Off

As if he were not already embroiled with Congress on enough issues involving Executive power, President Nixon last week sent to Capitol Hill a bill that would transfer to the White House much of the authority that Congress traditionally has exercised over U.S. trade policy. If it passes, the President, acting on his own, could:

>> Raise or lower tariffs on Japanese cameras, German cars or almost any other foreign goods.

>> Impose quotas on foreign goods -Italian shoes, for example -in order to protect an import-threatened American industry.

>> Order a temporary surcharge on imports from countries that run a persistent surplus in trade with the U.S.

>> Decree that goods from Communist countries be let into the U.S. under tariffs no higher than those levied against the merchandise of America's traditional trading partners.

Nixon argues persuasively that he needs the new power in order to negotiate from strength at world-trade talks beginning in September. He will get an argument from protectionist Congressmen who want to require, rather than merely permit, higher tariffs or quotas on imports that threaten the prosperity of U.S. industries. The President prudently proposed to give Congress a veto over the way he might exercise many of the new trade powers that he is requesting. In a typical example, if he decided to grant "most-favored-nation" tariff status to imports from the Soviet Union, either House or Senate could overrule him by a majority vote within 90 days. That might well happen, since many Congressmen are opposed to giving Russian goods most-favored-nation treatment until the Kremlin drops its tax on Jews emigrating to Israel.

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