A Shattering Disappointment

HENRY KISSINGER deplaned at Andrews Air Force Base after another bargaining session in Paris with Hanoi's Le Due Tho. A reporter asked, "Do you still think that 'peace is at hand'?" Replied Kissinger with a smile: "That's a great phrase. Who used it?"

The Kissinger coyness that is so delightful at times was misplaced last week. His "at hand" formulation, the attention-grabbing quote given in his dramatic press conference on Oct. 26, had instantly inflated hopes for an end to the long agony of Viet Nam. Now this optimism was dealt a heavy blow. At a Saturday news conference, Kissinger changed his evaluation considerably. "Peace can be near," he said, but--and this "but" loomed frighteningly large--North Viet Nam would have to decide to resume bargaining "in good faith," as defined by the U.S. Yet Kissinger revealed that his latest round of talks in Paris had failed to yield an agreement satisfactory to Richard Nixon.

In view of the confidence inspired earlier by the Administration's report of progress, the credibility of Nixon and Kissinger is clearly on the line. Kissinger gave no hint of that as he laid all of the blame for delay on Hanoi. He charged that Hanoi had suddenly begun raising "one frivolous issue after another." Tho and his associates would agree on a point, then retract it or try to make substantive alterations "in the guise of linguistic changes."

Citing one example of the difficulty in negotiating, Kissinger noted that Hanoi was arguing that a 250-man international truce-supervision team, without any Jeeps, telephones or radios of its own to use in investigating violations, would be adequate. The U.S. believes that a fully equipped force of at least several thousand is necessary. "The North Vietnamese perception of international machinery and our perception is at drastic variance," said Kissinger.

Despite all of the differences newly injected by Hanoi, Kissinger contended that most were readily reconcilable if the Communists would only return to the cooperative spirit shown last October. He reported that only one really basic clash remained; "we are one decision away from a settlement." Kissinger did not spell it out, but it was apparent that this question touched on one of the fundamental issues of the entire war: are there two Viet Nams engaged in international conflict, or is there one country temporarily divided by an arbitrary frontier and engaged in a civil war?

Imprudent. When the secret talks first produced a nine-point agreement between Kissinger and Tho last October, that problem was handled mainly by using vague language. The announced summary of Point 5 stated merely that "the reunification of Viet Nam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means," which seemed to imply that Viet Nam is divided now, but only until enough comity can be restored to permit reunification. The U.S. also agreed in Point 1 to respect the 1954 Geneva agreements, which partitioned the country only in a military sense, noting that no political or territorial boundaries were being created. In early October that language at least seemed acceptable to Kissinger.

In any event, Kissinger on Oct. 17 flew to Saigon to gain the approval of President Nguyen Van Thieu. Complaints by Thieu--about the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops, about the protection of South Viet Nam's sovereignty, about the organizing of national elections--apparently did not seem too serious to Kissinger. He informed Nixon that the agreement was still intact, and Nixon then cabled North Viet Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong, advising him that the agreement was ready to be signed. However, according to the Communists (and this is not denied by the White House), Washington suggested on Oct. 23 that the signing be postponed and new meetings be held to "clarify" some matters.

It was thus the U.S. that asked for clarification of the package--and opened itself up to the kind of tactics Hanoi is now employing. Amid all the uncertainties and the continuing delays, Kissinger's Oct. 26 television announcement of an imminent peace now looks uncharacteristically imprudent. Nixon critics will always wonder how much the haste was motivated by the impending presidential election and how much he allowed himself to be influenced by Thieu's resistance.

When the talks resumed, progress at first was rapid. But the North Vietnamese suddenly turned dilatory on Dec. 4 for reasons Kissinger could not explain. Whatever the cause, Hanoi was not prepared to yield enough to satisfy Washington on the sticky matter of Thieu's sovereignty. On that issue, Kissinger says that any agreement must include "some references--however vague, however allusive, however indirect--which would make it clear that the two parts of Viet Nam would live in peace and neither side would impose its solution by force." That also means, as Kissinger puts it, that the U.S. "cannot accept the proposition that North Viet Nam has a right of constant intervention in the South." That stand seems reasonable enough--although the U.S. may be demanding more, in Hanoi's view, than has been won on the battlefield. At any rate, why the problem was not anticipated by Kissinger at the October talks is still puzzling.

One related issue in the interrupted talks seems to have been resolved by a semantic compromise. While the original nine-point plan made no explicit demand that North Vietnamese troops be removed from the South after a ceasefire, there was an unwritten understanding that many would leave. Thieu insisted on the removal of all such troops, guaranteed in writing. The compromise, it is understood, drops the word withdrawal and calls instead for a phased mutual "demobilization." The North apparently would be allowed to retain enough forces in the South to keep its Viet Cong cadres from being overrun by Thieu's troops.

Final Test. The effect on both Thieu and Hanoi of Kissinger's disheartening report is uncertain. Thieu last week was still objecting to the original Kissinger-Tho proposals, claiming they would lead to a Communist takeover within six months. Nixon does not yet seem to have decided just how to handle Thieu if a showdown with him comes--although Kissinger called the matter "moot" until Hanoi changes its attitude. Kissinger did warn, however, that once Hanoi and Washington agree in Paris, "no other party will have a veto over our action." Yet it would be difficult for Nixon to brusquely bypass Thieu after doing so much to build him up.

The U.S. and North Viet Nam seem to be engaging in a final test of each other's nerve. Kissinger spoke out, he indicated, because of the Communist foot-dragging, adding: "The President decided that we could not engage in a charade with the American people." Yet as peace remained so elusive, the American people had every right to feel disillusioned and perhaps even misled.

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