Pursuing the Still Elusive Terms of Peace

HENRY KISSINGER was back in Paris to meet Hanoi's Le Due Tho for another in the seemingly interminable series of secret talks aimed at ending the war in Viet Nam. Lacking any formal announcements of either final agreement or impasse, newsmen concentrated on the omens--and they were ambiguous. As Kissinger emerged from one session, a nearly all-black cat jumped atop his Cadillac limousine. At another meeting in the private home of an American jeweler in fashionable Neuilly-sur-Seine, Kissinger pointed at the ceiling and said with a puckish smile: "When the light bulb starts blinking, it means we have to change the tape." As the North Vietnamese laughed, Kissinger assured them the room was not bugged.

The quip rather than the cat seemed to symbolize the state of the talks. In the general atmosphere of friendliness, definite progress was reported, and one high U.S. source estimated that there was only a 5% chance that the talks could break down. In fact, Hanoi seemed to be preparing its North Vietnamese listeners for an imminent cease-fire and some concessions to the enemy. "There is a time for us to advance," intoned Radio Hanoi, "but there is also a time for us to step backward temporarily, in order to advance more steadily later. Sometimes we must accept a certain agreement with the enemy--aimed at weakening the enemy's forces and strengthening ours." The U.S. State Department, too, apparently anticipates an early settlement; 100 Foreign Service officers have been told to stand by to travel to South Viet Nam to serve, among other duties, as observers watching for truce violations at least until a more formal four-nation commission can take over the task.

For all that, there was no doubt that the going was difficult, as Tho and Kissinger met six times during the week. Some talkathons lasted five hours. The cable traffic from Kissinger to the White House was unusually heavy, suggesting that the tentative language of sections of a final agreement was being transmitted for presidential approval. It was evident throughout the week that Nixon was remaining in close touch with each negotiating development.

Ominous. The talks apparently concentrated on three crucial points: 1) finding a formula that would guarantee that the North Vietnamese would make at least a token withdrawal of forces from South Viet Nam after a ceasefire; 2) the question of whether political prisoners held by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's government must be released; 3) the powers and duties of the proposed National Council of Reconciliation that would supervise the postwar elections and a new political arrangement for governing South Viet Nam. Also debated were the problems involved in establishing cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia when fighting stops in Viet Nam, and the details of getting a proposed International Control Commission into operation to supervise the truce.

At stake in many of those details is the key question of how the Communists can be prevented from seizing control of the new South Viet Nam government. U.S. intelligence sources report ominously that captured documents indicate that Hanoi is instructing many of its forces not to disband after the cease-fire but to reorganize as Viet Cong guerrilla-style units and continue terror and harassment tactics.

Thieu still remains a potential stumbling block. Radio Saigon warned that without Thieu's signature, "any peace accord concluded is just a piece of paper headed for the wastebasket." But American officials in Saigon were chorusing the catchword "reality" as the reason they thought Thieu would buckle to the U.S. pressure for peace. Explained one: "Thieu must recognize the realities. He cannot expect to win in negotiations what he cannot win on the battlefield."

While the delay in pinning down a settlement meant that the bombing, fighting and dying were continuing, it was also working to Thieu's short-term advantage. His troops have had time to recapture--or simply destroy--many of the hamlets the Communists seized when an earlier cease-fire seemed imminent. The U.S. has also been able to rush in more military supplies than had been planned under the Vietnamization program. Thieu has also been assured by President Nixon that the U.S. will not let him fall because of any Communist violaton of the ceasefire.

While a peace package once again seemed close at hand, its durability, as well as the political future of South Viet Nam, remained almost as tenuous as ever.

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