Could It Have Been Settled Sooner?

THE end of the war will not arrest the bitter debate in the U.S. over whether that end might have come much sooner. The note was struck to cheers from a student audience in Iowa last week by George McGovern when he asked: "Why, Mr. Nixon, did you take another four years to put an end to this tragic war?" For McGovern and many Americans, the Thieu regime was so corrupt, the war so immoral, the cost in lives and national spirit so debilitating, that instant U.S. withdrawal from Viet Nam had long since been justified. Nixon, of course, rejected unilateral withdrawal by the U.S. from the outset of his Administration. He was convinced that America's role in the world could not allow abandoning a commitment and an ally. More important, he felt that the sacrifices in blood that the U.S. had already made in Indochina must not be dishonored and seemingly rendered in vain. So the quest for either a clear victory through Vietnamization and the massive use of U.S. airpower, or a negotiated, face-saving "peace with honor" began--to be accomplished within the four years of his first Administration, Nixon promised.

Any illusions about the prospects of victory through Vietnamization in that time frame were shattered by the successes of Hanoi's Easter offensive this year, when only American air strikes prevented a South Vietnamese rout. For both sides, those battles seemed to mark an acquiescence, or at least a war-weary recognition of military stalemate, making the negotiations, stymied by the demands of both sides for so long, at last a more promising out. And finally, the bargain across the table was struck between Hanoi and Washington.

Could it have come sooner than this year? No, snapped Henry Kissinger in response to that inevitable first question following his briefing last week. There was "no possibility" for a deal until now because Hanoi, he said, "consistently refused to discuss the separation of the political and military issues" and insisted "that we had to predetermine the future of South Viet Nam in a negotiation with North Viet Nam." Hanoi's own testimony seemed to support that defense. Radio Hanoi claimed credit for making the swift, ultimate meeting of minds possible by its "extremely important initiative" in the area Kissinger cited. Moreover, there is little doubt that pressure from Moscow and Peking on Hanoi, which in turn resulted from Nixon's summit diplomacy, was a significant factor in Hanoi's agreement.

But the argument really goes beyond who finally said "I do" first, to an examination of what has finally been agreed to. The concessions and the compromises are real and earnest on both sides. The primary bargain may be that Nixon agreed to let North Vietnamese troops now in South Viet Nam remain there in exchange for Hanoi's permitting Thieu to stay in power while a political settlement is worked out.

On balance, whatever face the Administration puts on it, Nixon appears to have given more than he got. He has in effect ratified Hanoi's conquest of large portions of South Viet Nam, and will permit North Vietnamese soldiers to stay on to preserve those conquests. He has in effect overturned the South Vietnamese constitution by certifying a process to rewrite it and replace the country's form of government. As a result, Thieu's interim lease on the presidential palace--Hanoi's part of the bargain--is tenuous. To be sure, he has a chance, but it is a limited one. TIME'S Saigon Bureau Chief Stanley Cloud reports that "Most observers here seem to agree that it will be impossible for the Thieu government or any anti-Communist government in South Viet Nam to negotiate on a one-to-one basis, as the agreement provides, and survive." That does not necessarily mean an instant Communist government in Saigon; an interim period of years of factional regimes might ensue. For what Nixon has is a set of procedures for a political settlement among the Vietnamese so complicated that the U.S. will be gone from Viet Nam before any resolution, however injurious to American "honor," takes place. It surely is not the peace with honor Nixon said he had in mind when he took office and charted his Viet Nam course.

The question then becomes easier to frame: if Nixon had been willing to give as much in 1969 or 1970 or 1971 as he has now, could the U.S.'s part in the war have ended much sooner? There can, of course, be no definitive answer about the roads of history not taken. For its own reasons, Hanoi might have been adamant and unwilling to take the bargain. It was never tried. But in the long run the Communists stand to gain enough from the present deal so that it is hard to believe that Hanoi would not have accepted this or a similar offer.

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