Straight Talk from Sadat

One of the continuing puzzles of the Middle East has been why Egypt's President Anwar Sadat suddenly expelled his Soviet military advisers last summer --and why they left in such haste. Last week, in an interview that appeared in the Beirut magazine al Hawadess ("Events"), Sadat provided a rare insight into that historic moment: "1 told the Russians that they must end their military presence in Egypt before the morning of July 18. As to the equipment and installations, I said, "Sell them or take them with you.' " The Soviets managed to meet the deadline with 20 hours to spare but, as Sadat said, "There is no doubt that they must have been upset."

In a three-hour interview in Cairo with al Hawadess Editor-Publisher Salim Louzi, Sadat described with unusual frankness the reasoning behind his sudden decision. He had decided that another war with Israel was inevitable and that "the Russian military presence would render a big strategic service to Israel when the battle begins. Israel would then say that it was fighting the Russians, not the Arabs, and would thus win over the Americans and even European public opinion. This meant that the Russians had become a burden on us."

Beyond that, Sadat was certain that the Russians did not intend to let Egypt fight. Instead they were pressing the Arabs to accept a peace settlement. "Another point I wanted to make in removing the Russian military presence in Egypt was to make the leaders of the Kremlin understand that their strategy in the area cannot be fulfilled at our expense."

Sadat said there were four specific items of offensive weaponry that he had sought from the Soviet Union unsuccessfully. One was fighter-bombers "to enable us to strike in depth when Israel strikes at us in depth, and so we may not have to resort to kamikaze operations." Sadat had wanted the MIG-23, the hottest new airplane in the Soviet air force. "We have tested the MIG-23 here in Egypt," he told al Hawadess. "It flew more than once deep into Israel and took photographs. It has been proved that neither the Phantom nor the American-made missiles can reach the altitude of the MIG-23." If Egypt had got such a plane, Sadat intimated, the Middle East would be hotter now than it is. "I would not have allowed Israel to commit its aggression in southern Lebanon as it did recently."

Other weapons on Sadat's shopping list were tanks ("It is not logical that we cross the desert on rubber tires"), torpedo boats and electronic equipment. Since the Russians refused to supply Egypt with these items, Sadat said, the new strategy was for Egypt to manufacture them. "We must possess the arms factories so my will may not be dictated by friends or non-friends."

Sadat let slip some rare criticism of his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Egyptian army had not been properly trained under Nasser to fight an offensive war, Sadat declared--and it had also become too political. "The Egyptian army should have been converted to a fighting army after the 1956 Suez war," Sadat told al Hawadess. Egypt at that point had suffered a military setback, "but we turned it into a political victory" (when President Eisenhower forced Britain, France and Israel to desist in their combined attack on Egypt).

Nothing was done about improving the Egyptian army's fighting ability. For that, Sadat blamed Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, the commander who committed suicide after his troops were defeated again in 1967. Egypt's Revolutionary Council had tried to force Amer out in 1961, Sadat indicated, but Nasser allowed Amer to remain at the army's head because the two men were close friends. "I knew there had been mistakes--and grave ones at that," said Sadat of that era, "but I could not renounce Abdel Nasser."

Nasser also had difficulty getting weapons from the Soviets, Sadat revealed. On his last visit to Moscow before his death two years ago, he attempted to persuade them to improve Egypt's offensive capability. Nasser returned to Cairo to report that the situation was "a hopeless case." He even used the English words, recalled Sadat: there was nothing in Arabic to sum up his frustration so succinctly.

Though professing himself prepared to fight, Sadat declared that he was ready to make peace, so long as it is accomplished under terms laid down by the United Nations. Washington recently inquired about the possibility of peace, he said, and he had told the Americans that "I am ready to talk with you, but not via those through whom you are fighting us. I am not ready for direct negotiation with Israel." That was something of an improvement since last year Sadat was refusing even to talk to Washington about the Middle East.

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