So Much for No. 1

Former Attorney General John Mitchell once said of the Nixon Administration, "Watch what we do instead of listening to what we say." It is an apt alert. The gulf between the two can be wide, and nowhere more so than on the subject of welfare reform. Nixon has long been on record as saying that reform of the "welfare mess" was his "White House priority No. 1." Yet for more than a year he has put little of his prestige and even less of his energy behind his own reform measures. Last week, with welfare legislation finally before the full Senate, the President turned thumbs down on the various compromise reform measures that came to a vote. Thus he got apparently what he wanted--nothing.

Nixon's own welfare-reform plan was advanced three years ago by Daniel Moynihan, a Kennedy Democrat who used his charms and powers of persuasion as a presidential assistant to help win over Nixon's more conservative inclinations. Buried in the ore of a tough work-ethic requirement for the able-bodied on welfare were the Administration's glittering liberal jewels: 1) a guaranteed annual income eventually set as $2,400 for a family of four, 2) income supplements for the working poor, and 3) an extension of coverage to all male-headed families, since many states do not extend welfare to such families and thus encourage family breakups. The idea was to replace the fantastically complex welfare payments that varied enormously from state to state with a federally controlled minimum income, both for the working poor and those with no income. In order to qualify, those capable of working were required either to obtain job training or employment if available. When Moynihan departed for Harvard in early 1971, the proposal lost its architect and articulator.

More recently, it has been ably supported by the current HEW Secretary, Elliot Richardson, and by the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, who put it at the top of the House agenda in 1971. But the opposition--both right and left--was just as determined. On the right, Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, filibustered the House bill through the latter part of 1971 and 1972. This summer Long's committee added some stiff work provisions that would have required 1.2 million recipients to accept federally guaranteed, low-paying jobs.

Once changed by the conservative Finance Committee, the bill faced strenuous opposition on the left from the more liberal Senators. It was clear that the Administration would have to be willing to accept a compromise. One promising proposal came from Connecticut Democratic Senator Abraham Ribicoff. The "Ribicoff-Administration" measure, as the Senator called it, set the guaranteed annual income for a family of four at $2,600 and stipulated that it rise automatically with the cost of living. It also stated that no welfare recipient would be required to take a job that paid below the minimum wage.

Where the Administration plan would supplement the income of the working poor on a decreasing scale until earnings for a family of four reached $4,200 a year, Ribicoff s plan raised the break-even point below which the poor remained eligible for benefits to $5,053. But before he had even finished arguing his position in the Senate, a courier arrived with a press release saying in effect that the White House would not support his version of the bill.

The sticking point was Nixon himself. Although Richardson was willing to compromise, the President was not. He argued that the White House version of the legislation already "stretches the budget as far as it can be stretched." Furthermore, he had McGovern in a corner on the welfare issue, and he was not about to give him breathing room by softening his own position. So he stood firm, knowing full well he was sealing the fate of his own "priority" domestic legislation. Said one Congressman: "He preferred a campaign issue to the bill." An Administration executive ruefully agreed: "The President has to share a major part of the blame."

Instead a bill was approved that provides for a two-to four-year "test" of three different reform schemes, but without any "trigger" mechanism to put the one that works best into effect nationwide. The welfare "mess" thus perpetuated, the Senate moved on to pass an $ 18.5 billion welfare and Social Security bill. If signed into law by Nixon, the measure will increase Social Security taxes by 8%, expand both the number of people and services covered by Medicare, and permit older workers to earn almost twice as much--$3,000, compared with the present $1,680 --without loss of Social Security cash benefits.

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