Light at Last?

A fresh susurrus of rumors about an impending peace settlement in Viet Nam welled up last week, but with somewhat more than the usual volume. Both the Times of London and U.P.I., filing from Saigon, reported breakthroughs--and both stories were emphatically denied by both the White House and by North Vietnamese officials. Much of the speculation seemed inspired by the fact that Major General Alexander M. Haig Jr., deputy to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, had conferred with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon. TIME White House Correspondent Jerrold Schecter assesses the situation:

There are various indicators that the North Vietnamese are preparing for a political and military end to the war. U.S. intelligence experts report that captured North Vietnamese documents in the South indicate that cadres are being advised of the possibility of a ceasefire. But more immediately, cadres are being exhorted to a military effort before the U.S. election.

The President's May 8 proposal called for an end to "all acts of force throughout Indochina" after all American prisoners of war are released and "once the internationally supervised cease-fire has begun." That is the military part of the problem. Once these conditions have been met, the President has said, it would "permit the United States to withdraw with honor." These terms also, he explained, "would allow negotiations on a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves."

There seems little doubt that these principles have now been accepted in the Paris talks and that in this sense there is a broad area of agreement. But the difficult determination of terms and timing remains negotiable and unresolved. Thus there is an important distinction to be made between agreement in principle to end the war and the final timetable. U.S. intelligence officers as well as Vietnamese exile sources in Washington, D.C., say that though they do not expect a cease-fire before the election, they do foresee a positioning by both Washington and Hanoi that will lead to a cease-fire and political negotiations between North and South Viet Nam early next year. Nevertheless, all of the diplomatic activity makes a dramatic development at any moment a continuing possibility.

President Nixon's remarks at his press conference last week, if studied closely, indicate the willingness of the U.S. to follow the May 8 formula if an agreement on certain adequate guarantees can be reached. Said Nixon: "The settlement will come just as soon as we can possibly get a settlement which is right, right for the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese and for us, one that will have in mind our goals of preventing the imposition by force of a Communist government in South Viet Nam and, of course, a goal that is particularly close to our hearts, in a humanitarian sense, the return of our prisoners of war." Then the President added that "under no circumstances" would the timing of a possible settlement or related measures "be affected by the fact that there is going to be an election Nov. 7." Nixon's remarks must be read not so much as an appeal to American voters as a signal to the North Vietnamese that the guarantees that neither side will dominate South Viet Nam's political life are not yet satisfactory. Moreover, however welcome a settlement would be before the election, Nixon feels that he does not need it to win. In fact, an election-eve settlement might well be criticized on the grounds that Nixon might have got the same deal sooner, but cynically timed it to his maximum electoral advantage.

Presently the bargaining appears to be concerned with the point at which

Thieu will resign, and indeed whether he will step down as part of the initial solution. All indications are that what is being fashioned will be a separation of the military and political solutions at a decent interval. This can mean a ceasefire, bombing halt and return of prisoners before a political settlement is made. But there will have to be some agreed-upon conditions and procedures for the sharing of political power through a government of national union or a national commission that will include the Communists. In his talks with President Thieu, General Haig is reported to have discussed the details of the Paris talks and gone over possibilities and names for a tripartite government that would include the present regime in some form, the Communists and a neutral faction.

Thieu's real power will remain only until the American presidential election. Were he, for example, to charge a betrayal or drag his feet as he did in 1968, not only could he topple the negotiations but he could hurt Nixon at the polls. Thus the U.S. must continue to work for a political solution that, while including the North Vietnamese in power-sharing in the South, does not give them an edge. With Thieu in office the North Vietnamese believe they have little chance of sharing power. Even among South Vietnamese political leaders, the prevailing view is that Thieu must leave the scene before there can be a solution. Says one Administration official: "The positions have changed. But there is not an agreement; we have not got that last element."

The North Vietnamese could give more ground on the composition of the government and Thieu's tenure in the next round of talks. That remains entirely speculative. Nevertheless, the negotiations are reaching a new and critical stage of resolution.

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