The Candidates' World

ISSUES '72

The best case to be made for Richard Nixon's re-election can probably be found in his handling of foreign relations. George McGovern, on the other hand, has been accurately criticized for not articulating a clear foreign policy alternative of his own. Last week, speaking before the City Club of Cleveland, McGovern attempted to do just that. He rejected Republican charges that he is an isolationist and scored some telling points against Nixon's global policies; yet he left his own view of the world too fuzzy for the speech to make a major political impact. McGovern defenders argue that candidates are rarely expected to be specific about foreign affairs. But in addition to challenging an experienced incumbent, McGovern in the past has made much of his claim that he is specific on the big issues.

Nixon had watched the international monetary situation approach collapse for nearly a year before doing anything about it, McGovern charged, and when he did act it was to employ the "six-gun diplomacy of John Connally," thereby antagonizing U.S. allies. He had "insulted" Japan by not advising its leaders in advance of his trip to Peking and of the potential impact of his New Economic Policy. He had lost the good will of India by siding with Pakistan in their brief war, and he had waited five months to recognize "the infant, struggling nation of Bangladesh that has suffered so much for so long." Nixon had also "defied the conscience of mankind by giving up U.S. opposition to racism in Southern Africa," and he had "used the power of his office to bully and intimidate Latin American nations."

More generally, McGovern claimed that Nixon's policies were based on a scheme of balancing world power among five giants: the U.S., Russia, China, Europe and Japan. But that, he contended, is "a naive, pre-nuclear view" of the world--"an old world of kings and princes and empires that we will never see again." A balance among the giants cannot remove the causes of war among other nations, he pointed out, "nor can it dispel the demand of some 140 countries to have a say in the issues which determine their survival. Our preoccupation with a military balance leaves untouched the deadly imbalances among population, resources and wealth--and they too endanger our lives."

McGovern contended that Nixon was following a policy of "unconscious isolationism"; he had allowed the U.S. to become isolated from its allies and trading partners, isolated from the world's developing nations, and isolated "from reality by the insistence that tough talk and big Pentagon budgets are somehow synonymous with national manhood." McGovern called instead for "a new internationalism," which would de-emphasize military solutions and big-power politics. It would instead accent multilateral cooperation, especially in helping small nations overcome hunger and poverty.

McGovern seemed most convincing in the generally appealing tone of his statement and in his criticism of Nixon's tone; it is true that Administration policy has too often been articulated in macho terms of preserving an undefined and rather flexible national honor by always being first in nearly everything. It is also true that the U.S. has acted abruptly and sometimes abrasively in shifting its monetary, trade and foreign alignments. As for the Nixon balance-of-power concept, it has sometimes been explained by the President in overly simplistic terms; but its application by Henry Kissinger has been anything but naive, and it is hard to see just what kind of practical framework McGovern is suggesting to replace it.

When McGovern discussed some of the specific actions he would take in foreign affairs, the contrast with Nixon policies was not great. He would more speedily grant China diplomatic recognition, although the difference between this and what Nixon has done is of consequence mainly to Taiwan. Even as he urged closer cooperation with Japan, he had to note that Nixon had conferred, however belatedly, with Japan's new Premier Kakuei Tanaka. In calling for greater nuclear-arms reductions, he brushed off the fact that Nixon has been vigorously pursuing just that in the SALT talks with the Russians but legitimately criticized him for seeking more money for arms at the same time. McGovern could only applaud Nixon's trips to Moscow and Peking and imply that he would build on that base. He sounded every bit as dedicated to the preservation of Israel and opposition to Arab terrorism as Nixon has, leaving little variation there. The most significant differences between the two candidates apparently rest on their continuing arguments over the necessary level of military forces and over U.S. policy in Viet Nam. Those differences have not changed during the campaign.

McGovern insists, as he has all along, that his call for a $32 billion cut in the defense budget over three years would still leave the U.S. the world's strongest military power and would not endanger national security. He contends that the present force is wastefully large. The Nixon Administration argues that cuts of the size McGovern advocates would reduce U.S. military strength to the point where the nation could not back up its worldwide commitments. Nor is the Administration alone in such criticism. A current Nixon television commercial shows miniature fighter squadrons, naval vessels and toy soldiers, and then a hand dramatically sweeping away the forces that McGovern would eliminate. The announcer then quotes from Hubert Humphrey's primary campaign attacks on McGovern, protesting that this "isn't just cutting into the fat, it isn't just cutting into manpower; it's cutting into the very security of this country." McGovern aides validly objected to some of the statistics in the commercials, although one of his defense analysts, Bob

Sherman, argues that "the deception in the ads lies not in the numbers they use but in the implication."

The argument is of great importance. Certainly McGovern has been courageously specific in his alternate defense program, and the Nixon Administration has not been persuasive in its contention that he would leave the U.S. with an inadequate nuclear weapons arsenal. McGovern would end the policy of placing multiple warheads in the Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris submarine missiles, modernize the B-52 strategic bomber fleet rather than develop a new bomber, and rely heavily on submarine-borne nuclear missiles as the main deterrent against nuclear war.

McGovern is on riskier ground in the sharp reductions he would seek in conventional forces, including a large unilateral reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Europe. While his claim that aircraft carriers are too vulnerable in all-out war to be worth their huge costs is perhaps plausible, he probably underestimates their usefulness in a lesser crisis. His intention to keep only three carriers at sea sounds dangerous, although the Nixon Administration normally deploys only five carriers at a time, while keeping more in reserve than McGovern recommends. In general, McGovern would seem to provide less U.S. flexibility in meeting military contingencies without resort to nuclear weapons.

Clearly, it is on Viet Nam that McGovern still hopes many voters will base their choice. Asked after his speech whether Nixon's record in world affairs was not excellent except for Viet Nam, McGovern denied that it was, but added that even if it were true, "To say that we are doing fairly well in foreign policy except for Viet Nam is very much like a man saying 'I feel pretty well except for the cancer in my lungs.' "

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