The Israelis' Secret Peace Initiative

ISRAEL last week was on the diplomatic offensive for the first time since the Soviet military advisers were expelled from Egypt two months ago. That sudden and historic expulsion left Israel militarily supreme in the Middle East, and therefore able to risk making a generous peace offer. At the same time, Israel could no longer cite security as a reason for hanging on to the territory taken from the Arabs during the 1967 Six-Day War; it thus faced the possibility of international pressure to return the land to its rightful owners. Israel cautiously waited before making its move, but it has now responded on both counts. It has made a secret offer to Cairo that includes, for the first time, a map detailing what Israel sees as a near-final border between the two countries.

Though the State Department disclaimed knowledge of any new proposal, the plan was quietly transmitted to Cairo by American intermediaries two weeks ago, accompanied by an Israeli suggestion that secret negotiations should begin immediately between the two countries. As of last week, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat had not responded to the message, which could mean that Cairo was seriously considering the offer.

Israel's proposal provides for withdrawal from large areas of Egypt--more in fact than the Israelis have ever before indicated they might be willing to give up. It would hand back to Egypt more than two-thirds of the Sinai peninsula (see map), restoring the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian armistice line along much of the northern border. Israel would keep the Gaza Strip and a large share of the mountainous southern Sinai, in a triangle bordering the Gulf of Aqaba from Elath to Sharm el Sheikh. At least as the Israelis envisioned it, the Egyptian portion of the Sinai would be demilitarized. As of last week, the Israelis had not decided what legal status they should seek for the Sinai territory they expect to retain--whether it should be annexed or occupied, or even leased from Egypt.

Extra Prize. Israeli strategists had endorsed the plan on the grounds that such a settlement would give their country ample security. The southern Sinai would in effect be turned into an Israeli military bastion; the strategic military installations built there since 1967 would be left intact. From their southern stronghold, the Israelis could maintain a defensive radar watch over the area returned to the Egyptians, including the Suez Canal. The Israelis would also be left in full control of the Sinai's

Red Sea coast, thereby ensuring the safety of their southern sea lane. Moreover, the plan would secure to the Israelis a prize not at all connected with security: the oilfields at Ras Abu Rudeis.

As the Israelis see it, their proposal offers the Egyptians several concrete concessions. It would allow the Suez Canal to be reopened and leave the Egyptians free to develop the northern shore of the Sinai as far as Rafah, a region the Israelis have been eying for new resort communities. The exact eastern border would be subject to negotiation. As one Israeli Cabinet minister put it: "They have something solid here with which to convince both their people and the rest of the Arab world that they have done an honorable deal."

The offer to Cairo was coupled with another approach to Jordan's King Hussein. For the second time this year, Israel's Deputy Premier Yigal Allon met with Hussein in the Elath-Aqaba area to discuss Allon's five-year-old plan for a West Bank settlement. Essentially, the Allon plan provides for the return of the populous Arab communities of the West Bank to Jordan, while ensuring Israel's security by means of a series of armed settlements along the Jordan River on territory that would be retained by Israel; eleven settlements have already been built, five of which are armed. The latest version of the Allon plan incorporates some proposals advanced by Hussein himself in previous discussions with Israeli leaders, including Premier Golda Meir, whom he met last March.

With Israel keeping its strongholds on the River Jordan, the West Bank region would be demilitarized and returned to Jordanian civil administration. To make Israel's highways between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv more secure, the frontier would be moved back in the vicinity of Latrun. The plan does not offer a compromise on the most serious issue that divides Israel and Jordan, the future status of Jerusalem, because the two sides remain hopelessly deadlocked on the question. Syria's Golan Heights would simply be retained by Israel, which has already built 17 settlements there.

Israel's inner Cabinet wrestled with the proposal throughout August. Halfway through the month, the government decided to ask a committee of top military and security officials to make a survey of the occupied territories--principally the Sinai--and report in detail on the maximum concessions that Israel could afford to make without compromising the security of its frontiers. The proposal was the result, but it was made without the endorsement of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

Even before the Cabinet's peace plan was transmitted to Cairo, Dayan began pushing a rival plan of his own--one that would retain considerably more territory for Israel. Dayan would maintain Israel's rule over the West Bank. In the Sinai, his proposed dividing line would run from El Arish in the north to Sharm el Sheikh. In recent weeks, Dayan's ministry has drawn up a plan for a new port community of 250,000 just north of El Arish. When questioned about this scheme at a Cabinet meeting last week, Dayan replied that it was not "operational," and that he himself had reached no conclusion about it. Premier Golda Meir--making no secret of the current tension between herself and Dayan--told the Cabinet that she had first heard of the Defense Minister's idea from the newspapers.

Eventual Contest. Dayan obviously stood to gain in political popularity as the minister who wanted to retain more of the occupied territories than his colleagues did. That popularity might help him in any eventual contest for the leadership, but it comes at the cost of isolating Dayan from his senior colleagues in the Cabinet. Evidently troubled by the thought, Dayan told Foreign Minister Abba Eban--a rival for the leadership--that he would be "ready to serve" in any government Eban might form.

By making their offer (and even drawing a map, which they had always insisted they would do only after face-to-face negotiations), the Israelis had neatly put the onus of response back on Sadat. The offer was far from meeting his stated demand that Egypt must regain sovereignty over all of its territory before a peace agreement can be concluded, and it was questionable whether Sadat could even negotiate on the basis of Israel's proposal and survive in power. But by making the proposal, the Israeli government had probably gone about as far as it could without seriously eroding its own domestic support. And for the moment it had also helped to deflect international criticism over its determined grip on the occupied territories.

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