The Two-Tier Plan

One of the better-kept secrets in Washington has been what was said during Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger's recent meetings in Paris with North Viet Nam's chief negotiators, Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy. But one Administration official remarked last week that Hanoi has begun to conduct "a sort of flirtation." That is, the North Vietnamese have indicated just enough interest in a cease-fire and compromise settlement to put Administration policymakers to the task of finding a broader set of proposals that would give Hanoi "an option on the future through a process of political evolution."

A translation of that line goes roughly like this: The North Vietnamese reject President Nixon's proposal for a military settlement, involving a cease-fire in place and a unilateral U.S. withdrawal in return for the release of American prisoners of war, because that would not settle the central question--control of South Viet Nam following a ceasefire. Hanoi wants Washington to get rid of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu as a condition for a settlement. Washington in turn is seeking a formula that would permit the U.S. to withdraw militarily while leaving the political settlement to Saigon and Hanoi. In other words, the U.S. would be willing to leave things so that Hanoi has a fair chance of getting rid of Thieu by itself--without, however, the U.S.'s doing the North's dirty work.

Thieu-Teared. One of the latest approaches is a U.S. proposal for a "two-tier" government for South Viet Nam. One Saigon government would control the non-Communist portion of the South and another would run the Communist-held parts--perhaps including all or most of Quang Tri and Binh Dinh provinces and a slice of Military Region II along the Laotian border.

Such a plan would presumably cover only a transitional period during which the two governments would negotiate with each other as equals --though the Communist group would in fact be Hanoi's representatives. The plan neatly circumvents Hanoi's refusal to talk directly with Saigon. It also meets Washington's demand that a coalition government must not be forced upon Saigon. U.S. military aid to Saigon would probably be strictly limited to defensive weapons. Since the plan would almost certainly result in the resignation of Thieu, it has been described by one Washington wag as being 'in reality a Thieu teared plan."

Thieu is well aware that such proposals could lead to his eventual sacrifice. Evidently girding himself for political battles to come, he acquired emergency powers last June, and last week decreed a set of harsh new restrictions on the freedom of the South Vietnamese press. Saigon's 27 dailies must henceforth deposit $50,000 as security against libel suits or government fines. The effect is that about half of them--and most of the opposition newspapers--will be forced to close.

Hanoi is certainly considering a ceasefire, as captured documents attest. They outline a plan for isolating Saigon and seizing power from a coalition government. Yet despite the fact that they stand to gain from a ceasefire, the North Vietnamese have given no indication of immediate interest.

Why? One theory holds that the North Vietnamese are waiting until they can better judge the prospects of Senator George McGovern's candidacy. If by mid-fall Nixon seems assured of reelection, the North Vietnamese might begin to bargain. But if McGovern seems strong, they might prefer to hold out until he reaches the White House. Or perhaps they still believe that, with time on their side, they need make no compromise with their long-term objectives. In any case, U.S. officials see little chance of real progress in Paris before late September or early October.

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