Searching for New Roles

THERE was a striking lack of official comment from Washington and Moscow last week on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's sudden decision to evict his army of Soviet advisers. In fact, it was almost as if this strange turn in Middle Eastern affairs had not taken place at all. There was, of course, a good reason why the two big powers were maintaining a low profile: neither seemed to have a clear idea of what could, or should, happen next. The two superpowers seemed equally nonplussed by the diplomatic setback that a client state had handed one of them and by the potential political realignments that Sadat's desperate maneuvering had suddenly made possible.

Matters were not much clarified by Sadat, although he was hardly standing mute. Last week, behind a motorcycle escort, the Egyptian President zipped across Cairo in his Mercedes-Benz 600 to Cairo University's domed Nasser Hall; there he addressed 1,750 delegates to an Arab Socialist Union Congress assembled to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Nasser's revolution. In a remarkable wide-ranging speech that lasted four hours (see next page), Sadat alluded to the expulsion of the Russians only in meager and unrevealing phrases. Much of his address was taken up with angry denunciations of Israel and of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Sadat concluded with the statement that Egypt was willing to go to war alone if necessary to recover its lost territories.

Two days after Sadat's marathon spasm of rhetoric, Israeli Premier Golda Meir delivered a comparatively brief (44-minute) statement to the Knesset. Mrs. Meir's speech was carrot after stick. "Boldness and political responsibility have been rewarded," she began. "Thanks to this policy, Israel is stronger today in every respect." But she ended with a low-key leader-to-leader appeal to Sadat: "Let us meet as equals and make a joint supreme effort to arrive at an agreed solution. We have not declared permanent borders, we have not drawn up an ultimative map, we have not demanded prior commitments on matters which must be clarified by means of negotiations."

Deliberately, no timetable was set for such a meeting. "She didn't say 'Come to Cyprus next Monday,' " an Israeli diplomat explained later. "She was putting forward a concept, an idea." But the concept--direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt--has become a familiar one since the Six Day War, and Cairo quickly dismissed it. In a second, shorter speech in Alexandria last week Sadat asked: "Can anyone negotiate while his land is occupied? Did the U.S. negotiate with Japan after Pearl Harbor?" That left the principal Middle East adversaries--Egypt, Israel, Russia and the U.S.--all casting about to redefine their roles.

Egypt's position is the most complex. Indications are that the Russian exodus is much larger than Western watchers had first anticipated. It now seems likely that up to 90% of the 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet men (and women, in communications units) stationed in Egypt may leave. The first departures were not without rancor. At least one fight between Soviet and Egyptian soldiers was reported; newsmen attempting to take pictures of the exiting Russians had their cameras smashed.

Defensive Force. Although the decision to oust the Soviet advisers was urged upon Sadat by Egyptian army leaders--notably Lieut. General Mohammed Ahmed Sadek, the country's War Minister--the Russian departure is bound to weaken Egypt militarily. The Russians will leave behind vast quantities of materiel but they will certainly take home their most advanced offensive weapons--notably MIG-23 and Sukhoi-11 fighters and SA4 and SA-6 missiles. The Egyptian armed forces are almost totally Soviet-equipped, and must rely on Moscow for replacements and spare parts; every year, for instance, some 900 tank engines must be replaced with built-in-Russia engines. Moreover, the Egyptian army is basically a defensive force and, as even Sadat admitted last week in his Cairo speech, is inferior to Israel's potent military machine (see map). The Egyptians, for example, have more fighter planes than the Israelis, but many of their aircraft are obsolescent and they have fewer and less-experienced pilots. The Israelis also have a vast array of battle-tested U.S. electronic countermeasure gear that can pierce the Soviet-constructed necklace of ground-to-air missiles behind the West Bank of the Suez Canal.

In its few scattered comments on the ouster of the advisers, the Soviet press has referred to the matter as a routine phase-out of men whose job was finished. "Their homecoming by no means affects the foundation of our friendship," Pravda said last week. It may, in fact, prove to be more like the end of an era, but not of Russian interest and presence in the Middle East.

Moscow clearly wants to retain as much of its strategic role in Egypt as it can. As long as the Soviets cooperate by removing their men, the Egyptian government is prepared to negotiate concessions as part of what one official last week called "the coming stage in Soviet-Egyptian relations." The Russians will undoubtedly seek to continue using the big naval base at Alexandria and port facilities elsewhere along the coast for their Mediterranean fleet.

But there is no way for the Kremlin to disguise the fact that the "pause," as it is now referred to in Cairo, represents a major loss of diplomatic face. Or hide the equally significant fact that Moscow has major political differences with its erstwhile client. Although few experts think that Egypt is likely to renew the war, Sadat has not abandoned his threat to fight Israel.

The Soviet Union, judging from a recently reported dialogue between Soviet ideologists and members of the Syrian Communist Party, opposes such a move. Moscow's position, the Syrians were told, is that Egypt and Syria together are still not strong enough to defeat Israel. The Soviet Union in any case opposes Arab calls for the destruction of Israel.

The Russian departure removes a screen that has restrained the opposing sides along the canal--but it also rules out the possibility, long feared by the Israelis, of a direct encounter with the Soviets in any outbreak of combat. Clearly, the Israelis now have an upper hand in the "no war, no peace" status quo. They believe that in spite of Sadat's latest moves, they will be able to continue working out "arrangements" with neighboring Arab lands--although not a negotiated peace settlement. The most promising source of such arrangements is Jordan, whose King Hussein infuriated his Arab colleagues this year by outlining plans, predicated on a peace settlement with Israel, for an autonomous West Bank. Without any fanfare, Israel and Jordan have established a successful open-bridge policy across the Jordan River; no fewer than 150,000 Arab visitors will cross the Allenby Bridge this summer. Non-Arab tourists, including Jews, from Europe can save money by landing in Amman on charter flights--which El Al disdains to fly --and then crossing over into Israel.

Israel's main worry is what the reduced Russian presence in Egypt will do to its cozy relationship with the U.S. The departure of the advisers clearly weakens the argument that the U.S. must continually resupply the Israelis with ever more modern arms in order to maintain, in President Nixon's words, "the military balance in the Middle East." Another fear is that the U.S. might try to take diplomatic advantage of the near vacuum created by the Cairo-Moscow split and force the Israelis to make concessions to achieve peace. Israel's worries about the status of its relationship with Washington have not been soothed by a recent series of moves involving the U.S. and the Arab states. Yemen and Sudan have both restored diplomatic relations with Washington; Algeria may soon follow. Understandably, Mrs. Meir was quite effusive last week in speaking to the Knesset about the special quality of American-Israeli relations. "I have confidence," she said, "in the feelings of friendship of the American people--regardless of party affiliation--for the state of Israel."

These days at least, those feelings are strongly reciprocated by the Nixon Administration. The President has made little secret of his feeling that the Jewish vote will be important in the elections this fall. Last week he observed the inauguration of Israel's first telecommunication-satellite ground station by making a telephone call to Mrs. Meir from the White House. "You can be sure," he told her, "that we will continue to work together for what you are interested in, and what we are interested in, and that is a just peace in the Middle East which will protect the integrity of Israel." What that seemed to mean is that the U.S. is unlikely to take any new diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East before November--even though Sadat appeared to have given Washington a historic opportunity to try to nudge the Arabs and the Israelis toward a settlement.

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